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Regulatory Givings and the Anticommons
REZA DLBADJ*
The concepts of "takings" and the "tragedy of the commons" are familiar to
those versed in the legal and economic literature. Only recently has scholarship
begun to emerge around their less studied counterparts, "givings" and
"anticommons." For the first time, this Article attempts to develop and bring
together these two emerging areas of legal scholarship using the tools of law and
economics.
The focus is to explore how these new concepts, taken together, can create a
mechanism with which to explore developments in administrative law. The
Article first builds a theoretical argument as to how regulatory largesse can
subtly create a right for a small number of entities to exclude others, thereby
squelching business competition and social diversity. A variety of examples from
telecommunications law, local government law, natural resources law, and
intellectual property law adds empirical weight to the argument.
Next, the root causes of this phenomenon are explored Public choice theory and
the "public interest" rhetoric, while providing valuable insights, cannot offer a
satisfactory explanation. Ideas from transaction cost economics and behavioral
economics also shed light on why conventional solutions to the dilemma-
grouped around the polarities of "privatization" and "public commons"
creation-are inadequate.
The Article concludes by offering an approach with which to reform
administrative law. Central to change are reconceptualizations of the "public
trust" doctrine, "property" versus "liability" rules, and the publicprivate
distinction.
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REGULATORY GIVINGS AND THE ANTICOMMONS
I. INTRODUCTION
Virtually every area of administrative law must enable action about how we
put our collective resources to use and how we organize ourselves as a society.
All too often, however, these decisions have served to abuse resources, squelch
competition, and prevent social diversity.
A few examples should capture the gist of what is unfolding. In natural
resources law, our magnificent old growth forests are being "ground into pulp to
make disposable diapers and cellophane for cigarette packs."' In
telecommunications law, broadcasting interests have "stolen the free use of great
chunks of the most valuable natural resource of the information age: the digital
television spectrum owned by the American people."2 In local government law,
gated communities:
[H]ave taken the unusual step of returning to the medieval method of building
walls and denying entrance to all but their residents, employees, and visitors.
Access... is gained only after a variety of security checks-passing uniformed
guards and closed circuit television monitors, displaying an automobile sticker,
and showing an identification card. 3
A stark question emerges: why are these resources squandered and divisive
walls built? Despite the urgency of the question, it has received no systematic
exploration in the literature. This Article seeks to begin filling that void, and in the
process, challenge some commonly held notions about how law is developed and
implemented. To do this, it delves into uncharted legal waters, using the emerging
tools of law and economics.
Part 1I of the Article sets the conceptual background. The ideas of "takings"
and "tragedy of the commons" are familiar to those versed in the legal and
economic literature. However, only recently has scholarship begun to emerge
around their less studied counterparts, "givings" and "anticommons." In order to
understand how regulatory givings can create an anticommons, both "givings"
and "anticommons" need to be developed.
Part 1IH explores how these concepts, taken together, can create a mechanism
with which to explore a number of particularly disturbing developments in
administrative law. It first builds a theoretical argument as to how regulatory
largesse can subtly create a right for a small number of entities (be they natural
persons or corporations) to exclude others, thereby squelching business
I Perri Knize, The Mismanagement of the National Forests, THE ATLANTIC MONTHLY,
Oct. 1991, at 98, 100.
2 William Safire, Spectrum Squatters, N.Y. TIMEs, Oct. 9, 2000, at A21.
3 KENNEIm T. JACKSON, CRABGRASS FRONTIER: THE SUBURBINAZATION OF THE UNITED
STATES 301 (1985).
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competition and social diversity. Next, a variety of examples from
telecommunications law, intellectual property law, natural resources law, and
local government law, adds empirical weight to the argument.
Part IV delves into the root causes to ask: why do we allow regulatory
givings to create an anticommons? Public choice theory and the "public interest"
rhetoric-while providing valuable insights into what can go wrong--do not
offer a complete solution to the dilemma. Part V displays the conventional
response to regulatory problems as belonging to one of two polarities. On the one
hand, some espouse privatization of resources and decision-making; others frame
their insights around notions of a shared public "commons." Unfortunately,
neither notion withstands critical inquiry.
The privatization argument, built around the notion that private actors should
be free to bargain among themselves, simply misunderstands economic reality.
Notably, it does not pay adequate attention to transaction and enforcement costs,
behavioral biases, or even equitable distribution of resources. The commons
argument, while intellectually elegant and seductive, is presently unworkable
given the realities of technology and human behavior.
Finally, Part VI attempts to propose some provocative solutions. While
public and judicial oversight are necessary, the key lies in reconceptualizing the
anticommons problem as one that is central to administrative law. A panoply of
tools can be reconceived and pressed into service-including redefinitions of the
"public trust" doctrine, the impact of "property" versus "liability" rules, and the
public/private distinction. Each can contribute to preventing unjustified regulatory
givings.
A few caveats are in order before beginning. The first is that the Article
necessarily delves into new legal waters and is therefore merely a start. While
both descriptive and normative in its ambition, it cannot possibly offer a
definitive, or even complete, exposition of its complex themes. It is designed as
much to highlight the most promising areas for future research. The second, and
most important, is to emphasize upfront the piece's bias; namely, that competitive
markets and a diverse society are positive goods. If the reader is sympathetic to
these notions, then the Article can serve as a roadmap as to how to improve our
lot. If, on the other hand, the reader does not find this point of view palatable,4
then she can at least take comfort that she is in clever company: the Article must
necessarily explore the sophisticated arguments used to subvert competition and
social diversity.
4 For example, by contending that markets should consist of incumbents in monopoly
positions, or that housing segregation is rational.
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I. CONCEPTUAL UNDERPINNINGS
A. Takings and Givings
The takings jurisprudence, based on the Takings Clause of the Fifth
Amendment to the United States Constitution,5 essentially grapples with the
question of when government must provide compensation for "taking" property
from a private party. Since physical incursions on property are considered
"takings" under modem jurisprudence,6 the current debate revolves around which
regulatory changes constitute "takings."7 The takings literature is robust and
familiar. 8
In marked contrast, "givings" are understudied. Though not labeled as such,
perhaps the first exploration was in Charles Reich's classic law review article,
The New Property.9 Reich is primarily focused on how legal mechanisms such as
due process can help transform government largesse into rights for the
individual. 10 In passing, he does, however, broach the subject of how government
can bestow rights on businesses:
A franchise... is a partial monopoly created and handed out by government. Its
value depends largely on governmental power; by limiting the number of
franchises, government can make them extremely remunerative.... A television
channel, handed out free, can often be sold for many millions. Government
distributes wealth when it dispenses route permits to truckers, charters to bus
lines, routes to air carriers, certificates to oil and gas pipelines, licenses to liquor
stores, allotments to growers of cotton or wheat, and concessions in national
parks.'
Despite Reich's insight, the subject of "givings" remained dormant for nearly
thirty years. Thankfully, Abraham Bell and Gideon Parchomovsky, noting that
"givings play at least as prominent a role in public life as takings and, quite likely,
5 "[N]or shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation." U.S.
CONST. amend. V.
6 See, e.g., Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982).
7 See, e.g., Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992). Note that the idea of a
regulatory taking is not new and dates back to Justice Holmes' opinion in Pennsylvania Coal
Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922). See also Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438
U.S. 104 (1978).
8 For an overview of the takings literature, see Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky,
Givings, 111 YALE L.J. 547, 558-62 (2001).
9 Charles A. Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733 (1964).
10 See id. at 785 ("The proposals discussed above, however salutary, are by themselves far
from adequate to assure the status of individual man with respect to largess.").
I/d. at 735. The broadcasting issue will be dealt with in depth, 6fra Part Ill.B.1.
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an even greater role,"'12 began rectifying the "near complete absence of givings
scholarship."' 3 Their article, primarily concerned with exploring the duality of
takings and givings and a taxonomy of givings, very broadly defines givings as
"government distribution of property."' 14 More specifically, they conclude that a
regulatory giving "occurs when a government enhancement of property value by
means of regulation goes 'too far.' "15 Building on this definition, for our
purposes, a regulatory giving occurs when by means of regulation 16 the
government bestows a disproportionate benefit on a class of private actors. 17
There are two features of a regulatory giving that make it pernicious. The first
is that it is subtle in that it does not directly bestow property, thereby making it
often difficult to identify and monitor. 18 The second is that unlike a taking-
which is vivid in government's seizing of property-a giving appears more
benign on the surface. After all, one might argue, government is actually working
to help, not hurt someone. The reality, however, is quite different. As Bell and
Parchomovsky observe, "[i]n a giving, a small group is able to force the public as
a whole to subsidize the group's preferential treatment." 19 Charles Reich
presciently sounded off the alarm bell when he noted that "the apparatus of
governmental power may be utilized by private interests in their conflicts with
other interests, and thus the tools of government power become private rather
than public instrumentalities." 20
It is precisely on this danger that this Article focuses. More specifically, that
regulatory givings have the potential of creating an anticommons. But the concept
12 Bell & Parchomovsky, supra note 8, at 574.
13 Id. Note that while there are other references in the literature, none deal squarely with
the issue of givings. See id. at 549 n.3.
14Id. at 549.
15 Id. at 563. The other two categories in their taxonomy of givings are a physical giving
where "the government bestows a property interest upon a private actor" and a derivative giving
when "as a result of government giving or taking, surrounding property increases in value even
though no direct giving has occurred." Id.
16 This most obviously occurs when an administrative agency acts, though it could occur
if Congress is acting directly in a regulatory capacity or indirectly via an enabling statute.
17 Note that this tracks Bell and Parchomovsky's definition closely. The critical concept is
that a regulatory giving, unlike a physical giving, does not involve bestowal of a simple
property interest. Paradoxically, it is this feature that can make a regulatory giving so
dangerous. See infra Part 1H.
18 See infra Part ll.B.
19 Bell & Parchomovsky, supra note 8, at 554; see also id. at 564 ("Overlooking givings
may cause a massive misallocation of resources, impose an enormous cost on the public, and
create opportunities and incentives for political mischief.").
20 Reich, supra note 9, at 764. For a discussion of the manipulability of the public/private
distinction, see infra Part VI.C.2.
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of an anticommons, another ignored area in the literature, needs to be explored in
its own right.,
B. Commons and Anticommons
The "tragedy of the commons," like takings, is familiar. Garrett Hardin
popularized the concept by opining that communal use of resources is doomed to
failure, since each individual will have an incentive to freeload and use up
incrementally more of the resource, until resources are overextended.21 Bizarrely
enough, this portion of Hardin's essay has been embraced as gospel, even though
Hardin offers scant evidence to back up his point.22 In fact, there is significant
empirical evidence that a regulated commons can function effectively. 23
Harold Demsetz has offered a more satisfying critique of the commons by
focusing on the concept of externality. 24 Beginning with the notion that property
rights serve as a mechanism to internalize costs, 25 Demsetz theorizes that a
commons:
[Flails to concentrate the cost associated with any person's exercise of his
communal right on that person. If a person seeks to maximize the value of his
communal rights, he will tend to overhunt and overwork the land because some
of the costs of his doing so are borne by others.26
On the other hand, the notion of anticommons, like that of givings, is unfamiliar.
Given the importance of the anticommons to the remainder of the argument, and
the fact that it is a counterintuitive creature, it is worthwhile to develop the
concept in some detail.
21 See Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 Sci. 1243, 1244-45 (1968).
Hardin goes on to note that "the commons, if justifiable at all, is justifiable only under
conditions of low-population density." Id. at 1248.
22 Indeed, he is perhaps using this concept as a rhetorical tool to further the disturbing
argument that consumes the bulk of his essay-namely, that of restricting the freedom of
individuals to breed. See id. at 1248 ("No technical solution can rescue us from the misery of
overpopulation. Freedom to breed will bring ruin to all."). Hardin goes so far as to "deny the
validity of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights" and even suggests that individuals
should be coerced into not breeding. See id. at 1246-47.
23 See infra notes 302--06.
24 See Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 57 AM. ECON. REv. 347,
355 (1967).
25 See id. at 350.
26 Id. at 354. He also observes that a commons overweighs the needs of the current
generation, while underweighing those of future generations. See id. at 355.
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Strangely enough, anticommons can be traced backed to a theoretical article
by Wesley Hohfeld.27 Hohfeld tries to frame his analysis of property in terms of
what he terms "jural correlatives." 28 More specifically, right is defined as a
correlative of duty: "if X has a right against Y that he shall stay off the former's
land, the correlative (and equivalent) is that Y is under a duty toward X to stay off
the place."29 Similarly, privilege was defined as a correlative of no right:
[Whereas X has a right or claim that Y, the other man, should stay off the land,
he himself has the privilege of entering on the land; or, in equivalent words, X
does not have a duty to stay off.... [Thus] the correlative of X's privilege of
entering himself is manifestly Y's "no-right" that X shall not enter.30
The latter set of correlatives are analogous to a commons; namely, I have the
privilege of walking on the sidewalk, and you have no right to tell me not to. The
former, on the other hand, create an anticommons; namely, if you have a right to
prevent me from hiking in the national forest, then I have a duty to stay off it.
Note that you do not necessarily need to have a property interest in the forest; you
merely need to have some right to exclude me.
In their critique of the presumptive efficiency of private property, Duncan
Kennedy and Frank Michelman further developed the concept. They defined a
state of nature (SON) where "every person is free to do or take whatever she can
with whatever strength and cunning she has."3 1 At the other extreme, exists a
world owned in common (WOC) where "no one can do or use
anything... without the consent of everyone else."32 SON is thus an order where
each person holds privileges; WOC, where each person holds rights.3 3 Though
they did not label them as such, SON is effectively a commons; WOC, an
anticommons. In a later article, Michelman further noted that authorization
required under WOC could vary from "near-simultaneous unanimous
consent... [to] expressions of consent from any two persons occurring within the
same twelve-month time span."34
27 Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in
Judicial Reasoning, 23 YALE L.J. 16 (1913).
28 Id. at 30.
29 Id. at 32 (emphasis added). Hohfeld points out that "claim" would be a good synonym
for "right" in this context. See id.
30 Id. at 32-33.
31 Duncan Kennedy & Frank Michelman, Are Property and Contract Efficient?, 8
HOFSTRA L. REv. 711,750 (1980).
321Id.
33 See id. at 754.
34 Frank 1. Michelman, Ethics, Economics, and the Law of Property, in EThics,
ECONOMICS, AND THE LAw 6 (J. Roland Pennock & John W. Chapman eds., 1982). Note that in
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Very little was done to further these insights for nearly the next thirty years.35
This hiatus changed with Michael Heller's insightful analysis of how
anticommons have created underutilized resources in post-communist Russia. 36
Heller defines anticommons as a "property regime in which multiple owners hold
effective rights of exclusion in a scarce resource." 37 More importantly, Heller
observes that to create an anticommons one does not need to give away the
traditional "bundle of rights" commonly associated with property.38 Rather, an
anticommons emerges when different owners hold different rights within the
bundle, "with no hierarchy among these owners' rights or clear rules for conflict
resolution." 39 In other words, the precise definition of rights can be somewhat
fuzzy. 4
0
this article, Michelman renames WOC as REG, or regulatory regime. See id. Presumably, this
was done to avoid the confusing use of the term "common" in WOC, even though WOC is
really an anticommons.
35 Much like the prolonged vacuum in givings scholarship. See supra Part II.A.
36 See Michael A. Heller, The Tragedy of the Anticommons: Property in the Transition
from Marx to Markets, 111 HARv. L. REv. 621 (1998).
37 Id. at 668 (emphasis omitted).
38 See id. at 670. For a classic exposition on what constitutes property, see A.M. Honor6,
Ownership, in OXFORD ESSAYS IN JURISPRUDENCE 107 (A.G. Guest ed., 1961). Honor6 first
provisionally defines property as the "greatest possible interest in a thing which a mature
system of law recognizes." Id. at 108. He then highlights eleven incidents of ownership, not all
of which necessarily need be present for someone to be called an "owner':
(1) The right to possess
(2) The right to use
(3) The right to manage
(4) The right to the income
(5) The right to the capital
(6) The right to security
(7) The incident of transmissibility
(8) The incident of absence of tenn
(9) The prohibition of harmful use
(10) Liability to execution
(11) Residuary character
See id. at 112-28 (listing and explaining the above subheadings).
39 Heller, supra note 36, at 670.
40 Heller goes on to note that such problems emerge when governments create new rights,
as they did after the fall of the Soviet Union. See id. at 679; see also Keith Aoki, Sovereignty
and the Globalization of Intellectual Property: Neocolonialism, Anticommons Property, and
Biopiracy in the (Not-So-Brave) New World Order of International Intellectual Property
Protection, 6 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 11, 35 (1998) ("[T]here is a point where too many
property rights owned by too many parties creates a legal 'smog,' that is, an anticommons.").
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I am primarily concerned with Heller's latter observation; in other words, I
define "anticommons" as a legal regime where the Hohfeldian right to exclude is
created without granting the "bundle of rights" that constitutes property. This, in
turn, creates underutilization of resources. Of course, the degree of
underutilization may be proportional to the number of people who hold exclusion
rights,41 but this is not my focus. The touchstone is thus exclusion creating
underutilization, not the number of people who hold rights to exclude-after all,
one person is enough to create a holdout.42
This definition is closer to Michelman's original exposition,43 and in line
with recent law and economics scholarship.44 Though perhaps less precise than
Heller's carefully crafted parameters, it is arguably of broader applicability. 45
41 See, e.g., James M. Buchanan & Yong J. Yoon, Symmetric Tragedies: Commons and
Anticommons, 43 J.L. & EcON. 1, 5 (2000) ("The wastage of value will be a function of the
number of decision-making units that are assigned rights to exclude users.").
42 The concept of holdout has been usefully linked to the anticommons. For example,
John Armour and Michael Whincop have noted that the majoritarian processes of bankruptcy
law are designed to circumvent anticommons problems. See John Armour & Michael J.
Whincop, Unincorporated Business Entities: An Economic Analysis of Shared Property in
Partnership and Close Corporations Law, 26 J. CORP. L. 983, 999 (2001) ("During the firm's
solvency, it makes sense for creditors to be able to exercise their rights unilaterally, but once
they become residual claimants this gives rise to severe hold-up or anticommons problems.").
43 Heller refines Michelman's model apparently because he interprets it as one in which
"no one is privileged to use objects and everyone has the right to exclude." Heller, supra note
36, at 667. But Michelman can be read more broadly to encompass a continuum of exclusion
mechanisms. See supra note 34.
44 For example, Buchanan and Yoon have created a model to show the mathematical
symmetry between the commons and the anticommons. See Buchanan & Yoon, supra note 41,
at 1. They consider anticommons a "useful metaphor for understanding how and why potential
economic value may disappear into the 'black hole' of resource underutilization, a wastage that
may be quantitatively comparable to the overutilization wastage employed in the conventional
commons logic." Id. at 2 (emphasis added).
45 Note that Heller has convincingly extended his anticommons definition to land co-
ownership and patents. See Hanoch Dagan & Michael A. Heller, The Liberal Commons, 110
YALE L.J. 549, 614 (2001) ("Absent partition, the veto power each commoner enjoys leads to a
tragedy of the anticommons, with wasteful underuse and eventual division, as suggested by the
black landownership saga."); Michael A. Heller & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Can Patents Deter
Innovation? The Anticommons in Biomedical Research, 280 Sci. 698, 698 (1998)
("[O]verlapping patent claims in the hands of different owners" block innovation.); see also
Maureen A. O'Rourke, Toward a Doctrine of Fair Use in Patent Law, 100 COLUM. L. REV.
1177, 1179 (2000) ("Essentially, the sheer number of patents creates an 'anticommons,' where
rights are held by so many different patentees that the costs for any one to accumulate all the
required licenses to enable production is prohibitive."). Heller has also looked at how placing
boundaries on property, such as land use controls, can deter the tragedy of the anticommons.
See Michael A. Heller, The Boundaries of Private Property, 108 YALE L.J. 1163 (1999).
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ER1. THE PROBLEM
A. Theory
Part H explored the regulatory givings and the anticommons in isolation. To
recap: regulatory givings occur when regulation is used to bestow benefits on a
class of private actors; 46 an anticommons is a regime where one or more parties
are given the right to exclude, which leads to underutilization of resources. 47
These conceptual strands now need to be brought together into an analytical
framework.
The central premise of this Article is that the benefit administrative law
bestows as a regulatory giving is frequently the ability to exclude, ironically often
under the guise of the "public interest."48 This anticommons, in turn, breeds both
economic and social exclusion. Economically, new entrants can be hindered,
thereby hurting competition and further entrenching incumbent monopolies.
Socially, diversity and integration can be devastated by creating walls that divide
''us" and "them."
Think, for instance, of spectrum licensing, copyright, timber rights, or zoning.
Large swathes of bandwidth are underutilized, intellectual innovation is stifled,
national forests are razed, and suburbs are segregated. 49 These illustrative
examples will be explored in detail below.50
46 See supra Part I.A.
47 See supra Part ll.B.
48 See infra Part IV.B.
49 In some sense, this is the mirror image of the problem Charles Reich discusses. His
emphasis is on how to transform government largesse into a right that enables individuals to
sustain themselves in society. In other words, how to harness this largesse to improve society.
See Reich, supra note 9. In contrast, the focus here is on how government largesse can work to
the detriment of the vast majority of society. Later in the Article, however, proposals are made
not only on how to stop detrimental givings, but how to turn government largesse into a positive
good.
50 There is a plethora of other examples. Indeed, the framework forces the question: where
has administrative law bestowed a right on a segment of society at the risk of disenfranchising
another, larger, segment? For instance, government helps private interests when it subsidizes
manufacturing plants, sports stadiums, or casinos. It is interesting to note, for instance, that
casinos and sports stadiums can be viewed as explicitly redistributing income from the poor to
the wealthy. See, e.g., Mark Puls, Casinos on River Are in Jeopardy, DETROrr NEWS, Dec. 24,
2000, at 1A; William Claiborne, Detroit Rolls the Dice, WASH. POST, Aug. 22, 1999, at A3;
Robyn Meredith, Chrysler Wins Incentives From Toledo, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 12, 1997, at D3.
One might even argue that interstate highways have served as a massive subsidy to an emerging
class of suburbanites and the automobile and transportation industries. In turn, this has led to an
"underutilization" of the inner city and public transportation. See, e.g., JACKSON, supra note 3,
at 293 ("While it was a national purpose to build subsidized highways and utilities outside of
2003] 1051
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B. Examples
1. Telecommunications: Spectrum Allocation
The issue of how the airwaves should be allocated among different uses is
complex, but analytically rich.51 The structure of airwave allocation has not
changed over the past seventy-years: it is essentially a "command-and-control"
system where the FCC decides who gets to use what block of frequency and for
what purpose. 52 Notorious is the FCC's free allocation of prime bandwidth to
broadcasters in exchange for fulfillment of "public interest" obligations.53 In fact,
the high market values of broadcasters are largely due to this giveaway: a fact
recognized nearly fifty years ago by Ronald Coase in his classic article on the
FCC,54 and more recently by Lawrence White.55 One estimate is that spectrum
cities, it was not national policy to help cities repair and rebuild aging transit systems, bridges,
streets, and water and sewer lines.").
51 See, e.g., Yochai Benkler, The Commons as a Neglected Factor of Information Policy 5
(Oct. 3, 1998) (unpublished manuscript) ("Nowhere has the intellectual dualism of direct
government intervention versus privatization been clearer than in the area of radio frequency
spectrum regulation."), at http:/www.tprc.org/abstracts98/benkler.pdf (last visited Oct. 9,
2003). Note that an environment akin to an anticommons is present in other areas of
telecommunications law, notably cable, where regulators have largely given incumbent
monopolies free reign to exclude competitors from the "last mile" of infrastructure running into
subscribers' homes. See Reza Dibadj, Toward Meaningful Cable Competition: Getting Beyond
the Monopoly Morass, 6 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL'Y 245 (2003).
52 See, e.g., Michael K. Powell, Remarks at the Silicon Flatirons Telecommunications
Program, University of Colorado at Boulder (Oct. 30, 2002), at http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/
edocs-public/ attachmatch/DOC-227944A1.pdf (last visited Oct. 9, 2003). Recent auctions of
certain portions of the bandwidth are an exception, and are discussed in detail infra in Part
V.A.2.d.
53 For a detailed discussion of the "public interest" myth, see infra Part IV.B.
54 See R.H. Coase, The Federal Communications Commission, 2 J.L. & ECON. 1, 32
(1959) ("Because no charge has been made for the use of frequencies, franchises worth millions
of dollars have been created, have been bought and sold, and have served to enrich those to
whom they were first granted."). Coase gives examples of the high prices for broadcasting
properties in New York City, Pittsburgh, and Philadelphia. Id. at 22. He goes on to note that
"part of the extremely high return on the capital invested in certain radio and television stations
has undoubtedly been due to this failure to charge for the use of the frequency.. Id. Coase
contuinues, "[it is not easy to understand the feeling of hostility to the idea that people should
pay for the facilities they use." Id. at 24.
55 White discusses the sales of ABC, NBC and CBS during the 80s and 90s where "[t]he
purchase prices in each case ran to tens of billions of dollars. These prices were largely
reflections of the scarcity values of the TV and radio stations owned directly by these networks
plus the value of the network affiliation systems-themselves much the product of artificial
scarcity." Lawrence J. White, "Propertyzing" The Electromagnetic Spectrum: Why It's
Important, and How to Begin, 9 MEDIA L. & POL'Y 19, 27 (2000).
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assigned, for free, to commercial TV broadcasters would approach a market value
of $400 billion.56 The business press has called this "the biggest handout of public
assets since the land grants to the railroads. '57
Two examples should help drive home this point: UHF television and high-
definition television (HDTV). Back in 1952, the FCC granted large swathes of
spectrum to UHF television operators. 58 Today, this vast expanse of airwaves is
largely used to air syndicated re-runs and infomercials, with analysts agreeing that
this is a colossal waste of public assets. For instance, FCC economists themselves
estimate that the reallocation of a single UHF television channel from
broadcasting to cellular applications in Los Angeles alone would have increased
social welfare from 1992-2000 by over one billion dollars.59 UHF license holders
would be all too happy to stop pushing their trinkets and recycled programming,
but on just one condition: not having paid anything for their licenses, they now
want to "sell the spectrum at market prices and pocket the profit."60
As a society, where has all this regulatory benevolence gotten us? As noted
telecommunications economist Thomas Hazlett has pointed out, we are left with
an "economically crude and technically obsolete framework to separate various
services in frequency space." 61 Bandwidth for cellular applications is
56 See MICHAEL CALABRESE, BATTLE OVER THE AIRWAVES: PRINCIPLES FOR SPECTRUM
POLICY REFORM 4 (New America Found., Spectrum Series Working Paper No. 1, 2001),
http://www.newarnerica.net/DownloadDocs/pdfs/Pub-File 610 1.pdf (last visited Oct. 9,
2003).
57 Scott Woolley, Dead Air, FORBES, Nov. 25, 2002 at 138, 142. To make things worse, as
Woolley points out, "[tihe railroads at least got freely transferable land, so that over time there
was nothing to inhibit the use of the land for its most profitable purpose. Radio spectrum, in
contrast, is frozen in anachronistic uses." Id. at 142.
58 VHF television channels, licensed in 1945, are numbered 2 to 13-at 6 Megahertz
(MHz) per channel, this amounts to 66 MHz. UHF comprises channels 14 through 69, or 330
MHz. See id at 144.
59 See EVAN R. KWEREL & JOHN R. WILIAMS, CHANGING CHANNELS: VOLUNTARY
REALLOCATION OF UHF TELEVISION SPECrRUM vii (Fed. Communications Comm'n, OPP
Working Paper No. 27, 1992), http://www.fcc.gov/Bureaus/OPP/working-papers/oppwp27.pdf
(last visited Oct. 9, 2003). Kwerel and Williams defined social gains as the "present discounted
value of the change in consumer plus producer surplus." Id.
60 Woolley, supra note 57, at 144.
61 Thomas W. Hazlett, The Wireless Craze, the Unlimited Bandwidth Myth, the Spectrum
Auction Faux Pas, and the Punchline to Ronald Coase's "Big Joke": An Essay on Airwave
Allocation Policy, 14 HARV. J. LAW & TECH. 335, 373 (2001) [hereinafter Hazlett Wireless
Article]. Hazlett, for example, has pointed out how wasteful it is to leave channels adjacent to
the broadcasting channel empty as a buffer. See Thomas W. Hazlett, Liberalizing U.S.
Spectrum Allocation, 27 TELECOMMUNICATIONS POLICY 485, 490 (2003), available at
http://www.manhattan-institute.org/hazlett/Liberalizing%20U.S.%2OSpectrm%20 Allocation.
pdf (last visited Oct. 9, 2003) [hereinafter Hazlett Allocation Article].
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starved,62 and new wireless applications are handicapped due to artificial
spectrum scarcity.63 In other words, even though broadcasters have not been
granted property rights in the spectrum, they effectively hold rights that enable
competing uses, and hence consumer welfare, to be excluded. This is the essence
of an anticommons.
Recent events surrounding High-Definition Television (HDTV) add insult to
injury. In an effort to improve the quality of broadcast television, the FCC granted
each broadcaster an additional 6 Megahertz (MHz) channel within which to
provide high-resolution digital television64-an event identified as the giveaway
of a "$70 billion national asset."65 As if this were not unsettling enough, the FCC
ended up making the HDTV format optional, not mandatory, as long as at least
one signal was broadcast digitally66-the remainder of the 6 MHz allocation67
could be used for other services. As Hazlett has pointed out, broadcasters have
taken advantage of this regulatory state of affairs by essentially "abandoning"
HDTV.68 Americans have thus been excluded from being able enjoy better video
technology, and a small group of broadcasters have benefited. As one
62 The artificial spectrum shortage is of course manifested by busy signals and dropped
calls. Since cellular providers shrink cells to reuse frequencies, it is also the reason why over
100,000 cell sites litter the landscape. See Woolley, supra note 57, at 142.
63 See id. at 138 ("Cell phones and wireless industries of the future are snarled by a critical
shortage of airwaves-the result of decades of wrongheaded, archaic regulations.").
64 For a detailed description of the HDTV fiasco, see Yochai Benkler, Siren Songs and
Amish Children: Autonomy, Information and Law, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 23, 98-101 (2001).
65 What Price Digital Television?, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 26, 1998, at A26; see also Yochai
Benkler, From Consumers to Users: Shifting the Deeper Structures of Regulation Toward
Sustainable Commons and User Access, 52 FED. COMM. L.J. 561, 572-73 (2000) (lamenting
the HDTV giveaway).
66 See Hazlett Wireless Article, supra note 61, at 352.
67 Six MHz is the bandwidth required to transmit an old-fashioned analog television
signal. Digital transmission, however, is far more spectrally efficient, and anywhere from two to
three regular digital channels or one HDTV channel can be broadcast in a 6 MHz allocation.
See, e.g., Walter S. Ciciora, Who Wants HDTV?, CED, Aug. 1, 2002, at 76; DTV Notebook,
TELEVISION DIG., Apr. 14, 1997.
68 See Hazlett Wireless Article, supra note 61, at 352; see also Thomas W. Hazlett,
Washington's Wireless Wars, Remarks at the Center for the Digital Economy at the Manhattan
Institute 4 (Autumn 2002), at http://www.manhattan-institute.org/htmlrmif2.htm (last visited
Oct. 9, 2003) [hereinafter Hazlett CDEMI]. Hazlett remarked:
There are 1,400 full-power TV stations, but only about 200 have gone digital thus far, and
55 percent of all TV stations have officially informed the FCC that they will not make this
[May 1, 2003] deadline [for all American TV stations to transmit digital programming].
By the end of 2006, we're supposed to turn off the old analog signals, going to all-digital
TV broadcasting. That deadline will, likewise, be a figment of the FCC's imagination.
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commentator notes, broadcasting interests would "be crazy to spend money on
fantastic display quality when they can simply exploit a captive audience with
low-quality video that uses as little bandwidth as possible." 69
As this brief foray into spectrum allocation shows, our approach to using the
airwaves is flawed.70 While the FCC has begun efforts at reform,71 solutions
remain elusive.72 During a recent FCC Workshop on spectrum allocation reform,
FCC Chairman Michael Powell noted that he had "never worked on an issue that
has so much smoke and nobody can find the fire.' 73 Commissioner Kathleen
Abernathy put it succinctly by asking "why are we in such a mess today... ?74
The reason we are in such a mess today is that we have ignored that granting
regulatory rights is far from innocuous: even though they do not represent
property rights, they nonetheless can create significant holdup problems. After all,
as a society it might be comforting to think that since we have not granted
property rights to broadcasters, we have not done much damage, since the broader
polity is still in control. Put simply, we have failed to realize how decades of
regulatory givings can create an anticommons.
2. Intellectual Property: Copyright
Recent developments in copyright .law are also indicative of the dangers of an
exclusionary anticommons. 75 Two developments merit particular attention: the
69 Charles Platt, The Great HDTV Swindle, WIRED, Feb. 1997, at 57, 189.
70 See, e.g., Michael K. Powell, Press Conference, "Digital Broadband Migration" Part II,
at 7 (Oct. 23, 2001) ("Put simply, our Nation's approach to spectrum allocation is seriously
fractured. ... The spectrum allocation system is not effectively moving spectrum to its highest
and best use in a timely manner."), at http://www.fcc.gov/Speeches/PoweU/2001/spmkpI09.pdf
(last visited Oct. 9, 2003) [hereinafter Powell Broadband Comments]; Michael K. Powell,
Remarks at the National Association of Cellular Telecommunications & Intemet Association
(CTIA) 8 (Mar. 19, 2002) ("So, there is sort of this odd hodgepodge of allocation choices in
spectrum management writ large."), at http://www.fcc.gov/Speeches/Powell/2002/
spmkp206.pdf (last visited Oct. 9, 2003) [hereinafter Powell CTIA Comments].
71 For a discussion as to whether these efforts will likely help or hurt the situation, see
infra Part V.A.
72 For a perspective on what can be done to ameliorate the situation, see infra Part VI.
73 Michael K. Powell, Statement at FCC Spectrum Rights and Responsibilities Protection
Public Workshop 5, (Aug. 9, 2002), at http://www.fcc.gov/sptf/fldes/0809fcc.pdf (last visited
Oct. 10, 2003) [hereinafter FCC Spectrum Workshop].
74 Id. at 16 (statement of Kathleen Abernathy, FCC Commissioner).
75 Note that anticommons are created in other areas of intellectual property law. For
instance, overlapping rights in drug patents stifle scientific innovation. See Heller & Eisenberg,
supra note 45. Patent law has grown increasingly expansive, allowing, for example, rights to ill-
defined business processes. See, e.g., State St. Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Group, 149
F.3d 1368, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 1998) ("Today, we hold that the transformation of data, representing
discrete dollar amounts, by a machine through a series of mathematical calculations into a final
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Sincessant drive to increase the length of copyright protection and the move to
limit fair use of digital information. 76
The Copyright Act of 1790 originally gave authors protection for fourteen
years.77 From 1790 to 1962, Congress extended copyright terms twice, and a
further eleven times since 1962.78 The most recent extension, the Sonny Bono
Copyright Term Extension Act (CTEA),79 retroactively increases the duration to
the "life of the author and 70 years after the author's death." 80 For works owned
by a corporation, "copyright endures for a term of 95 years from the year of its
first publication. '81 All this despite the Constitution's Copyright Clause that
instructs Congress 'To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by
securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Rights to their
share price, constitutes a practical application of a mathematical algorithm, formula, or
calculation...."). More broadly, as Maureen O'Rourke has noted:
[Iln recent years, (i) the judiciary has expanded the subject matter of the patent laws to
encompass technologies considered unpatentable in the 1950s as well as others never
anticipated fifty years ago; (ii) the PTO [Patent and Trademark Office] has issued patents
at a record rate; and (iii) the primary judicial institution overseeing the system since 1982
(the Federal Circuit) has held patents valid more often than its predecessor courts.
O'Rourke, supra note 45, at 1178-79 (citations omitted). In the realm of trademark, some well-
known commentators have criticized corporations for trying to use intellectual property laws to
squelch free speech. See, e.g., Jack M. Balkin, Don't Use Those Words: Fox News Owns Them,
L.A. TIMES, Aug. 14, 2003, at B15 (arguing that a federal court should dismiss Fox News'
lawsuit against satirist Al Franken for using the words "fair and balanced" in a book itle).
Judge Denny Chin did in fact dismiss Fox's attempt, noting that the words "fair and balanced"
are too common to claim trademark infringement. See Susan Saulny, In Courtroom, Laughter
at Fox and a Victoryfor Al Franken, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 23, 2003, at B5.
76 These are indicative of an overall trend to interpret copyright protections more broadly.
See, e.g., Jed Rubenfeld, The Freedom of Imagination: Copyright's Constitutionality, 112 YALE
L.J. 1, 52 (2002) (noting that historically, "infringement" required the copying of an entire
work, whereas today it can consist simply of reproducing a few sentences). There is even a
legal battle unfolding over whether manufacturers of digital video recorders are violating
copyright law by allowing consumers to skip commercials when recording television programs.
See Newmark v. Turner Broad. Network, 226 F. Supp. 2d 1215 (C.D. Cal. 2002); Thomas
Carey, Fair Use: The Electronic Frontier Jumps Into the Movie Studios' Fight with
SONICBlue, INTELL. PROP. TODAY, Dec. 2002, at 20; Lee Gomes, Hollywood Needs a Fast-
Paced Script For Copyright Issues, WALL ST. J., Feb. 10, 2003, at B 1.
77 Copyright Act of May 31, 1790, ch. 15, § 1, 1 Stat. 124.
78 See, e.g., Heather Green, Copyrights-Or Mothballs?, Bus. WK. ONLINE, Mar. 4, 2002,
at http://www.businessweek.com/technology/content/mar2002/tc2002034_6498.htm (last
visited Oct. 10, 2003).
79 Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-298, § 120(a),
112 Stat. 2827 (1998) (codified at 17 U.S.C. §§ 301-04 (2000)).
80 17 U.S.C. § 302(a) (2002).
81 Id. § 302(c).
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respective Writings and Discoveries." 82 The opportunity to stifle innovation and
derivative use is obvious.83 Moreover, the gradual extension of rights is
troublesome given that the reversion of copyright to the public domain is
precisely what is used to balance the rights of the author against those of the
public, and hence justify the very existence of copyright. 84
As if this were not enough, another law, the Digital Millennium Copyright
Act (DMCA),85 essentially eliminates fair use of information delivered by digital
means. It does this by not allowing the bypass of any copy-protection scheme,
even if it is to make a legal copy-for instance, for personal use.86 To the extent
that intellectual property will be increasingly delivered by digital means, this
prevents the public from taking advantage of new information delivery
mechanisms.
Note that copyright holders, much like spectrum licensees, do not have the
"bundle of rights" traditionally associated with property. But regulatory givings
have nonetheless engendered an anticommons that excludes the public. As Ruth
Okediji has pointed out, increased copyright protection "favors those who create
and own information, but fails to consider the other vital component of the
information revolution-public welfare."87 A "technological world of cyber-
82 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (emphasis added). Note that the Supreme Court has upheld
the CTEA. See Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003). But see Lawrence Lessig, Time to End
the Race for Ever-Longer Copyright, FIN. TIMES (London), Oct. 17, 2002, at 21 (arguing that by
striking down the Sonny Bono Copyright Extension Act, the Supreme Court would be
enforcing "the limits of the Constitution against Congress"); YOcHAI BENKLER, PROPERTY,
COMMONS AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT: TOwARDS A CORE COMMON INFRASTRUCTURE 70
(2001) (White Paper for the Brennan Center for Justice at NYU School of Law) (wryly
observing that Congress seems "[d]azzled by the industrial conception of the 'limited times'
exception"), at http://www.benkler.org/Pub.html#Commons (last visited Oct. 11, 2003).
83 Notice that this is a variation on the practice of buying patents in order to prevent
innovation, which legal realists recognized early in the twentieth century. See Morris R. Cohen,
Property and Sovereignty, 13 CORNELL L.Q. 8, 20 (1927) ("Patents for processes which would
cheapen the product are often bought up by manufacturers and never used.").
84 See, e.g., Justin Hughes, The Philosophy of Intellectual Property, 77 GEo. L.J. 287, 323
(1988).
85 Digital Millennium Copyright Act, Pub. L. No. 105-304, § 103(a), 112 Stat. 2863
(1998) (codified at 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)-(b) (2000)).
86 "No person shall circumvent a technological measure that effectively controls access to
a work protected under this itle." 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1)(A) (2000). In theory, the DMCA does
allow exceptions, at the discretion of the Librarian of Congress, for "noninfringing uses." 17
U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1)(C) (2000). However, "the [Library's] Copyright Office "has denied
virtually every request by librarians, educators and consumers seeking exceptions to the
[DMCA]." Edmund Sanders, She Holds the Cards in Copyright Fight, L.A. TIMEs, Oct. 19,
2002, at Cl. See also Elliot Zaret, Access Denied, WASH. LAw., Feb. 2003, at 21, 25-26.
87 Ruth Okediji, Givers, Takers, and Other Kinds of Users: A Fair Use Doctrine for
Cyberspace, 53 FLA. L. REV. 107, 179-80 (2001).
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vassals and cyber-lords cannot be what the Founding Fathers envisioned as
progress." 88
3. Natural Resources: Forest Management
Natural resources and environmental law are replete with misguided
regulatory largesse.89 One vivid example is the management of our national
forests. The federal government has sought to attract logging operations by
offering private companies lucrative rights to cut down trees. This is
accomplished primarily via concessionary stumpage fees and weak enforcement
of environmental laws that "do not incorporate the full costs of environmental
damage and restoration, and do not incorporate the range of environmental
benefits provided by forests." 90
88 Id. at 182; see also Benkler, supra note 51, at 20 ("The conclusion relevant here is that
increases in intellectual property rights are likely to lead, over time, to concentration of a greater
portion of the information production function in the hands of large commercial organizations
that vertically integrate new production with inventory management."); Green, supra note 78
(outlining the "double whammy of expanding and extending copyright control").
89 Beginning with the Mining Act of 1872, which gave away mineral rights on public
land. See Harold J. Krent & Nicholas S. Zeppos, Monitoring Governmental Disposition of
Assets: Fashioning Regulatory Substitutes for Market Controls, 52 VAND. L. REv. 1703, 1720
(1999). Ranchers also benefit from grazing rights on federal land which not only damage the
environment, but are estimated at one-fourth the level of what they would be on private land.
See, e.g, id. at 1732-33; Richard Stroup & John Baden, Externality, Property Rights, and the
Management of Our National Forests, 16 J.L. & EcON. 303, 311 (1973). In fact, the grazing
issue has, sadly, provoked violence and threats against government officials. See, e.g., R. Brent
Walton, Ellickson's Paradox: It's Suicide to Maximize Welfare, 7 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 153, 185
(1999) ("In the West there is a serious problem of overgrazing. One proposed solution to the
problem, the closure of public lands to grazing by the Bureau of Land Management (BLM), has
prompted violent replies by some ranchers, including the bombing of federal offices.");
Building Bombed, P1TrSBURGH POST-GAZETtE, Nov. 1, 1993, at A5 (bomb exploded on the
roof of Bureau of Land Management Building in Nevada that was involved in controversies
over grazing fees); Hal Bemton, Grazing-Cutback Proposal Meets Trouble on the Range,
SEATrLE TIMES, July 6, 1997, at B8 (County Sheriff warning that "U.S. Department of the
Interior agents risked being thrown into jail if they venture into Owyhee County [Idaho]."). In a
different context, Bruce Ackerman and Donald Elliott have even argued that giving companies
free pollution emission credits is a giveaway to large corporations. See Bruce A. Ackerman &
Donald Elliott, Air Pollution "Rights", N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 11, 1982, at 23.
90 Paul Stanton Kibel, Reconstructing the Marketplace: The International Timber Trade
and Forest Protection, 5 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 735, 752 (1996). Kibel observes:
[P]olitical collusion between government and logging interests adversely impacts native
forests. By keeping the production costs of logging low, such collusion has increased the
industry's profit margin while simultaneously exerting downward pressure on the market
price of timber and wood-based products. These profits and low market prices help
increase demand, and provide industry with excess capital.
Id. at 754 (citations omitted).
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Thus, logging companies, who have no real property interest in the forest-
after all, title rests with the government-are able to come in and harvest the
public's land for their private benefit. As if the overall allowance were not
disconcerting enough, a particularly egregious giving is the "salvage logging
rider," a 1976 law that allows burned trees to be sold as salvage lumber, no
questions asked. 91 Commentators have noted the unsavory incentives this creates
as loggers rush to declare anything they can "salvage." 92 New Forest Service
rules proposed in 2003, supposedly to reduce the risk of wildfires, will make
aggressive logging even easier.93
The result has been devastating, both environmentally and economically. As
Perri Knize describes:
Entire mountain ranges have their faces shaved in swaths of forty to a hundred
acres which from the air resemble mange. From the ground these forests, charred
and smoking from slash burning, look like battlefields. 94
Economically, the public fisc has suffered mightily. The Forest Service has lost
an astounding amount of taxpayer money: $6 billion between 1980 and 1991, and
$1 billion from 1992 to 1994. 95 As Brent Walton has concluded, "[t]o date, such
management has been nothing other than a nursery for industry harvest, all on the
taxpayer's dime.' 96 But it is critical to observe that the mechanisms used are
much more subtle than a vulgar transfer of assets under traditional corporate
91 See, e.g., Michael Axline, Salvage Logging: Point and Counterpoint: Forest Health
and the Politics of Expediency, 26 ENvTL. L. 613, 613 (1996).
92 See Paul Roberts, The Federal Chain-Saw Massacre, HARPER'S MAG., June 1997, at
37, 45-46. Note that attempts at reform have been met by threats of violence. See id. at 44
(discussing the threats of torching the Warner Creek drainage in north-central Oregon if logging
were curtailed). Cf supra note 89 (describing threats of violence relating to grazing rights on
federal land).
93 See, e.g., William Booth, Wildfire Plans Generate Heat, WASH. POST, Mar. 9, 2003, at
A3 ("The new rules... would allow federal foresters and the timber companies to fell larger,
bigger trees-and a lot of them ... ").
94 See Knize, supra note 1, at 98. What makes this phenomenon even more concerning is
that our public lands apparently contain "the most biomass per acre of any forests on the
planet." Id.
95 See Roberts supra note 92, at 47. Part of the complication is that the Forest Service's
accounting has historically been opaque. For example, though it might show a profit on its
books, this does not take into account payments to counties and expenses for road maintenance,
surveying, protection against insects and disease, staff buildings and the like. Note that in some
instances, roads had been amortized over 1,800 years. See id. at 46. Cf Curt Anderson, Timber
Sales Lost Millions in 1997, CHArrANOOGA TIMEs, June 11, 1998, at C6 ("After years of
ignoring many costs of logging in the nation's 192 million acres of national forests, the
government is now admitting timber sales lost more than $88 million last year.").
96 Walton, supra note 89, at 183.
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welfare. This has all been made possible by a regulatory giving-in Hohfeldian
terms, giving loggers rights to cut down national forests, which forces upon
citizens the duty to stay away. This is the essence of an anticommons.
4. Local Government Law: Zoning
Zoning ordinances are yet another example of how a regulatory giving
facilitates the anticommons. The giving here in fact occurs at two levels. First, the
states have decided to give suburbs the right to organize their spatial arrangements
without overseeing their effects on the social fabric. 97
Next, local governments manifest this power via zoning ordinances. Note
again that zoning does not confer any property right per se.98 For instance, by
dictating that certain areas can only contain single-family homes, or particular lot
sizes or set back requirements, a financial barrier is created which members of
many socio-economic groups cannot meet.99 In his study of American
suburbanization, Charles Haar laments the "invidious discrimination that can
result from local community regulatory power"'100 and how such power is used to
"exclude low-income groups"'' 1 and to "prevent minorities from gaining a
foothold in the locality in the same way that private restrictive deeds did."'102
9 7 See, e.g., CHARLES M. HAAR, SUBURBS UNDER SIEGE: RACE, SPACE, AND AUDACIOUS
JUDGES 187 (1996) ("Municipalities wielded local land-use law to keep rich and poor, blacks
and whites far apart, separated by legal walls surrounding suburbia."); JACKSON, supra note 3,
at 277 ("'The fact that the peripheral neighborhoods had then and usually have now the legal
status of separate communities has given them the capacity to zone out the poor, to refuse
public housing, and to resist the integrative forces of the modem metropolis."). For a general
critique of traditional concepts of decentralization and local autonomy, see Jerry Frug,
Decentering Decentralization, 60 U. CHI. L. REv. 253 (1993).
98 If anything, a zoning regulation is traditionally conceived of as limiting property rights.
99 For an example of a typical zoning ordinance, see S. Burlington County NAACP v.
Township of Mount Laurel, 336 A.2d 713, 719-20 (N.J. 1975) (Mt. Laurel I). The Mount
Laurel I court explained:
The general ordinance provides for four residential zones, designated R-1, R-1D, R-2 and
R-3. All permit only single-family, detached dwellings, one house per lot ....
[These] requirements, while not as restrictive as those in many similar municipalities,
nonetheless realistically allow only homes within the financial reach of persons of at least
middle income.
Id. For a discussion of Mt. Laurel in the context of the proper role for judicial review, see infra
Part VI.C.1.
100 HAAR, supra note 97, at 208.
101 Id. at xiii.
102 Id. at 8; see also id. at 201 ("Exclusionary zoning is, after all, the assertion of delegated
public power by a local community to the detriment of a cherished assumption of the society:
the individual's subjective pursuit of happiness and well-being.").
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As if it were not detrimental enough on its own, exclusionary zoning also
provides a roadmap for other tools to facilitate exclusion. For instance, the
process of "red lining"-or only providing home loans within certain areas-was
started with the Home Owners Loan Corporation (HOLC), which created
Residential Security Maps based on zoning.10 3 Similarly, the Federal Housing
Authority would set requirements for loan guarantee requirements that were
eerily based on exclusionary zoning.1 4
In addition, fiscal policy supports zoning by exacerbating the anticommons.
In particular, under the Internal Revenue Code, mortgage interest and real-estate
taxes can be deducted from gross income, whereas rental payments, typical for
urban apartments, are not deductible.10 5
Even intentions to ameliorate the problem have made things worse. For
instance, under the Wagner-Steagall bill, the United States Housing Authority
was empowered to build public housing. 10 6 But this regulatory giving again
bestowed discretion on the municipalities who proceeded to place the housing in
poor, urban neighborhoods. 107 As Kenneth Jackson has pointed out, the result has
been "to segregate the races, to concentrate the disadvantaged in inner cities, and
103 See JACKSON, supra note 3, at 197 ("HOLC devised a rating system that undervalued
neighborhoods that were dense, mixed, or aging. Four categories of quality-imaginatively
entitled First, Second, Third, and Fourth, with corresponding code letters of A, B, C, and D and
colors of green, blue, yellow, and red-were established.").
104 See id. at 208. Jackson states:
mhe Federal Housing Administration set up minimum requirements for lot size, setback
from the street, separation from adjacent structures, and even for the width of the house
itself. While such requirements did provide light and air for new structures, they
effectively eliminated whole categories of dwellings, such as the traditional 16-foot-wide
row houses of Baltimore, from eligibility from loan guarantees.
Id.
105 See id. at 294 ("Simply put, the Internal Revenue Code finances the continued growth
of suburbia."). He even notes that the "reimbursement formulas for water-line and sewer
construction have had an impact on the spatial patterns of metropolitan areas." Id. at 191.
Jackson concludes that "the basic direction of federal policies toward housing has been the
concentration of the poor in the central city and the dispersal of the affluent to the suburbs." Id.
at 230.
106 United States Housing Act of 1937 (Wagner-Steagall Act), Pub. L. No. 75-412, 50
Stat. 888 (codified as amended at42 U.S.C. § 1437(a)-(j) (1982)).
107 See JACKSON, supra note 3, at 225 ("Because municipalities had discretion on where
and when to build public housing, the projects invariably reinforced racial segregation."); see
also id. at 228 ("95 percent of Chicago's public housing, however, was dumped into the most
poverty-impacted black ghettoes in the city.... Poorly maintained, segregated, cheaply
constructed, and often physically dangerous, the projects had become 'the dumping ground for
the poor."'). For a discussion of what might be motivating the municipalities, see infra Part
IV.A.2.
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to reinforce the image of suburbia as a place of refuge for the problems or race,
crime, and poverty."' 10 8
Charles Haar sums up the anticommons eloquently:
The state confers on localities the sovereign power to regulate land use as they
see fit. And although local geographical boundaries are increasingly artificial as
today's metropolis spreads out across counties and districts, suburbs, as separate
legal municipal corporations, deploy exclusionary zoning in its many forms to
keep out "undesirables"-both uses and people. Law has become a surrogate for
physical walls. Minimum lot and room sizes, setback rules, and discretionary
procedures for multifamily developments-familiar argot to the zoning
specialist--become dependable weapons in the exclusionary zoning arsenal. 109
The bottom line here is that regulatory givings have had everything to do
with suburbanization and exclusion: "government largesse can affect where
people live," 110 too often to the detriment of social integration and mobility. I I
Table 1 summarizes the illustrative examples. The next step is to grapple with
why this is happening.
Table 1: Summary of Examples
Example Regulatory Giving Anticommons
Airwaves 0 Broadcasters receive right to use a Incumbents able to hold
airwaves for free up migration of
a UHF and HDTV are particularly spectrum to more
egregious examples efficient uses
Copyright 0 Copyright terms regularly v Competition and
extended innovation based on
N Fair use of digital works outlawed derivative uses stifled
Forest N Private corporations offered * Both citizens and the
Management logging rights at below cost broader ecosystem lose
right to benefit from
forests
Zoning 9 States confer zoning authority to 0 Housing integration of
suburbs lower income and
N Suburbs, in turn, deploy zoning to minority groups
benefit spatial homogeneity prevented
108 JACKSON, supra note 3, at 219.
109 HAAR, supra note 97, at 8 (emphasis added).
110 JACKSON, supra note 3, at 190.
'11 See, e.g., HAAR, supra note 97, at 5 ("Indeed, for partisans of democracy, the most
disturbing characteristic of the metropolitan scene is surely the high degree of racial and ethnic
separation in the new spatial pattern."); see also JACKSON, supra note 3, at 218 ("The poor in
America have not shared in the postwar real-estate boom, in most of the major highway
improvements, in property and income-tax write-offs, and in mortgage insurance programs.").
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IV. WHY?
A. Public Choice
1. A Powerful Theme...
Public choice theories can offer an insightful, albeit incomplete, account of
why these pernicious regulatory givings occur. As Daniel Farber and Philip
Frickey succinctly point out, "[i]n public choice, government is merely a
mechanism for combining private preferences into a social decision."1 12 The idea
can be traced backed to Madison's account of how "factions" can organize to
push their own agenda to the detriment of society at large. 1 3 In the examples
discussed above, 114 one can easily imagine various lobbying groups exercising
undue influence: broadcasters, large corporations holding intellectual property,
logging interests, and wealthy landowners, to name a few.
Indeed, George Stigler, in his seminal contribution to public choice theory,
performed an empirical analysis of various regulations to conclude that the more
powerful the interests being regulated, the more advantageous the regulations
turned out being to them.115 Stigler thus proposed a theory of "regulatory
capture," making the bold statement that "regulation is acquired for the industry
and is designed and operated primarily for its benefit." 1 6 Distinguished
commentators have echoed this point of view over the years. 17
112 DANIEL A. FARBER & PHILIP P. FRICKEY, LAW AND PUBLIC CHOICE: A CRITICAL
INTRODUCTION 44 (1991).
113 Madison defines factions as "a number of citizens, whether amounting to a majority or
minority of the whole, who are united and actuated by some common impulse of
passion ... adverse to the rights of other citizens, or to the permanent and aggregate interests of
the community." THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 57 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961).
114 See supra Part lll.B.
115 For instance, Stigler performed an empirical analysis of interstate trucking. See George
J. Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 BELL J. EC. & MGMT. SCI. 3, 9 (1971) ("The
regulations on [truck] weight were less onerous; the larger the truck population in farming, the
less competitive the trucks were to railroads (i.e., the longer the rail hauls), and the better the
highway system .... "). He also came to similar conclusions in the context of occupational
licensing. See id. at 13-17.
116 Id. at3.
117 See, e.g., Reich, supra note 9, at 767. Reich states:
Public-private partnerships attain their greatest significance when they are translated
into power. Sometimes private elements are able to take over the vast governmental
powers deriving from largess, and use them for their own purposes. Thus, an exercise of
governmental power may reflect the standards of the dominant group in an industry or
occupation, and represent an effort to enforce these standards on others.
Id.; see also Krent & Zeppos, supra note 89, at 1708. Krent and Zeppos state:
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Mancur Olson's research on group dynamics has added a critical
organizational dimension which gives public choice ideas further credence:
The smaller groups---the privileged and intermediate groups--can often defeat
the large groups-the latent groups-which are normally supposed to prevail in
democracy. The privileged and intermediate groups often triumph over the
numerically superior forces in the latent or large groups because the former are
generally organized and active while the latter are normally unorganized and
inactive. 118
The fact that small groups are better organized than large groups accords with
today's reality. Certain relatively narrow industry lobbies-pharmaceuticals,
insurance, and the like-are powerful; other, more diffuse ones, such as the
Chamber of Commerce, 119 are not. 120
Private entities have successfully lobbied Congress for public resources to subsidize their
own financial activities. Interest group influence continues post-enactment, with groups
exerting leverage to retain legislative benefits. Moreover, private groups have similarly
curried favor with agencies to obtain (or retain) government largesse. Such governmental
subsidization reflects the organizational advantages of the few who can benefit at the
expense of the less well-organized public.
Id.; see also Stroup & Baden, supra note 89, at 304-05. Stroup and Baden note:
In general, all policy maldng in the American political context follows a similar
pattern. Demands for rights to public assets are made by individuals or groups upon the
political system at some level. The component of the political system responds by ignoring
the demands, by converting the demands into public policy, or by taking steps to
strengthen the existing policy.
Id.; see also Eli M. Noam, The Future of Telecommunications, The Future of
Telecommunications Regulation, Remarks at the Conference on Telecommunications,
Pennsylvania State University (Apr. 26, 1999) ("Regulation exists in response to interest
groups. Whether they are incumbents, entrants, consumers, rural residents, or large users."), at
http://www.citi.columbia.edu/elinoarnarticles/Naruc9.htm (last accessed Oct. 11, 2003).
118 MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COL.LEcvE ACrION 128 (1971) (emphasis added).
Olson devotes considerable energy to providing the analysis behind this assertion. See id. at 22-
36 (theoretical underpinnings); id at 53-57 (empirical support). Note also the intuitive nature of
his conclusion. See id. at 127 ("Practical politicians and journalists have long understood that
small 'special interest' groups, the 'vested interests,' have disproportionate power.").
119 See id. at 146.
120 See id. at 142-43. Olson writes:
The number and power of the lobbying organizations representing American business is
indeed surprising in a democracy operating according to the majority rule.... The high
degree of organization of business interests, and the power of these business interests, must
be due in large part to the fact that the business community is divided into a series of
(generally oligopolistic) "industries," each of which contains only a fairly small number of
firms.
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These observations fit our examples particularly well. To begin with, though
the threat of capture exists across all regulations, regulatory givings are
particularly dangerous since they may produce winners without producing
obvious losers, making them a very attractive policy tool. Givings that harm no
identifiable person may not attract public attention and are unlikely to lead to
legal challenges. The dark side, of course, is that the government may abuse its
power to reward political supporters.1 21
As a general rule, broadcasters, media holding companies, and logging firms
are more concentrated and better organized than say consumers, hikers or
environmentalists. Specific examples serve to drive the point home. 12 2 On the
copyright anticommons front, there is a worry, for example, that the Library of
Congress Copyright Office "is too closely aligned with the interests of copyright
owners."
123
Take also exclusionary zoning. As Charles Haar observes:
Suburban governments operate on behalf of their own partisan considerations;
their main interests reside in preserving tax ratables and in keeping densities low.
Such local parochialism makes land scarce for housing, especially that destined
for low-income families. Because it is easy for local homeowners to control the
local council, a classic example of Madison's factionalist ghost appears. Entry
of potentially dissenting voices is barred. 124
Some commentators criticizing the suburbanization movement have even
questioned the true motivations of the Census Bureau125 and politicians
representing central cities. 126
121 Bell & Parchomovsky, supra note 8, at 574-75; see also id. at 577 ("In all, there is real
reason to suspect that the power to give is a major source of potential corruption and
mischief."); supra notes 19-20.
122 Examples reflect those supra Part lIl.B.
123 Sanders, supra note 86 (raising concerns about a 'revolving door' between the
Copyright Office and the entertainment industry").
124 HAAR, supra note 97, at 180 (emphasis added); see also id. at 179 ("[P]olicy
formulation, when entrusted to the elected instrumentalities of government, can become too
easily identified with the interests of the economically powerful. This is especially true of the
small suburb with its insulated majority.") (citation omitted).
125 See, e.g., JACKSON, supra note 3, at 5 ("Because the Census Bureau is subject to heavy
political pressures, the way it defines 'suburbs' and 'metropolitan areas' serves more to confuse
than to enlighten the serious student.").
126 See, e.g., WILLUAm A. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMICS OF ZONING LAWS: A PROPERTY
RIGHTS APPROACH TO AMERICAN LAND USE CONTROLs 316-38 (1985) (Fischel makes the
subtle point that if suburbs permitted low-income housing, then the importance of politicians
representing urban areas would dwindle since their constituents would move into the suburbs.
Fischel also argues that urban public housing can be conceived as an inefficient distribution of
wealth in exchange for votes from the beneficiaries).
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Forest management raises much the same issues, with most of the
cynicism directed at the Forest Service. 127 Note, for example, the striking
parallel between Haar's critique of the local council, 128 and Perri Knize's
view that the "[florest Service's timber program is beneficial chiefly to
politicians in Washington, to a small segment of the timber industry, and to
the Forest Service's administrators. Taxpayers, small communities,
recreationists, the owners of private timberland-and the land itself-all
lose."'129 Observations on public choice motivations behind spectrum policy, 130
meanwhile, date back to Ronald Coase's classic article on the FCC. Coase
expressed concern over disclosures "concerning the extent to which pressure is
brought to bear on the Commission by politicians and businessmen (who often
use methods of dubious propriety) with a view to influencing its decisions." 131
In a series of articles, Thomas Hazlett argues that the Radio Act of 1927, and
indeed the FCC, came into being not so much to put an end to chaotic
interference on the airwaves, 132 but rather "as the result of a calculated rent-
127 See, e.g., Roberts, supra note 92, at 38-40. Roberts notes:
[What is essentially a timber bureaucracy, one whose budget is tied to the number of trees
it can 'harvest' and whose managers have long been rewarded for keeping those harvests
high-even if it meant selling trees at a loss or breaking environmental laws.... Actually,
the Forest Service is among the Beltway's more adept insiders.
Id.; see also Knize, supra note 1, at 104 ("Forest Service administrators are concerned with
maximizing their budgets, holding on to their jobs, and preserving the status quo.").
128 See supra note 124.
129 Knize, supra note 1, at 112 (emphasis added); see also Douglas Gantenbein, Forests
May Not Get Thin but Bureaucrats Will Get Fat, L.A. TIMEs, Sept. 3, 2003, at B13 ("[The
Healthy Forests Initiative probably has another name: the Forest Service Bureaucrat Lifetime
Employment Act.").
130 Note that there are other areas in telecommunications law that are equally amenable to
public choice analysis. For example, broadcasting interests were able to thwart the development
of cable in its early years. See, e.g., Dibadj, supra note 51; Thomas W. Hazlett, The Spectrum
Allocation System, Remarks at the National Press Club (Nov. 2, 2001), at
http://www.aei.org/news/newslD. 13310,flter./news detail.asp (last accessed Oct. 11, 2003).
131 Coase, supra note 54, at 35-36; see also R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3
J.L. & ECON. 1, 18 (1960) (decisions are "made by a fallible administration subject to political
pressures and operating without any competitive check") [hereinafter Coase Social Cost]. Even
Leo Herzel, who first proposed the idea of privatizing the spectrum, noted the "opposition from
groups which have acquired a vested interest in the present methods of regulation." Leo Herzel,
Comment, "Public Interest" and the Market in Color Television Regulation, 18 U. Cm. L. REV.
802, 815 (1951).
132 Hazlett argues that a homesteading regime of "priority-in-use rights established on a
'first come, first served' basis" was sufficient to prevent interference. Thomas W. Hazlett,
Assigning Property Rights to Radio Spectrum Users: Why Did FCC License Auctions Take 67
Years?, 41 J.L. & ECON. 529, 530 (1998) [hereinafter Hazlett Auctions]; see also Thomas W.
Hazlett, The Rationality of U.S. Regulation of the Broadcast Spectrum, 33 J.L. & ECON. 133,
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sharing arrangement serving the interests of regulators and industry
incumbents."'133 In fact, spectrum allocation is viewed as a rational bargain:
regulators get authority over airwaves, and broadcasters get zero-priced rights. 134
This in turn, explains the massive regulatory inefficiencies:
Material self-interest of these primary participants in the regulatory process
strongly favors under-utilization of radio spectrum. The block allocation system
has historically served spectrum-based industries, such as AM radio, television
broadcasting, and cellular radio, as a cartel enforcement device, limiting service
competition by denying licenses to newcomers and imposing technical rules that
lower industry output. 135
Other academics, 136 journalists, 137 think tanks, 13 8 and even government
officials 139 have echoed these concerns, some even going so far as to connote a
151 (1990) [hereinafter Hazlett Rationality] ("It was on this homesteading principle that the
judge found a common-law remedy to the potential 'tragedy of the commons."').
133 Hazlett Auctions, supra note 132, at 543.
134 See Hazlett Rationality, supra note 132, at 170 ("The fact that spectrum fees and
discretionary regulatory authority are substitutes has never been misunderstood in the U.S.
regulation of the broadcast spectrum."); Hazlett Auctions, supra note 132, at 543 ('T'he
broadcast licensing bargain-zero-priced rights in exchange for 'public interest' obligations-
creates an exchange that cannot be easily duplicated via an auction regime in which licensee
obligations are explicitly delineated."). While Hazlett's descriptive analysis is well-reasoned
and provocative, his solution, that of privatizing the airwaves via auction, is overly simplistic.
See infra Part V.A.
135 Hazlett Wireless Article, supra note 61, at 387-88; see also id. at 406-53 (giving
examples of how the FCC allowed incumbents to hurt new entrants).
136 See, e.g., White, supra note 55, at 26 ("With licenses distributed for free, incumbent
license holders often have an extremely valuable privilege that they are understandably
reluctant to see undermined. Hence, they are prepared to lobby vigorously to preserve the status
quo and defeat, or at least delay, competitive change."); Pablo T. Spiller & Carlo Cardilli,
Towards a Property Rights Approach to Communications Spectrum, 16 YALE J. ON REG. 53,
62-63 (1999) ("In fact, it is far more likely that regulators' real interest in perpetuating the
existing spectrum administration stems from their desire to maintain the steady flow of political
rents generated by control over spectrum.").
137 See, e.g., Woolley supra note 57 ("Over the past century the federal govemment has
carved up the airwaves and given them away to private and special interests ranging from
television broadcasters and power utilities to universities and the Catholic Church.").
138 See, e.g., J.H. SNIDER, WHO OWNS THE AIRWAVES?: FOUR THEORIES OF SPECTRUM
PROPERTY RIGHTS 4-5 (New America Foundation, Public Assets Program, Spectrum Series
Issue Brief No. 3, 2002) ("everyone who is anyone knows that telecom policy is largely driven
by power politics, not policy considerations .... Washington's political elites.., have been
transferring tens of billions of dollars of public assets to fat cat special interests."), at
http://www.newamerica.net/DownloadDocs/pdfs/Pub File 808_l.pdf (last accessed Oct. 11,
2003).
20031 1067
OHIO STATE LA W JOURNAL
Faustian bargain: "[s]o long as broadcasting is protected from the free market by
legislators who depend on TV to get themselves reelected, Congress will continue
giving broadcasters special treatment and favors, and consumers will suffer. 14°
To boot, many spectrum license holders are former politicians. 141
Cast in this light, the HDTV fiasco' 42 is more of the same thing: broadcasters
did not want reallocation of vacant UHF channels, so they encouraged a
proceeding to allocate the bandwidth to HDTV.' 43 In exchange, regulators
received continued control over airwave allocation.144 In an ironic twist, once
assured they would keep the bandwidth, the broadcasters then proceeded to
oppose the actual implementation of HDTV.145
One could also apply public choice frameworks to other areas within
spectrum policy, such as lobbying to lift the spectrum cap that ensured cellular
competition 46 or to defeat low power FM radio.' 47 While these examples are not
139 See, e.g., Powell Broadband Comments, supra note 70, at 7 ("Existing users move to
block new uses [for spectrum] and line up support for their position, and the new providers are
forced to do the same. The ultimate decision is reached as a result of a politicized reactive
process.").
140 Platt, supra note 69, at 191; see also Hazlett Wireless Article, supra note 61, at 536-37
("The bargain that created government spectrum allocation in 1927, and exists still, is the quid
pro quo: lucrative licenses to broadcasters in exchange for content controls. Broadcasters gain
rents, and public officials gain some discretion over a powerful and influential component of
the press.").
141 See, e.g., Arthur De Vany, Implementing a Market-Based Spectrum Policy, 41 J.L. &
ECON. 627, 641 (1998) ("The spectrum is locked away in blocks of bandwidth licensed to a
privileged few through methods that are too complex and expensive for all but major
corporations or the politically connected to bear (an extraordinary number of broadcast licenses
are held by former members of Congress).").
142 See supra notes 64-69.
143 See Hazlett Wireless Article, supra note 61, at 351-54.
144 See, e.g., Spiller & Cardilli, supra note 136, at 64 ("[W]hile raising billions by
auctioning spare TV frequencies might ensure the agency some fleeting praise during the
congressional budget process, continuing control over the allocation of the HDTV spectrum
empowers regulators to bargain with the private sector for politically important concessions.").
145 See Hazlett Wireless Article, supra note 61, at 351 ("While providing the pressure to
initiate the Advanced Television proceeding and the momentum to keep it slowly rolling
forward, the TV industry remarkably opposed actual creation of HDTV broadcasting at almost
every turn."). For a curious defense of the broadcaster's point of view regarding HDTV, see
Denise Ulloa, Notes and Comments, Advanced Television Systems: A Reexamination of
Broadcasters' Use of the Spectrum from a Twenty-First Century Perspective, 16 WHITtER L.
REv. 1155 (1995).
146 The Cellular Telephone Industry Association (CTIA), composed of the largest
wireless carriers, worked for years to defeat a spectrum cap that ensured competition by
limiting a cellular carrier to 45 MHz bandwidth in each market. See, e.g., CTIA Faults FCC
Wireless Policies as Anticompetitive, MOBILE COMM. REP., Jan. 11, 1999, at 1; Jube Shiver, Jr.,
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necessarily crude sagas "of procrastination, protectionism, political favors, and
outrageous greed"'148 like HDTV, the bottom line is that public choice theories
provide a useful framework against which to explain regulatory givings that
create an anticommons.
Public choice theory brings a dose of legal realism to the debate, essentially
arguing Morris Cohen's point that "[t]his profound human need of controlling
and moderating our consumptive demands cannot be left to those whose
dominant interest is to stimulate such demands"149-be they broadcasters,
logging companies, developers, or copyright holders.
2.... But for Some Nuances
The picture painted above is hopefully bold and convincing. Unfortunately, it
is far from complete in its descriptive power.150 Traditional public choice fails to
take into account a number of realities: the distributive and ideological functions
of regulation, the practical realities of controlling an industry, and the recent
transformations of many regulated industries to the detriment of incumbents.
As a threshold question, one must be cognizant of Mancur Olson's
sophisticated depiction of why interest group politics might be a positive good.
Referring to the work of economists such as John Commons, Olson highlights the
belief not only that different interest groups jockeying for position tend to
counterbalance each other, 151 but even the belief among pluralists "that economic
FCC Gets Rid of Limits on Mobile Airwaves, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 9, 2001, at C3 ('"he decision
represents a victory for Cingular Wireless, AT&T Wireless Services Inc. and other large mobile
carriers.").
147 An unusual alliance between the National Association of Public Broadcasters and
National Public Radio destroyed lower power FM radio. See, e.g., BENKLER, supra note 82, at
43; THOMAS W. HAZLEIT & BRuNO E. VIANI, LEGISLATORS V. REGULATORS: THE CASE OF
Low POWER FM RADIO 4 n.4 (AEI-Brookings Joint Ctr. for Regulatory Studies, Working Paper
No. 02-1, 2002), available at http://aei-brookings.org/admin/pdfflles/php4b.pdf (last visited
Oct. 26, 2003); Arthur Martin, Comment, Which Public, Whose Interest? The FCC, the Public
Interest, and Low-PowerRadio, 38 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 1159, 1196 (2001).
148 Platt, supra note 69, at 57.
149 Cohen, supra note 83, at 30.
150 See also FARBER & FRICKEY, supra note 112, at 5 ('The most dramatic, stark versions
of public choice have received the most publicity, but they are not necessarily the most useful or
even the most representative of current work in the field.").
151 See OLSON, supra note 118, at 126. Olson states:
It can scarcely be emphasized too strongly that the analytical pluralists see the results of
pressure-group activity as benign, not from any assumption that individuals always deal
altruistically with one another, but rather because they think that the different groups will
tend to keep each other in check because of the balance of power among them.
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pressure groups were more representative of the people than the legislatures based
on territorial representation."152
Even if one does not subscribe to this benign account of public choice, one
can argue that regulation does fulfill a distributive mandate. In two articles written
primarily as a response to Stigler's public choice argument,153 Richard Posner has
argued that regulation effectively performs the function of taxation, and is thus a
branch of public finance. 154 Posner discusses how regulators often cross-
subsidize certain constituents by setting below market rates, 155 how "interests
promoted by regulatory agencies are frequently those of customer groups rather
than those of the regulated firms themselves,"' 156 and how the same agency often
has to regulate different firms with competing interests. 157
Posner even finds fault in the view that common carrier and public utility
regulation has served to benefit incumbents. 158 Nonetheless, he argues that even
152 Id. at 116. Note also that this point can be extended to argue that different government
branches and agencies exert power that attempt to counterbalance each other. For example, in
the realm of spectrum allocation, FCC Chairman Powell has noted:
[W]hen it comes to spectrum policies not only does the Commerce Department have a
central role in it with respect to government users, but you have these huge client groups, if
you will, at the Department of Defense, the Department of Transportation, that are their
own power centers, that have their own jurisdictions, that have their own leadership, that
have their own political power, and it's just messy.
Powell CTIA Comments, supra note 70, at 6.
153 See supra note 115.
154 See Richard A. Posner, Taxation by Regulation, 2 BELL J. EC. & MGMT. Sci. 22, 23
(1971) ("[O]ne of the functions of regulation is to perform distributive and allocative chores
usually associated with the taxing or financial branch of government.").
155 See id. at 23-27; see also Richard A. Posner, Theories of Economic Regulation, 5
BELL J. Ec. & MGMT. SCI. 335, 341 (1974) ("A great deal of economic regulation serves the
interests of small-business--or nonbusiness-groups, including dairy farmers, pharmacists,
barbers, truckers, and, in particular, union labor.") [hereinafter Posner Theories].
156 Posner Theories, supra note 155, at 342; see also id. at 353. Posner states:
The 'consumerist' measures of the last few years-truth in lending and in packaging,
automobile safety and emission controls, other pollution and safety regulations, the
aggressiveness recently displayed by the previously lethargic Federal Trade
Commission-are not an obvious product of interest group pressures, and the proponents
of the economic theory of regulation have thus far largely ignored such measures.
Id. (citation omitted).
157 See id. at 342. For example, the FCC has to regulate wireless and wireline carriers,
cable, and satellite companies.
158 See id. at 351. Posner argues:
[C]ontrols over construction of new plant and over abandonment of service, the duty of the
common carrier to serve all comers, and the tendency to impose public utility and common
carrier controls on industries that sell services rather than goods, are best explained on the
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"if we assume that regulation is imposed primarily for the benefit of the regulated
firms, it must be shown why other industries have not obtained the same kind of
regulation as public utilities and common carriers."' 159 Thus, he mounts a full
attack on public choice accounts.
Regardless of where one might stand on Posner's beloved economic
models, 160 empirical studies show that ideology is a better predictor of legislative
votes than economics.161 Yet, as Farber and Frickey point out, public choice
ignores the ideology of politicians and bureaucrats. 162 Ideology, of course, like
public choice itself, has a dark side. For example, Kenneth Jackson asks why
"[d]espite the fact that the government's leading housing agency openly exhorted
segregation throughout the first thirty years of its operation, very few voices were
raised against FHA red-lining practices."' 163 The reason may be less that the
agency was captive to banking or real estate interests, and more that it reflected
the segregationist ideology of the time. Indeed, Charles Haar makes the
provocative point that ideology interfered with rational functioning of the free
market: "the national federalist agenda pushed local governments to interfere
with the private building industry and, through regulation and taxation, to counter
the ordinary operations of the real estate world.' 1
64
Economics and ideology aside for a minute, the realities of managing a
bureaucracy kick in. In his critique of the administrative state, Richard Stewart
challenges the critics who assert "with a dogmatic tone that reflects settled
opinion, that in carrying out broad legislative directives, agencies unduly favor
theory that regulation is designed in significant part to confer benefits on politically
effective consumer groups.
Id. But see Posner, supra note 154, at 29-34 (using the examples of international telegraph and
cable television to show how regulation has protected incumbents).
159 Posner, supra note 154, at 39.
160 Posner is careful to emphasize that Stigler's point is not some vanilla public interest or
capture theory, but rather an "economic theory." Posner Theories, supra note 155, at 335. But
this seems to be more a function of Posner's affection for objective "rationality." See, e.g.,
Richard A. Posner, Rational Choice, Behavioral Economics, and the Law, 50 STAN. L. REV.
1551 (1998) [hereinafter Posner Rational Choice]; Christine Jolls et al., Theories and Tropes: A
Reply to Posner and Kelman, 50 STAN. L. REv. 1593, 1597-98 (1998) ("Posner's (undefended
but more than implicit) view that an essential part of a good theory is that it be a rational choice
theory.").
161 See FARBER & FRICKEY, supra note 112, at 29.
162 See id. at 24 ("[P]ublic choice ignores some other common sense observations about
politics. Some crucial features of the political world do not fit the economic model. It does not
account for ideological politicians like Reagan and Thatcher. Most notably, it does not account
for popular voting.").
163 JACKSON, supra note 3, at 214.
164 HAAR, supra note 97, at 203 (emphasis added).
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organized interests." 165 In fact, Stewart offers an overarching practical
explanation as to what might really be going on: given limited resources,
regulators are dependent on the industries they regulate for cooperation and
information. 166 This problem is exacerbated to the extent agencies must
increasingly fund their budgets with user fees from the very companies they
regulate. 167 Another practical reality is the need for laws to evolve quickly. For
example, there might be a law that is unwise today because it protects a powerful
industry. But when the law was originally developed, years or even decades ago,
it may have been with the good intentions of protecting a nascent industry. 168 The
motivations, then, may not be invidious, just outdated. 169
Beyond the realities of regulatory implementation, agency capture theories
themselves are problematic. In their analysis of the vast changes in regulation of
transportation, telecommunications, and energy over the past twenty-five years,
Joseph Kearny and Thomas Merrill remark:
The public choice perspective is also vulnerable insofar as its central
premise-that positive regulation is always inferior to market ordering-is
usually advanced as an article of faith rather than by empirical demonstration.
The history of the great transformation that we have recounted-in which
regulatory agencies often led the charge for regulatory reform--should by itself
be enough to give pause before one asserts any invariant hypothesis about the
behavior of regulators. Contrary to the theory popular in the late 1960s and early
1970s, agencies do not always behave as the hopeless captives of their client
industries. 170
165 Richard B. Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88 HARv. L.
REv. 1669, 1684-85 (1975).
166 See id. at 1685-86. Stewart also makes the subtle point that by its very nature a
regulatory bureaucracy is focused on controlling an industry, to the detriment of competition
among industry players. See id.
167 See, e.g., Yochi J. Dreazen & Deborah Solomon, Paying for Regulation, WALL ST. J.,
Feb. 4, 2003, at A4.
168 Cable is a classic case in point where a legal regime favorable to cable companies in
the 1960s and 1970s was no longer necessary once cable became the dominant transmission
medium for video programming. See Dibadj, supra note 51.
169 In fact, one of the reasons Farber and Frickey countenance a greater role for judicial
oversight is the notion that statutes can become obsolete quickly. See FARBER & FRJCKEY,
supra note 112, at 133-39. For a broader discussion of judicial review in the context of
addressing the anticommons, see infra Part VI.C. 1.
170 Joseph D. Keamey & Thomas W. Merrill, The Great Transformation of Regulated
Industries Law, 98 COLUM. L. REv. 1323, 1406 (1998); see also David B. Spence, Getting
Beyond Cynicism: New Theories of the Regulatory State: A Public Choice Progressivism,
Continued, 87 CORNELL L. REv. 397, 436 (2002) (noting that public choice theory does not
explain why regulations often burden those being regulated). One notable example is the
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In their critique of the nondelegation doctrine, David Spence and Frank Cross
argue that the public may in fact be better served by having an administrative
bureaucracy. 171 Noting in particular that industry lobbyists typically rush to
legislatures for favors, they conclude that "[n]o family of public choice models
seems more irrelevant yet is more widely cited than capture models."'172
One can quibble with Posner, Farber, Stewart, or Kearney. Of course, public
choice theories do play an important role in describing how regulatory givings are
crafted. But public choice by itself cannot explain everything, and we must bear
this in mind when crafting solutions.
B. Public Interest
An overarching mandate from Congress to virtually every regulatory agency
is to protect the public interest.173 Given that the agency cannot do everything
Telecommunications Act of 1996 which sought to restructure local telephone markets to the
detriment of entrenched incumbents. See, e.g., Reza Dibadj, Competitive Debacle in Local
Telephony: Is the 1996 Telecommunications Act to Blame?, 81 WASH. U. L.Q 1, 1-2 (2003);
Monroe E. Price & John F. Duffy, Technological Change and Doctrinal Persistence:
Telecommunications Reform in Congress and the Court, 97 COLuM L. REv. 976, 1012 (1997)
(noting the "reengineering of local and long distance telephone markets"). In addition,
regulators permitted new innovations such as direct broadcast satellite (DBS) despite the lobby
of incumbent broadcasters. See, e.g., Howard A. Shelanski, The Bending Line Between
Conventional "Broadcast" and Wireless "Carriage", 97 COLUM. L. REv. 1048, 1063-464
(1997).
171 David B. Spence & Frank Cross, A Public Choice Case for the Administrative State,
89 GEO. L.J. 97, 119 (2000) ("[The empirical evidence on independent bureaucracies does not
support the claims that independent bureaucrats advance their own interests at the expense of
the commonwealth; to the contrary, greater independence may better promote the public
interest.").
172 Id. at 121-22. Spence and Cross also aptly note that "capture theory is directly
contradictory to the agency policy bias criticism, which suggests that agencies will over-
regulate." Id. at 122. Spence revisits this argument in Spence, supra note 170, at 438 ('The
ability to influence legislators' reelection prospects through campaign contributions, issue
advertising, and the like, offer well-heeled interest groups much greater leverage over
legislators than over agency bureaucrats .. "). Spence and Cross' perspective is consistent, for
example, with that of Hazlett and Viani who argue that it was Congress, not the FCC, who
defeated low power FM radio. See HAzLErr & VIANI, supra note 147, at 3 ("when the FCC
attempted to allocate radio spectrum for low power FM licenses, it was sharply rebuked by
Congress").
173 For instance, under the Communications Act of 1934, the FCC must rle as "public
convenience, interest, or necessity requires." 47 U.S.C. § 303 (2000). FCC Commissioner
Copps has observed that "the term 'public interest' appears over 110 times in the
Communications Act." See Statement Before the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science,
and Transportation, 108th Cong. 2 (Jan. 14, 2003) (statement of Michael J. Copps,
Commissioner, Federal Communications Commission), at http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/
edocs.public/attachmatch/DOC-230241A4.pdf (last visited Oct. 11, 2003); see also To
20031 1073
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
itself, it effectively delegates its authority to a private party; for instance, logging
rights to timber companies, radio licenses to broadcasters, or patents to
pharmaceutical companies. In exchange for this "giving," the agency insists that
the holder of the right act "as the agent of the 'the public interest' rather than
solely in the service of his own self-interest.... The opportunity for private profit
is intended to serve as a lure to make private operators serve the public."'174
On one level, all this makes eminent sense. After all, protecting the public
should be a central mandate of government agencies, and very often, regulators
have the best intentions to help the public.' 75 Furthermore, regulation is an
inherently dangerous business; in particular, in fast-moving areas such as
telecommunications and high technology, it is very difficult for anyone to predict
the future.176 Thus, even when a course of action may look dubious in hindsight,
regulators may have begun with every desire to protect the public. 177
But this belies a number of interpretative quandaries. To begin with, how
does one measure "public interest"? Who should determine it? Thomas Hazlett
puts it bluntly when he notes that "not even the government's own experts can
define what it means, or what action it rules out."'178
Regulate Radio Communication: Hearings on H.R. 7357 Before the House Comm. on the
Merch. Marine and Fisheries, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. 10 (1924). Herbert Hoover commented:
Radio communication is not to be considered as merely a business carried on for
private gain, for private advertisement, or for entertainment of the curious. It is a public
concern impressed with the public trust and to be considered primarily from the standpoint
of public interest to the same extent and upon the basis of the same general principles as
our other public utilities.
Id.
174 Reich, supra note 9, at 745. In some areas, such as influence over programming, the
insistence is even more direct. See, e.g., Coase, supra note 54, at 38 ("If the aim of government
regulation of broadcasting is to influence programming, it is irrelevant to discuss whether
regulation is necessitated by the technology of the industry.").
175 See, e.g., FARBER & FRICKEY, supra note 112, at 32; supra notes 156-70.
176 For instance, in his discussion of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, Thomas
Krattenmaker has pointed out that "[o]ne reads the new Act in vain for something that reflects
Congressional awareness that the FCC may not be onipotent, its commissioners not
omniscient." Thomas G. Krattenmaker, The Telecommunications Act of 1996, 29 CONN. L.
REV. 123, 173 (1996); see also Glen 0. Robinson, On Refusing to Deal With Rivals, 87
CORNELL L. REV. 1177, 1218 (2002) ("It must have seemed so simple to a Congress
accustomed to issuing orders in the manner of Jean Luc Picard of the USS Enterprise: 'make it
so number one.' And the FCC, a dutiful if not always fully informed number one, tried to make
it so.").
177 It is precisely to address this issue that I propose regulators adopt a "hedging" strategy
where appropriate. See infra Part VI.A.
178 Hazlett Wireless Article, supra note 61, at 401; see also Hazlett CDEMI, supra note
68 ("No one has been able to figure out what that phrase means .... ). Indeed, some official
pronouncements on the subject tend to be perplexing. For instance, FCC Commissioner
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As a result of this fuzziness, the public interest mandate has gone awry. The
quid can become not so much between the profit of the private entity and the
public's welfare, but rather between the profit of the private entity and the narrow
interests of politicians whose authority is ensured by the presence of powerful
incumbents. 179
Lawrence White laments how the public interest "banner" has been used to
establish "far too many protectionist, anti-competitive, anti-innovative, inflexible,
output-limiting regulatory regimes."'180 Other critics have variously charged
agencies such as the FCC of using the public interest standard as "incumbent
protectionism"'' 81 that even justifies "the elimination of competition."' 182
A dumbfounding sense of the public interest infects essentially all areas of
regulatory givings to the point where "public interest" can actually become code
for "private interest." For instance, in local government law, the court in Poletown
Neighborhood Council v. City of Detroit183 allows an entire neighborhood to be
condemned in order to clear land for a General Motors plant. The majority notes,
quite stunningly, that "[t]he power of eminent domain is to be used in this
instance primarily to accomplish the essential public purposes of alleviating
unemployment and revitalizing the economic base of the community. The benefit
to a private interest is merely incidental."184 Similarly, in the copyright realm,
Abernathy once commented that "[t]oday the Commission uses its broad discretion in crafting
service rules in the public interest to grant far more flexibility to our licensees." Kathleen Q.
Abernathy, My Vision of the Future of American Spectrum Policy, Remarks Before the Cato
Institute's Sixth Annual Technology & Society Conference (Nov. 14, 2002) (emphasis added),
at http:llwww.fcc.gov/Speeches/Abemathy/2002/spkqa228.html (last visited Oct. 11, 2003).
One is, of course, left wondering how granting more power to a private party necessarily
equates with enhanced benefits for the public.
179 For example, Thomas Hazlett notes:
Private spectrum rights... were "purchased" by broadcaster subsidies to "public interest"
concerns, a tax which initially amounted to little more than nominal acquiescence to (and
political support for) a federal licensing authority but would, over time, include significant
payments to unprofitable local programming, "fairness doctrine" regulation, extensive
proof of commitment to "community" in station renewals, and the avoidance of
broadcasting content offensive to the political party in power.
Hazlett Rationality, supra note 132, at 170; see also Shelanski, supra note 170, at 1056.
180 White, supra note 55, at 35.
181 FCC Spectrum Workshop, supra note 73, at 248 (statement of Thomas Hazlett).
182 Herzel, supra note 131, at 809.
183 304 N.W.2d 455 (Mich. 1981).
184 Id. at 459 (emphasis added). As Justice Fitzgerald notes in dissent, "[t]he
condemnation contemplated in the present action goes beyond the scope of the power of
eminent domain in that it takes private property for private use." Id. at 464 (Fitzgerald, J.,
dissenting).
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one is left wondering how incessant expansion of private rights in copyright law
could possibly be in the public interest.185
There are also constitutional concerns. Commentators have worried that
telecommunications law and intellectual property law often violate the First
Amendment by giving license holders undue power to limit the speech of
others.186 What has received scant attention is the fact that vague "public interest"
interpretations are a central culprit: after all, how can a court interpret an
essentially meaningless standard? 187 The irony, of course, becomes that the
standard now allows a private actor to violate someone's First Amendment rights
with the state's blessing. There are also serious procedural issues, since
administrative agencies are able to make sweeping determinations outside their
areas of expertise based on interpretation of the "public interest." 88
185 See, e.g., Okediji, supra note 87, at 110-11. Okediji states,
There has been no express challenge to the fact that the public interest lies at the heart of
copyright and trademark protection, although the above mentioned recent legislative
enactments---both the process by which they came to fruition as well as their substantive
provisions-give reason to pause over Congress' commitment to the public interest or, at
the very least, its understanding of the implications of the expansion of copyright law.
Id.
186 See, e.g., Benkler, supra note 64, at 71 ("A system that permits owners of
infrastructure to exclude anyone they choose from their infrastructure, or to impose conditions
on the use of the infrastructure, creates a cost, in terms of autonomy, for users."); Rubenfeld,
supra note 76, at 3 ("Copyright law is a kind of giant First Amendment duty-free zone. It flouts
basic free speech obligations and standards of review. It routinely produces results that, outside
copyright's domain, would be viewed as gross First Amendment violations."); Reich, supra
note 9, at 762 ("Largess also brings pressure against firSt amendment rights."); Dibadj, supra
note 51 (arguing that First Amendment jurisprudence overly protects the commercial speech
rights of cable operators, while ignoring the First Amendment rights of subscribers to receive
information of their choice).
187 See also Hazlett Wireless Article, supra note 61, at 402. Hazlett states,
The ambiguity of the standard was largely by design. The phrase provided the least
constraining constitutional standard for regulation.... Putting spectrum regulation under a
vague and meaningless standard allowed a creature of Congress to exercise influence over
an industry with intense political significance. The standard's malleability offered policy
makers maximum degrees of freedom while shielding Congress from the First Amendment,
a potential constraint on intervention in the editorial content of the broadcast press.
Id.
188 For instance, Charles Reich, lamenting administrative trials, notes that the FCC
"disclaims any expertise in the area of the antitrust laws, but insists that it can make findings on
monopolistic practices without the aid of a court, and deny licenses on the basis of such
findings." Reich, supra note 9, at 753; see also National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319
U.S. 190,223 (1943). The Court found:
Nothing in the provisions or history of the [Communications] Act lends support to the
inference that the [Federal Communications] Commission was denied the power to refuse
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The "public interest" standard is thus often used, rather ironically, to protect
private interests. It has become an instrument of public choice. 189 In many ways,
it is a perfect vehicle to perpetuate regulatory givings and the anticommons. After
all, it is politically impractical for government simply to give property away, so it
doles out regulatory favors-under the guise of "public interest." These givings,
in turn, give certain private parties the right to exclude the rest. Any attempt at
administrative law reform must redefine the standard; otherwise "[aihead there
stretches-to the farthest horizon-the joyless landscape of the public interest
state." 190
V. CONVENTIONAL POLARITIES
The analysis so far has been somewhat disturbing. I have attempted to
illustrate, via both a theoretical framework and illustrative examples, how
regulatory givings short of property transfers have created an exclusionary
anticommons. Traditional commentary around regulatory reform espouses one of
two polarities: either privatizing public assets or declaring a commons. The
conventional commentary is schizophrenic, and I will argue, obfuscates the
derivation of real solutions.
A. Privatization
1. The Argument
Privatizing, or what is sometimes euphemistically termed "propertyzing"
public assets, 191 is currently very much in vogue. The original ideas can be traced
to one dimension of the seminal contributions of Ronald Coase and Harold
Demsetz. 192 The theory is that if private parties are given property rights, they
a license to a station not operating in the "public interest," merely because its misconduct
happened to be an unconvicted violation of the anti-trust laws.
Id.
189 See Stewart, supra note 165, at 1682-83 ("To the extent that belief in an objective
'public interest' remains, the agencies are accused of subverting it in favor of the private
interests of regulated and client firms.").
190 Reich, supra note 9, at 778; see also id. at 771 ("Somehow the idealistic concept of the
public interest has summoned up a doctrine monstrous and oppressive."); Glen 0. Robinson,
Spectrum Property Law 101, 41 J.L. & ECON. 609, 613 (1998) ("Like Lewis Carroll's Cheshire
cat, the body may disappear, but the grin [of the public interest standard] lingers on.").
191 See, e.g., White, supra note 55, at 20.
19 2 In this Part, I outline the simplistic, commonly held interpretations of Coase and
Demsetz. Part V.A.2, infra, discusses how their theories have been misunderstood.
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will negotiate to strike a bargain via the price mechanism that puts the resources
to their most efficient use:
Land, labor, and capital are all scarce, but this, of itself, does not call for
government regulation. It is true that some mechanism has to be employed to
decide who, out of the many claimants, should be allowed to use the scarce
resource. But the way this is usually done in the American economic system is to
employ the price mechanism, and this allocates resources to users without the
need for government regulation. 193
A corollary to this theory is that in a world of zero transaction costs, 194 an
efficient outcome will attain regardless of who is given the initial entitlement. 195
Private property averts the major problem of property held in common;
namely, it forces individual actors to internalize their costs:
Communal property rights allow anyone to use the land. Under this system it
becomes necessary for all to reach an agreement on land use. But the
externalities that accompany private ownership of property do not affect all
owners, and, generally speaking, it will be necessary for only a few to reach an
agreement that takes these effects into account. The cost of negotiating an
internalization of these effects is thereby reduced considerably. 196
The conventional argument thus proceeds as follows: privatizing assets not only
allows private parties to put goods to their most efficient use via the price
mechanism, 197 but prevents freeloading by forcing interested parties to internalize
193 Coase, supra note 54, at 14 (emphasis added); see also id. at 18 ("the allocation of
resources should be determined by the forces of the market rather than as a result of
government decisions.").
194 This world is, of course, unrealistic. See infra Part V.A.2.a.
195 See Coase Social Cost, supra note 131, at 8 ("But the ultimate result (which
maximizes the value of production) is independent of the legal position if the pricing system is
assumed to work without cost."); Demsetz, supra note 24, at 349 ("There are two striking
implications of this process that are true in a world of zero transaction costs. The output mix
that results when the exchange of property rights is allowed is efficient and the mix is
independent of who is assigned ownership .... ).
196 Demsetz, supra note 24, at 356-57 (emphasis added). Coase does not use the word
"externality," preferring instead the term "harmful effects." See R.H. COASE, THE FIRM THE
MARKET AND THE LAw 27 (1988).
197 Even the legal realists acknowledged this as a strong argument in favor of property.
See, e.g., Cohen, supra note 83, at 19 ("The economic justification of private property is that by
means of it a maximum of productivity is promoted.").
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their costs. 19 8 Since this, by and large, has worked successfully for real and
private property, 199 why not apply it to public property as well?
Indeed, several distinguished commentators have even made such arguments
around the examples discussed in Part III.B. For instance, Milton Friedman has
proposed privatizing national forests.200 William Fischel has argued that since
"zoning and other local land use controls are most usefully viewed as collective
property rights controlled and exchanged by rational economic agents,"20 1
municipalities should be able to sell zoning rights to private parties.202 In the
intellectual property arena, granting indefinite protection becomes de facto
privatization.
The most strident contemporary debate on the privatization front, however, is
that around spectrum reform. In seeming violation of the plain language of the
Communications Act of 1934,203 several well-known commentators are
198 See, e.g., Hardin, supra note 21, at 1245 ("The tragedy of the commons as a food
basket is averted by private property, or something formally like it.").
199 See, e.g., Adam D. Thierer, Solving America's Spectrum Crisis, TECHKNOWLEDGE
(Cato Inst., D.C.), Apr. 18, 2001, ("America does not find itself in the midst of a real estate
crisis precisely because markets are allowed to freely calibrate the forces of supply and demand.
Property rights, private contracts, and the common law govern disputes over tangible property
in America."), at http://www.cato.org/tech/tk/010418-tk.html (last visited Oct. 13, 2003).
200 MILTO)N FRIEDMAN, CAPrrALISM AND FREEDOM 31 (1962); see also Stroup & Baden,
supra note 89, at 305.
201 FISCHEL, supra note 126, at xiii; see also id. at 179-84.
202 Apparently underlying Fischel's argument is his belief that "local authorities attempt
to maximize the net worth of the median voter." Id. at 127.
203 Pub. L. No. 73-416, 48 Stat. 1064 (1934) (codified as amended at 47 U.S.C. §§ 151-
602). The statute explicitly prohibits ownership and any renewal expectancy. Section 301
states:
It is the purpose of this [Act], among other things, to maintain the control of the
United States over all the channels of radio transmission; and to provide for the use of such
channels, but not the ownership thereof, by persons for limited periods of time, under
licenses granted by Federal authority, and no such license shall be construed to create any
right, beyond the terms, conditions, and periods of the license.
47 U.S.C. § 301 (emphasis added). Section 304 provides:
No station license shall be granted by the Commission until the applicant therefor
shall have waived any claim to the use of any particular frequency or of the
electromagnetic spectrum as against the regulatory power of the United States because of
the previous use of the same, whether by license or otherwise.
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advocating granting private property rights to America's airwaves.204 Apparently
having accepted these arguments, the FCC seems headed in this direction as
well. 2
0 5
Unfortunately, as seductive as it sounds, the privatization solution is based on
fundamental economic misunderstandings. If implemented, its effect would be to
make the anticommons even worse.206
47 U.S.C. § 304. Some scholars have argued that de facto property rights have been created
despite these statutory prohibitions. See, e.g., Howard A. Shelanski & Peter W. Huber,
Administrative Creation of Property Rights to Radio Spectrum, 41 J.L. & ECON. 581 (1998);
William L. Fishman, Property Rights, Reliance, and Retroactivity Under the Communications
Act of 1934, 50 FED. CoMM. L.J. 1 (1997). But see CALABRESE, supra note 56, at 5 ("There is a
strong case to be made that not even Congress has the authority to 'sell off' the public airwaves
for all time."); Norman Orenstein & Michael Calabrese, A Private Windfall for Public
Property, WASH. POST, Aug. 12, 2003, at A13 ("The contemplated FCC action [to privatize the
airwaves] could result in the biggest special interest windfall at the expense of American
taxpayers in history.").
204 See, e.g., GERALD R. FAULHABER & DAVID J. FARBER, SPECTRUM MANAGEMENT:
PROPERTY RIGHTS, MARKETS, AND THE COMMONS 19 (AEI-Brookings Joint Ctr. for Regulatory
Studies, Working Paper No. 02-12, 2002) (advocating fee simple ownership coupled with a
non-interference easement), available at http://aei-brookings.orgladmin/ pdffiles/php84.pdf
(last visited Oct. 29, 2003); Hazlett Wireless Article, supra note 61, at 405 ('The enabling
policy is simply private property in radio spectrum. Such a regime would allow for the efficient
definition of rights, adjudication of disputes (including interference), and easy entry into
unoccupied property.").
205 The latest FCC pronouncement is tilted heavily toward privatization in the most
attractive bands--those between 3 MHz and 3 GHz that are both energy efficient and able to
penetrate walls. See FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION, SPECTRUM POLICY TASK FORCE
REPORT 38 (ET Docket No. 02-135, Nov. 2002) ('These variables suggest that in the lower
portion of the radio spectrum, particularly bands below 5 GHz, the Commission should focus
primarily, though not exclusively, on using the exclusive use model."), at
http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs-public/attachmatch/DOC-228542AI.pdf (last visited Oct. 11,
2003) [hereinafter FCC SPTF Report]. On the other hand, the FCC favors a commons model in
the higher, less attractive frequencies. See id. at 39 ("The variables described above tend to tilt
in favor of expanded use of the commons model in higher spectrum bands, particularly above
50 GHz, based on the physical characteristics of the spectrum itself."); see also FEDERAL
COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION, REPORT OF THE SPECTRUM RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES
WORKING GROUP 17-21 (Nov. 15, 2002), at http://www.fcc.gov/sptf/files/SRRWG
FinalReport.pdf (last visited Oct. 11, 2003) [hereinafter FCC Spectrum Rights Report];
KENNETH R. CARTER Er AL., UNLICENSED AND UNSHACKLED: A JOINT OSP-OET WHITE PAPER
ON UNLICENSED DEVICES AND THEIR REGULATORY ISSUES (Fed. Communications Comm'n,
OSP Working Paper No. 39, 2003), http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs-public /attachmatch/DOC-
234741Al.pdf (last visited Oct. 12, 2003).
206 See also James R. Rasband, The Public Trust Doctrine: A Tragedy of the Common
Law, 77 TEx. L. REV. 1335, 1358 (1999) (reviewing BONNIE J. MCCAY, OYSTER WARS AND
THE PUBLIC TRUST: PROPERTY, LAW, AND ECOLOGY IN NEW JERSEY HISTORY (1998))
(commenting that privatization is "the most anticommons solution").
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2. Deconstructing the Argument
a. Those Pesky Transaction Costs
It is startling that the overwhelming majority of commentary is focused on
the first part of Coase's landmark article, The Problem of Social Cost, where he
highlights a theoretical world of "perfect competition"20 7 and zero transaction
costs.208 Unfortunately, economic reality is much more messy, which is perhaps
why most economists either misread or duck the issue of transaction costs. 209 In
addition, privatization advocates have conveniently found ammunition in the first
part of the essay, whereas when the article is read in toto, a different picture
emerges.210
Transaction costs include "search and information costs, bargaining and
decision costs, policing and enforcement costs." 211 Imagine, for instance, if
207 See Coase Social Cost, supra note 131, at 3.
208 See supra note 195.
209 As Coase himself later lamented,
[t]he world of zero transaction costs... is the world of modem economic analysis, and
economists therefore feel quite comfortable handling the intellectual problems it poses,
remote from the real world though they may be.... A conclusion so depressing is hardly
likely to be welcomed, and the resistance that my analysis has encountered is therefore
quite natural.
Coase, supra note 196, at 15; see also Carl J. Dahlman, The Problem of Externality, 22 J.L. &
ECON. 141, 161 (1979) ("[O]ur sad state of affairs is rather due to positive transaction costs and
imperfect information."). An analogy can be drawn to the seminal work of Modigliani and
Miller exploring the effect of capital structure on the cost of capital. While postulating that in a
world of zero taxation, capital structure does not matter, they are careful to note that "drastic
simplifications have been necessary in order to come to grips with the problem at all. Having
served their purpose they can now be relaxed in the direction of greater realism and relevance, a
task in which we hope others interested in this area will wish to share." Franco Modigliani &
Merton H. Miller, The Cost of Capital, Corporation Finance and the Theory of Investment, 48
AM. ECON. REv. 261, 296 (1958). Of course, we live in a world of taxation, such that debt
financing (whose interest is deductible from income) is often used as financing strategy.
2 10 Commenting on Coase's Problem of Social Cost, Oliver Williamson notes that "this
important and influential paper is in two parts: the first part features frictionlessness; the second
qualifies the earlier discussion to make allowance for frictions. Much of the follow-on literature,
including franchise bidding, is largely or wholly preoccupied with frictionlessness or deals with
frictions in a limited or sanguine way." Oliver E. Williamson, Franchise Bidding for Natural
Monopolies-In General and with Respect to CATV, 7 BELL J. ECON. 73, 74 n.2 (1976); see
also Dahlman, supra note 209, at 158 ("The immediate implication, so often overlooked in
subsequent writings on Coase's work, is that when there are transaction costs and informational
differences between traders, then it may very well matter to whom liabilities and rights are
assigned.").
211 Dahlman, supra note 209, at 148.
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zoning rights were privatized as William Fischel has suggested. 212 For the right to
be put to its most efficient use, 213 market transactors must have information about
precisely who owns which right. They then have to find each owner and negotiate
to use the right-assuming, of course, that no right owner will "hold out" for a
better bargain.214 Then, even though the idea is to privatize, some authority figure
needs to make sure the zoning right is being respected. At each step, then, the
unfortunate reality of transaction costs challenges an elegant theory.215
In the context of forest management, Richard Stroup and John Baden have
discussed that "among potential externalities (aspects difficult to contract for) are
some of the effects of flood control, watershed provision, weather modification,
animal habitat, biotic diversity, and environmental buffering." 216 Yochai Benkler
has made an analogous argument to argue against the privatization of spectrum
rights,217 noting more broadly how:
212 See FISCHEL, supra note 126.
213 Here I ignore the critical issue of equity which I return to in Part V.A.2.b.
214 See, e.g., OLSON, supra note 118, at 176.
215 See also Demsetz, supra note 24, at 354. Demsetz notes:
It is conceivable that those who own these rights, i.e., every member of the community,
can agree to curtail the rate at which they work the lands if negotiating and policing costs
are zero. Each can agree to abridge his rights. It is obvious that the costs of reaching such
an agreement will not be zero. What is not obvious is just how large these costs may be.
Id.
216 Stroup and Baden, supra note 89, at 307.
217 See Yochai Benkler, Overcoming Agoraphobia: Building the Commons of the
Digitally Networked Environment, 11 HARv. J.L. & TECH. 287, 346 (1998). Benkler notes:
These costs are associated with deciding how to use the transmission rights, including
costs of collecting information about what the highest value use is at a given time,
processing that information, and deciding to switch uses when appropriate. They are
continually incurred by the transmission rights owner and by putative purchasers of
transmission rights to determine what the highest value of transmissions will be.
Id. In addition to the costs Benkler outlines, there are also the costs of switching between
different types of equipment depending on what use the spectrum is put to. A careful reading of
the articles that are simplistically assumed to advocate privatization also points to the
complications of transaction costs. See, e.g., Arthur S. De Vany et al., A Property System for
Market Allocation of the Electromagnetic Spectrum: A Legal-Economic-Engineering Study, 21
STAN. L. REv. 1499, 1507-08 (1969) ("Exchanging rights is a costly process; it includes the
costs for both buyers and sellers of searching out, negotiating, and enforcing mutually beneficial
exchange opportunities."); Jora R. Minasian, Property Rights in Radiation: An Alternative
Approach to Radio Frequency Allocation, 18 J.L. & ECON. 221, 269 (1975). Minasian
observes:
In order to demonstrate the mechanism by which such rights, once assigned, would
be reconstituted in a market, it was assumed that emission rights could be defined in terms
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Our entire relationship with our physical surroundings would likely be altered
fundamentally if, in order to leave our homes, we had to transact constantly with
others, having a superior right to decide whether we could or could not take the
route of our choice, at the time of our choice, using the vehicle of our choice. 2 18
Enforcement is also problematic. The conventional reaction is simply to
assume that common law will protect rights,219 and antitrust law will curb
monopoly.220 Both assertions miss the mark. It is woefully unclear how a
generalist judiciary has either the time or the expertise to police everything from
zoning rights to spectrum. Some scholars have even suggested that such proposals
misunderstand the essence of common law.221
Similarly, despite antitrust law, many industries-such as airlines, banks,
cable companies-have become increasingly concentrated, to the detriment of
consumers. 222 In the words of the trade press describing the evolution of the
wireless industry, industries left to the devices of antitrust law tend to engage in a
of single-valued power levels--that signal levels did not vary-and that there was no cost
associated with enforcing these rights.
Id.
218 Benkler, supra note 217, at 389; see also Lawrence Lessig, Commons and Code,
Keynote Address at the Fordham Intellectual Property, Media, & Entertainment Law Journal's
Seventh Annual Symposium: First Amendment and the Media (Feb. 9, 1999), in 9 FORDHAM
INrELL. PROP. MEDIA &ENT. L.J. 405,406 (1999).
219 For example, Pablo Spiller and Carlo Cardilli have made this argument in the context
of spectrum rights: "Once a property rights system is implemented, interference could be
handled through access to tort law. As long as individuals or entities may be sued and fined for
trespassing on another's spectrum rights, spectrum users will have incentives to respect the
rights of their spectrum neighbors." Spiller & Cardilli, supra note 136, at 63--64.
220 See, e.g., White, supra note 55, at 36 ('The antitrust laws would apply to spectrum
markets, just as they apply to most other markets in the U.S."); Hazlett Wireless Article, supra
note 61, at 405 ("Monopoly problems would continue to be the domain of antitrust law.").
Surprisingly, in one article Hazlett even assumes that "[s]pectrum use has no tendency to
natural monopoly .... Thomas W. Hazlett, Spectrum Flash Dance: Eli Noam's Proposal for
"Open Access" to Radio Waves, 41 J.L. & ECON. 805, 816 (1998). He offers no explanation,
however, of how spectrum is any different from other network infrastructure that tends toward
monopoly.
221 For instance, Tom Bell has insightfully critiqued Peter Huber's simplistic reliance on
common law to reform telecommunications, noting that Huber "too readily embraces a variety
of rules that would both clog common law processes and contradict common law principles."
Tom W. Bell, Public Choice and Public Law: The Common Law in Cyberspace, 97 MICH. L.
REV. 1746, 1770 (1999) (reviewing PETER HUBER, LAW AND DISORDER IN CYBERSPACE:
ABOISH THE FCC AND LET COMMON LAW RULE THE TELECOSM (1997)).
222 See Reza Dibadj, Deregulation: A Tragedy in Three Acts, WASH. POST, Sept. 13,
2003, at A21.
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"horribly self-destructive orgy of affiliation, branding and mergers." 223 Professors
Jean-Jacques Laffont and Jean Tirole use the example of New Zealand, where
telecommunications regulatory oversight was abolished, then reinstated, 224 to
demonstrate the "difficulty of ensuring competition in the absence of
regulation." 225
The most sophisticated advocates of privatization, who concede that
regulatory oversight would still be needed, gloss over the costs of such
mechanisms or even whether deploying such "public" mechanisms eviscerates
the core of the privatization argument. 226 As Stroup and Baden point out, "a
simple market solution, unbounded by continuing government intervention of
some sort, would involve serious externality problems ... ,"227
Perhaps the ultimate reason why transaction costs are important is
devastatingly simple: if we lived in a world of zero (or even low) transaction
costs, then the modem firm would not even exist.228 After all, if business could be
transacted via the price mechanism, there would be no need for organizations to
have developed alongside markets.229 Indeed, an entire branch of economics,
223 John Sullivan, Be Careful About Losing Spectrum Caps, WIRELESS INSIDER, Nov. 12,
2001, at 1. For a discussion of the anticompetitive effects of mergers, see, e.g., John W.
Berresford, Mergers in Mobile Telecommunications Services: A Primer on the Analysis of
Their Competitive Effects, 48 FED. COMM. L.J. 247 (1996). For a behavioral explanation, see
infra notes 257-65.
224 In late 2001, the government of New Zealand created the role of Telecommunications
Commissioner. See Press Release, New Zealand Ministry of Economic Development,
Landmark Telecommunications Act Passed (Dec. 18, 2001),
http://www.med.govt.nz/pbt/telecom/ minister20011218ahtml (last visited Sept. 15, 2003).
This action was partly in response to evidence that the incumbent, Telecom, was abusing its
market power to the detriment of new entrants such as Clear. See, e.g., iHam Dann, Change a
Way of Life for "Other Woman," SUNDAY STAR-TIMES (Auckland, New Zealand), Mar. 3,
2002, at 4.
225 JEAN-JACQUES LAFFONT & JEAN TIROLE, COMPETITION IN TELECOMMUNICATIONS 34
(2000).
226 See, e.g., White, supra note 55, at 32 (admitting the need for a national spectrum
agency-including to maintain registry, enforce interference issues, and serve as a vehicle for
international coordination and standards development).
227 Stroup & Baden, supra note 89, at 312.
228 See, e.g., Coase supra note 196, at 7 ("But perhaps the most important adaptation to
the existence of transaction costs is the emergence of the firm.").
229 Beyond markets and organizational hierarchies, a third mode of organization called
"peer production" may be emerging. See Yochai Benkler, Coase 's Penguin, or, Linux and The
Nature of the Firm, 112 YALE L.J. 369 (2002) (extrapolating beyond the open source software
movement, which is considered to be the first form of peer production), available at
http://benkler.org/CoasesPenguin.PDF (last visited Oct. 11, 2003). In an earlier article, Benkler
similarly posits that decentralization of information production is an alternative to privatization
or direct regulation of information policy. See Benkler, supra note 51, at 27.
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transaction cost economics (TCE)-building on Coase's insights23 0-has
developed in response to this reality.231
In his TCE study of opportunistic behavior by cable companies in franchise
renewals, Oliver Williamson observes that the traditional
"economic approach to law". . is characteristically deficient in microanalytic
respcts .... As I have observed elsewhere, this tradition relies heavily on the
fiction of frictionless and/or invokes transaction cost considerations selectively.
However powerful and useful it is for classroom purposes and as a check against
loose public policy prescriptions, it easily leads to extreme and untenable
"solutions. "232
Coase's The Problem of Social Cost plainly states that the "argument has
proceeded up to this point on the assumption... that there were no costs involved
in carrying out market transactions. This is, of course, a very unrealistic
assumption."23 3 In a later book, Coase points out quite clearly that the "world of
zero transaction costs has often been described as a Coasian world. Nothing could
befurtherfrom the truth. It is the world of modem economic theory, one which I
was hoping to persuade economists to leave.' 234
Coase suggests that future theories should be "incorporating transaction costs
into the analysis, since so much that happens in the economic system is designed
either to reduce transaction costs or to make possible what their existence
prevents. ' 235 He even postulates:
230 See, e.g., R.H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386, 389 (1937) ("It can,
I think, be assumed that the distinguishing mark of the firm is the supersession of the price
mechanism.") [hereinafter Coase NOF]; Coase Social Cost, supra note 131, at 16 ("It does not,
of course, follow that the administrative costs of organising a transaction through a firm are
inevitably less than the costs of the market transactions which are superseded.").
231 For an overview of transaction cost economics, see Christopher S. Boemer & Jeffrey
T. Macher, Transaction Cost Economics: An Assessment of Empirical Research in the Social
Sciences 3-4 (2001) (unpublished manuscript) ("The basic insight of TCE is to recognize that
in a world of positive transaction costs, exchange agreements must be governed, and that,
contingent on the transactions to be organized, some forms of governance are better than
others."), at http://www.ssu.missouri.edu/Faculty/Msykuta/Courses/AgEcon4l5/Macher%20
and%20Boemer.pdf (last visited Oct. 11, 2003); Howard A. Shelanski & Peter G. Klein,
Empirical Research in Transaction Cost Economics: A Review and Assessment, 11 J.L. ECON.
& ORG. 335, 337 (1995) ("TCE tries to explain how trading partners choose, from the set of
feasible institutional alternatives, the arrangement that offers protection for their relationship-
specific investments at the lowest total cost.").
232 Williamson, supra note 210, at 74 (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
233 Coase Social Cost, supra note 131, at 15 (emphasis added).
234 Coase, supra note 196, at 174 (emphasis added).
23 5 Id. at 30. He admits that his own analysis on this front is "extremely inadequate."
Coase Social Cost, supra note 131, at 18.
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[T]here is no reason why, on occasion, such governmental administrative
regulation should not lead to an improvement in economic efficiency. This
would seem particularly likely when.., a large number of people are involved
and in which therefore the costs of handling the problem through the market or
the firm may be high.236
In fact, the difficult problems-those we are concerned with here-are
precisely those that are messy and involve multiple constituents. They are those
where government regulation may actually pose fewer transaction costs than
purely private market transactions. What is fascinating is that Coase's logic
unwittingly leads in the same direction as that espoused by the leading twentieth-
century welfare economist, A.C. Pigou,237 whose work Coase initially set out to
refute.23 8 The economics literature virtually ignores this point.239
Simply put, basing policy on a world of zero transaction costs, is a canard.
b. What About Equity?
Transaction costs, whose analysis is based on efficiency grounds, make the
privatization solution to the anticommons problematic. Another blow to
privatization emerges when equity considerations are incorporated.
236 Coase Social Cost, supra note 131, at 18; see also Coase, supra note 54, at 18. Coase
states:
This discussion should not be taken to imply that an administrative allocation of
resources is inevitably worse than an allocation by means of the price mechanism.
The operation of the market is not itself costless, and, if the costs of operating the
market exceeded the costs of running the agency by a sufficiently large amount, we
might be willing to acquiesce in the malallocation of resources resulting from the
agency's lack of knowledge, inflexibility, and exposure to political pressure.
Id.
237 See generally A.C. PIGOu, THE ECONOMICS OF WELFARE (4th ed. 1932).
238 See Coase Social Cost, supra note 131, at 28-29.
239 Carl Dahlman and William Fischel are the rare economists who have made a similar
observation. See Dahlman, supra note 209, at 160. Dahlman states:
[Tihe Coase analysis implies one of two conective measures: (i) find out if there is a
feasible way to decrease the costs of transacting between market agents through
government action, or (ii) if that is not possible, the analysis would suggest employing
taxes, legislative action, standards, prohibitions, agencies, or whatever else can be thought
of that will achieve the allocation of resources we have already decided is preferred.... In
this way, the Coase recommendations arrive at exactly the same policy implications that
the correct Pigou analysis does ....
Id.; see also FISCHEL, supra note 126, at 121 ("Despite my claim that there is little
fundamentally separating Pigovian from Coasian analysis, two schools of thought on this
persist.").
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Proponents of privatization, who mistakenly use Coase's The Problem of
Social Cost as their treatise,240 ignore the fact that Coase's analysis is prefaced by
four all important words: "questions of equity apart." 24 1 Arguably, the greatest
weakness of traditional economic analysis is that in its fascination with
utilitarianism and efficiency, it ignores issues of justice that are central to our
jurisprudence. 24 2 For example, what is to be done with citizens who do not have
the financial means to participate in the privatization of our public assets? What
about those values we hold dear, but that are not quantifiable: what price on clean
air, recreational uses, or a diverse community?243 These are the troubling
questions that should haunt privatization advocates.
As Joseph Tomain has pointed out in his critique of William Fischel's
defense of private markets for land use control: 244 "Fischel never answers the
questions: Where do the excluded go? Are they to be denied community? Or
must they settle for a substandard community?" 245 In the context of
communications law, Cass Sunstein has noted that the "most important point is
that a market system may fail to provide a system of communication that is
240 See Coase Social Cost, supra note 131, at 3; supra notes 195,209-10.
241 Coase Social Cost, supra note 131, at 19.
242 Cf Christine Jolls et al., A Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics, 50 STAN. L.
REV. 1471, 1510-13 (1998) (discussing bans on mutually desired trades such as usurious
lending, price gouging, and ticket scalping that are based on standards of perceived fairness).
243 This weakness is also a reason why better regulations have not been enacted to protect
our forests. See, e.g., Stroup & Baden, supra note 89, at 306 ("We know, for example, how
much people are willing to sacrifice for a thousand board feet of lumber of a given species and
grade, but how much would they pay for a day's access to a wilderness area? In the latter case
we have only rough estimates."); Charles F. Wilkinson, The Public Trust Doctrine in Public
Land Law, 14 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 269, 269 (1980) (observing that our public lands "contain
economic wealth that is literally beyond our capacity to measure").
244 See FISCHEL, supra note 126, at xiii; see also id. at 179-84.
245 Joseph P. Tomain, On Local Autonomy: Discontinuity and Convergence, 55 U. CIN. L.
REV. 399, 413 (1986) (reviewing WILLIAM FISCHEL, THE ECONOMICS OF ZONING LAw: A
PROPERTY RIGHTS APPROACH TO AMERICAN LAND USE CONTROLS (1985)). Fischel himself
seems somewhat ambivalent. On the one hand, he argues:
[Tihe wealth effect of zoning accrues chiefly to some of the wealthiest members of our
society.... I argue that the free entitlements that zoning offers to suburban residents are
like offers of free memberships to the best country clubs to the rich, while all others must
pay to get in.
FISCHEL, supra note 126, at 137. On the other hand, he notes understandingly that "land use
controls are an inexpensive means of achieving social controls." Id. at 335.
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well-adapted to a democratic social order."246 Needless to say, privatization in the
context of telecommunications and intellectual property also raises significant
First Amendment concerns. 247
Interestingly enough, the equity argument is sometimes flipped to argue that
it would be unfair to ask firms to make investments unless they are given property
rights in public assets such as the airwaves. The traditional formulation of this
argument is that privatization encourages investment because it provides
certainty; of course, no evidence is provided as to why.2 4 8 Indeed, economists
who have studied the issue come to the opposite conclusion. As Louis Kaplow
observes:
For purposes of analyzing risk and incentive issues, the source of the uncertainty
is largely irrelevant. A private actor should be indifferent as to whether a given
probability of loss will result from the action of competitors, an act of
government, or an act of God, except to the extent that the source of the risk will
affect the likelihood of compensation or other relief.249
As Eli Noam succinctly points out "[u]ncertainty exists in every business, and no
firm can control every input.' 250
246 Cass R. Sunstein, Television and the Public Interest, 88 CAL. L. REv. 499, 520 (2000).
Sunstein also discusses a variety of problems that impinge on consumer sovereignty, leading to
an underproduction of public goods. See id. at 514-17; see also Ronald J. Krotoszynski & A.
Richard M. Blaildock, Enhancing the Spectrum: Media Power, Democracy, and the
Marketplace ofIdeas, 2000 U. ILL. L. REV. 813, 887 ("Given the dependency of our democratic
practices on this medium [television], it seems reasonable to ask whether it should be for sale to
the highest bidder, for such uses and for such purposes as the buyer might require. We think it
reasonably self-evident that this proposition must be rejected.").
247 See, e.g., Benkler, supra note 64, at 26-27 ("The information economy has made
things more difficult. To create property rights in this economy, government must often prohibit
speech."); supra note 186.
248 See, e.g., FCC Spectrum Rights Report, supra note 205, at 6 ("Parties who advocated
granting exclusive rights to licensees argue that such an approach encourages investment.");
Howard A. Shelanski, Competition and Deployment of New Technology in U.S.
Telecommunications, 2000 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 85, 89 (noting that to oppose the 45 MHz
spectrum cap, incumbent carriers argued that "without such consolidation, they would be
uncertain of having sufficient spectrum capacity for the new services and hence would find it
too risky to invest in developing the new technology").
249 Louis Kaplow, An Economic Analysis of Legal Transitions, 99 HARv. L. REV. 509,
534-35 (1986) (footnote omitted). Cf Lawrence Blume & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Compensation
for Takings: An Economic Analysis, 72 CAL. L. REv. 569, 573 (1984) (on the basis of efficiency
alone, concluding that government compensation for takings should be paid only "in those
cases that entail relatively large losses to those unable to insure against such losses").
250 Elt Noam, Spectrum Auctions: Yesterday's Heresy, Today's Orthodoxy, Tomorrow's
Anachronism. Taking the Next Step to Open Spectrum Access, 41 J.L. & ECON. 765, 784
(1998).
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Thus, privatization ignores equity as a vital component of public policy. To
boot, arguing that the only equitable incentive for firms to invest is to give them
free reign of public assets is a red herring. One may or may not agree with
Coase's point that "problems of welfare economics must ultimately dissolve into
a study of aesthetics and morals."251 But at least the law shouldn't ignore
"aesthetics and morals."
c. Behavioral Economics
As if transaction costs and equity considerations were not enough to spoil the
privatization party, there is also the thorny issue of human behavior.
Recent work by economists is casting doubt on the notion that economic
actors are, by definition, rational utility maximizers.252 Behavioral economics
fundamentally relies on real-world experiments to ascertain how real people
behave. Indeed, the core of the behavioral argument is that "assumptions about
behavior should accord with empirically validated descriptions of actual
behavior." 253 One behavioral trait, directly applicable to the privatization
argument, is the "endowment effect" which states that people often demand more
to give up a good than to purchase it.254 This casts strong doubt on the idea that
251 Coase Social Cost, supra note 131, at 43.
252 For an overview of behavioral economics in the law and economics context, see
generally Jol1s et al., supra note 242. For critiques of this approach, see Mark Kelman,
Behavioral Economics as Part of a Rhetorical Duet: A Response to Jolls, Sunstein, and Thaler,
50 STAN. L. REv. 1577, 1586 (1998) ("[Blehavioral economics can better be seen as a series of
particular counterstories, formed largely in parasitic reaction to the unduly self-confident
predictions of rational choice theorists, than as an alternative general theory of human
behavior."); Posner Rational Choice, supra note 160, at 1559 (arguing for rational choice theory
since with behavioral theories, "descriptive accuracy is purchased at a price, the price being loss
of predictive power"). Note that behavioral models, though gaining in momentum, are not new.
Mancur Olson, for instance, used a behavioral argument to discuss why states have had to resort
to mandatory taxation, even though it would be rational for citizens to pay them voluntarily. See
OLSON, supra note 118, at 13 ("But despite the force of patriotism, the appeal of the national
ideology, the bond of a common culture, and the indispensability of the system of law and
order, no major state in modem history has been able to support itself through voluntary dues or
contributions.").
253 Jolls et al., supra note 242, at 1489. Notably, in the emerging vocabulary of behavioral
economics, they exhibit "bounded rationality," "bounded willpower," and "bounded self-
interest." See id. at 1477-79; see also Richard Craswell, Passing on the Costs of Legal Rules:
Efficiency and Distribution in Buyer-Seller Relationships, 43 STAN. L. REv. 361, 385-90
(1991) (discussing how wealth effects and framing effects distort consumer behavior). Note that
leading behavioralists are careful not to call this behavior simply "irrational." See Jolls et al.,
supra note 160, at 1594.
254 The classic experiment in this context surrounds the exchange of coffee mugs. People
who were initially given the mugs wanted twice as much to give them up as those who didn't
have a mug were willing to pay. See Jolls et al., supra note 242, at 1483-85. This also explains
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rights will be put to their most efficient use regardless of their initial allocation-a
notion which privatization advocates are fond of citing.255 As Jennifer Arlen has
pointed out:
The endowment effect challenges the fundamental assumption of
economics that, absent wealth effects, an individual's maximum willingness to
pay for a good should equal his minimum sale price. This assumption is at the
heart of the conclusion that in markets with de minimis transactions costs,
commodities willflow to the people who value them most.256
Behavioral quirks also extend to firms as market actors. Many management teams
desperately want to "build an empire" even where a rational utility maximizer
would not. One article in the business press sums up the situation nicely: "All too
often nowadays, corporate boards seem eager to rubber-stamp deals negotiated by
empire-building CEOs. ' '257 It is why many companies, for example, overpay for
acquisitions. 258 It has also led companies in network industries to try to build
large proprietary networks, 259 something which even the most sophisticated
commons advocates view as "rational." 260 As the fate of companies like Apple in
why parties do not negotiate after a court judgment is rendered even though it could be more
efficient to do so. See id. at 1497-1501.
255 See supra note 195.
256 Jennifer Aren, Comment, The Future of Behavioral Economic Analysis of Law, 51
VAND. L. REV. 1765, 1771 (1998) (emphasis added); see also Jolls et al., supra note 242, at
1483 ("[E]ven when transaction costs and wealth effects are known to be zero, initial
entitlements alter the final allocation of resources."); Jolls et al., supra note 160, at 1602 ("The
behavioral economic analysis is that the granting of property rights will affect the allocation of
those rights.").
257 Michael Arndt, Let's Talk Turkeys, Bus. WK., Dec. 11, 2000, at 44.
258 See, e.g., Robert G. Eccles et al., Are You Paying Too Much for that Acquisition?,
HARV. Bus. REV., July-Aug. 1999, at 136 ("Despite 30 years of evidence demonstrating that
most acquisitions don't create value for the acquiring company's shareholders, executives
continue to make more deals, and bigger deals, every year.").
25 9 The rational argument would be that since the value of a network increases with user
and content variety, network operators such as cable companies have an economic incentive to
open their networks to third parties even without regulation. See, e.g., James B. Speta,
Handicapping the Race for the Last Mile?: A Critique of Open Access Rules for Broadband
Plaiforms, 17 YALE J. ON REG. 39 (2000). Unfortunately, as the behavior of the cable
companies to build closed networks makes clear, this argument simply doesn't accord with
reality. See Dibadj, supra note 51. For an overall discussion of network economic effects, see
generally Mark A. Lemley & David McGowan, Legal hnplications of Network Economic
Effects, 86 CAL. L. REV. 479 (1998).
260 See, e.g., BENKLER, supra note 82, at 6 ("Cable operators act rationally when they
design their broadband systems to favor their own ISP and their own content, but their private
rationality leads to public loss."). The reality is that their private irrationality leads to public and
private loss.
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computers261 and Wang in word processing 262 shows, this strategy typically ends
up "irrationally" destroying shareholder value-but CEOs continue to try.
In the context of environmental regulation, Timothy Malloy captures reality
when he notes that "what goes on inside the firn matters, and regulators should
pay attention to this point in designing and implementing regulation,"263 adding,
"[t]he critical point here is that even a perfectly efficient, profit-maximizing firm
will not consist of a group of profit-maximizing employees and managers. The
sheer size and complexity of the modem firm virtually precludes it from using
profit-maximization as the driving goal for every firm participant. '264 Regulation
could even serve as a proxy for shareholder oversight, which has become very
difficult given the dispersion of ownership in corporate America. 265
The insights of behavioral economics have potentially far-reaching
implications in the context of regulatory givings. That regulatory givings create an
anticommons that excludes the polity should hopefully be clear.266 That
regulatory givings can hurt the very private interests they are designed to protect
is, however, supremely ironic. Privatization of a portion of the airwaves has
already contributed to a "speculative frenzy" 267 over bits of spectrum that has sent
several wireless providers into bankruptcy. Some economists have argued that
general federal timber management policies, by increasing cheap supply, actually
hurt the very private companies they were supposed to benefit. 268 It is also
unclear what the long-term effects of exclusionary zoning will be on the social
stability of those who live behind the gates. The perhaps surprising implication is
261 See, e.g., Sculley Placed All Bets on the Proprietary Mac Way, INFOWORLD, Feb. 17,
1997 (noting with some amusement Sculley's 1987 statement of how unimportant
compatibility with IBM's PC standard would be).
262 See, e.g., The Innovator that Quit Innovating, U.S. NEws & WORLD REP., Aug. 31-
Sept. 7, 1992, at 23 (observing that "Wang... stuck with its own proprietary software on its
minis after cheaper models running Unix, an industry standard operating system, caught on").
263 Timothy F. Malloy, Regulating by Incentives: Myths, Models, and Micrornarkets, 80
TEx. L. REv. 531, 536 (2002).
264 Id. at 558.
265 Cf Demsetz, supra note 24, at 358. Demsetz writes:
Hence a delegation of authority for most decisions takes place and, for most of these, a
small management group becomes the defacto owners. Effective ownership, i.e., effective
control of property, is thus legally concentrated in management's hands.... Shareholders
are essentially lenders of equity capital and not owners ....
Id.
266 See supra Part Ill.
267 Woolley, supra note 57, at 150.
268 See Roberts, supra note 92, at 47.
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that revamping the regulatory state to curb unnecessary givings 269 can actually
protect the beneficiaries of regulatory largesse from themselves. 270
The field of behavioral economics is still in its infancy, 271 with its
implications likely refined and debated in the years to come.272 It is very unlikely
to supplant traditional economic theory, but will rather complement and enrich
it.273 One thing can be stated with reasonable certainty, however: often irrational
market actors cast serious doubt on the feasibility of privatizing public rights.
Coase himself observes, somewhat somberly:
The rational utility maximizer of economic theory bears no resemblance to
the man on the Clapham bus or, indeed, to any man (or woman) on any bus.
There is no reason to suppose that most human beings are engaged in
maximizing anything unless it be unhappiness, and even this with incomplete
success.
274
269 See infra Part VI.
270 There is even some support for this proposition in early twentieth-century economics
literature. See Frank H. Knight, The Ethics of Competition, 37 Q.J. ECON. 579, 593 (1923)
("Under freedom all that would stand in the way of a universal drift toward monopoly is the
fortunate limitations of human nature, which prevent the necessary organization from being
feasible or make its costs larger than the monopoly gains which it might secure."). In discussing
the size of the firm, Coase notes that "[o]ther things being equal, therefore, a firm will tend to be
larger: ... (b) the less likely the entrepreneur is to make mistakes and the smaller the increase in
mistakes with an increase in the transactions organised." Coase NOF, supra note 230, at 396.
However, empirical economics might suggest that, in fact, the larger the transaction, the bigger
the mistakes.
271 The recent award of the 2002 Nobel Prize to Daniel Kahneman and Vernon Smith for
their work in behavioral and experimental economics should hopefully advance the debate. See
Press Release, The Royal Swedish Academy of Sciences, The Bank of Sweden Prize in
Economic Sciences in Memory of Alfred Nobel 2002 (Oct. 9, 2002), at http://www.nobel.se/
economics/laureates/2002/press.htnl (last visited Oct. 11, 2003).
272 See, e.g., Arlen, supra note 256, at 1788 ("Behavioral economic analysis of law shows
promise, but it cannot yet provide us with a rigorous analytical framework which is consistently
superior to conventional law and economics.").
273 See, e.g., Gregory Mitchell, Taking Behavioralism Too Seriously? The Unwarranted
Pessimism of the New Behavioral Analysis of Law, 43 WM. & MARY L. REv. 1907, 2021
(2002) ("Just as we should not base our legal rules and standards on faulty assumptions about
the basic rationality of people, so should we not base reforms of our legal rules and standards on
faulty claims about the basic irrationality of people.").
274 Coase, supra note 196, at 3-4; see also id. at 5 ("None of the essays in this book deals
with the character of human preferences, nor, as I have said, do I believe that economists will be
able to make much headway until a great deal more work has been done by sociobiologists and
other noneconomists.").
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d. Problematic Transitions: The Auction
A final argument against privatization is the lack of an appropriate transition
mechanism. After all, how will the entitlements be allocated? This issue has
received the greatest attention in the context of spectrum allocation, where the
current vogue espouses auctions.275 Notwithstanding efforts to improve auction
design,276 the auction brings with it its own set of problems.
Auctions are clearly better than giving away spectrum to specific licensees
for specific uses under a "command and control" model.2 77 Another benefit is
275 This is based on Coase's zero-transaction abstraction. See also Coase, supra note 54,
at 30 ('The simplest way of doing this would undoubtedly be to dispose of the use of a
frequency to the highest bidder, thus leaving the subdivision of the use of the frequency to
subsequent market transactions."). For more recent support of the auction idea, see, e.g.,
FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION, FCC Doc. NO. 97-533, WT DOCKET No. 97-150,
THE FCC REPORT TO CONGRESS ON SPECTRUM AUCTIONS 39-41 (1997), at
http://wireless.fcc.gov/auctions/data/papersAndStudies/fc970353.pdf (last visited Oct. 11,
2003); Gregory L. Rosston & Jeffrey S. Steinberg, Using Market-Based Spectrum Policy to
Promote the Public Interest, 50 FED. COMm. L.J. 87 (1997); GREGORY L. ROSSTON, THE LONG
AND WINDING ROAD: THE FCC PAVES THE PATH W1TH GOOD INTENTIONS 17-20 (Stanford
Institute for Economic Policy Research, Discussion Paper No. 01-08, 2001), available at
http://siepr.stanford.edu/papers/pdf/01-08.pdf (last visited Oct. 11, 2003); John McMillan,
Selling Spectrum Rights, 8 J. ECON. PERSP. 145, 160 (1994) ("The FCC's spectrum auction is
unprecedented in its use of economic theory in the design of the auction."); Evan Kwerel &
Walt Strack, Federal Communications Commission, Auctioning Spectrum Rights (Feb. 20,
2001) (unpublished manuscript), at http://wireless.fcc.gov/auctions/data/papersAndStudies/
aucspec.pdf (last visited Oct. 11, 2003). For a more nuanced and balanced portrait of auctions
versus comparative selection, see ORGANISATION FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION AND DEVEL.
(OECD) Doc. No. DSTI/ICCP/TISP(2000)12IFINAL, SPECTRUM ALLOCATION: AUCHIONS
AND COMPARATIVE SELECTION PROCEDURES (2001) at http://www.olis.oecd.org/olis/
2000.doc.nsf/LinkTo/dsti-iccp-tisp(2000)12-fmal (last visited Oct. 11, 2003) [hereinafter
OECD Report]. For a survey of the rise of the auction phenomenon, see Krystilyn Corbett,
Note, The Rise of Private Propeny Rights in the Broadcast Spectrum, 46 DUKE L.J. 611 (1996).
276 See, e.g., Jeffrey Banks et al., Theory, Experiment and the Federal Communications
Commission Spectrum Auctions (2001) (unpublished manuscript) (using experimental
economics to model how actual participants will behave), at http://www.ices-
gmu.org/pdf/materials/376.pdf (last visited Oct. 11, 2003); Michael Abramowicz, The Law-
and-Markets Movement, 49 Am. U. L. REv. 327, 335-73 (1999) (improving private exchanges
via a combination of auction, exchange, and self-assessment rules); Patrick S. Moreton & Pablo
T. Spiller, What's in the Air: Interlicense Synergies in the Federal Communications
Commission's Broadband Personal Communication Service Spectrum Auctions, 41 J.L. &
ECON. 677 (1998); Dean Lueck, Auctions, Markets, and Spectrum Ownership: Comment on
Moreton and Spiller, 41 J.L. & ECON. 717 (1998).
277 For a persuasive criticism of the "command and control" paradigm, see MARTIN NEIL
BAILY, Er AL., WT DoCKEr No. 00-230, IN RE PROMOTING EFFICIENT USE OF SPECTRUM
THROUGH ELIMINATION OF BARRIERS TO THE DEVELOPMENT OF SECONDARY MARKETS:
COMMENTS OF 37 CONCERNED ECONOMISTS (Feb. 7, 2001), at http://www.aei.brookings.org/
publications/relatedlfcc.pdf (last visited Oct. 11, 2003); see also Hazlett CDEMI, supra note 68
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that they enrich the public fisc. As of autumn 2003, auctions for wireless
spectrum have raised over $40 billion in revenues for the U.S. Treasury.278 As Eli
Noam has pointed out, however, this uses a one-time cash inflow to fund ongoing
annual expenditures: governments clearly should not be going around selling
public assets to ease budgetary pressures.279 In addition, auction receipts are
offset by reduced future tax receipts (since bidding costs are deducted from
income). 280
Another argument against auctions is that providers will pass on the cost of
auctions in the form of higher prices to consumers. Many sophisticated
commentators ignore this reality. For instance, Lawrence Zelenak exempts
auctions from his general critique of revenue maximizing lotteries because the
"price to the consumer of personal communications will be a function of the
producer's marginal cost curve. Thus the cost to the consumer will be the same
whether the producer received the license as a windfall or paid dearly for it."'28 1
Unfortunately, this wishfully assumes a perfectly competitive market. As Jerry
Hausman has pointed out, "the actual economics of telecommunications
investment could not beffurtherfrom a perfectly contestable market.... Thus, the
use of a perfectly contestable market standard fails to recognize the important
(arguing that incumbent licensees "can file position papers, raise objections, question assertions
of entrants, demand additional information, and present doomsday scenarios about the effect of
additional competition. All the while, they win the game through mere delay").
2 7 8 See FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION, AucTIoNs SUMMARY, at
http://wireless.fcc.gov/auctions/summary.htm1#completed (last visited Oct. 11, 2003); see also
FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION, FCC Doc. No. 02-179, IN RE IMPLEMENTATION OF
SECTION 6002(B) OF THE OMNtmus BUDGET RECONCILIATION ACT OF 1993: ANNUAL REPORT
AND ANALYSIS OF COMPETITIVE MARKET CONDITIONS WITH RESPECT TO COMMERCIAL MOBILE
SERVICE, App. B (2002), http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs-public/attachmatch/FCC-02-179A1.
pdf (last visited Oct. 12, 2003); Woolley, supra note 57, at 150 ("In recent years companies-
mostly cell phone carriers-have bid over $30 billion for access to a mere 5% of the prime
spectrum."). Similarly, the auctioning of forests could bring revenue to the government (but
would be ill-advised). See Stroup & Baden, supra note 89, at 309.
279 See Eli M. Noam, Before the U.S. Senate Committee on Commerce on Radio
Spectrum Allocations and Valuation, 104th Cong. (July 25, 1995) (prepared testimony of Eli
M. Noam) ("[B]udget pressures are forever.... It's like New York City solving its budget
problems by selling off Central Park to developers."), at http://www.citi.columbia.edu/elinoan
articles/spectrum allocationjtestimony.htm (last visited Oct. 12, 2003).
280 Noam estimates that about twenty-five cents are lost in this manner for every dollar
raised. See id.
281 Lawrence Zelenak, The Puzzling Case of the Revenue-Maximizing Lottery, 79 N.C. L.
REV. 1, 17-18 (2000) (emphasis added); see also Kwerel & Strack, supra note 275, at 3
("Pricing depends on opportunity cost, not historical cost, and the opportunity cost of spectrum
is independent of the assignment technique.").
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feature of sunk and irreversible investments-they eliminate costless exit."282 Eli
Noam even suggests that winning companies could try to recover their high bids
by organizing an oligopoly to keep end-user prices high.283
Further, even if we assume there are no frivolous, unqualified, or collusive
bidders,284 there is the risk that only large corporations will be able to participate
in the auctions. What happens to smaller, technologically innovative firms?
Thomas Hazlett, perhaps privatization's most eloquent defender, concedes the
point that auctions may not allocate resources to innovative companies.28 5 After
all, an auction simply rewards the highest bidder, regardless of its contribution to
society. More broadly, we have to ask whether spectrum management's goal
should be to maximize government revenue or to protect consumers.286
One of the touted benefits of privatization is the lure of secondary markets;
indeed, this is often what allows the resource to be put to its most efficient use.
Evidence to date, however, suggests that these oft-touted markets are unlikely to
282 Jerry A. Hausman, The Effect of Sunk Costs in Telecommunications Regulation 3
(1999) (unpublished manuscript) (emphasis added), at http://econ-www.mit.edu/faculty/
jhausman/files/Colum98_rev3.pdf (last visited Oct. 12, 2003); see also OECD Report, supra
note 275, at 16. The Report notes:
The assumption that licence fees are a sunk cost is, however, based on the argument
that the market is sufficiently competitive, which is not always the case given that the
number of licences issued is usually limited either by the government and/or by the
availability of spectrum. In addition, since all firms with a licence face a similar level of
licence fees the possibility exists that all firms shift the costs of the licence to users....
While the concept of sunk costs has traditionally held sway in economic theory it has
recently been questioned, and there is not unanimous agreement that the prices paid in
auctions do not play a role in firm strategies especially with respect to their level of end
user prices.
Id. (footnote omitted).
283 Noam, supra note 279. Analogous problems emerge whenever the costs of entry to an
industry escalate. For example, Yochai Benkler has argued that intellectual property rights
increase not only revenues but costs for producers-"forcing producers to recoup these high
entry costs by selling to wide audiences. This results in a relatively small number of producers
able to fund full-time authoring and pay licensing fees to use existing information, who attempt
to recover their investments by capturing wide audiences." Benkler, supra note 65, at 570; see
also BENKLER, supra note 82, at 14.
284 Which some argue might be a heroic assumption. See, e.g., Comment, Ruth W.
Pritchard-Kelly, A Comparison Between Spectrum Auctions in the United States and New
Zealand, 20 MD. J. INT'LL. & TRADE 155, 159 (1996).
285 See Hazlett Allocation Article, supra note 61, at 13-14.
286 See Robinson, supra note 190, at 621 (bemoaning the "current enthusiasm for auctions
merely as a means of filling a depleted treasury, which has the effect of making
communications policy a simple tool of fiscal policy, probably to the detriment of both.");
Hazlett Allocation Article, supra note 61, at 15 ("[A] pre-occupation with government revenue
extraction leads to anti-consumer policies.").
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develop. In his study of New Zealand, which has gone furthest in privatizing its
telecommunications markets,287 Robert Crandall notes bluntly that "the winners
of the New Zealand tenders for management rights have not begun to shift
spectrum to potentially higher-valued uses." 288 This is something that ardent
privatization advocates have difficulty grappling with.289 There is also analogous
evidence in the United States. Eli Noam has challenged "[a]dvocates of resale
markets.., to explain the empirical fact that there was never any meaningful
resale of nonadvertising time slots for spectrum access by broadcasters, even in
multistation markets .... "290 Similarly, I have argued elsewhere that reselling
capacity is anathema to incumbent telephone and cable companies.291 Whatever
the cause--and no doubt the "endowment effect" plays a central role292-a
robust secondary market in rights does not necessarily follow from an auction.293
Finally, there is the argument that auctions which give away rights in fee
simple, or even have a renewal expectancy, violate the Communications Act of
1934.294 Some scholars go so far as to question their constitutionality based on
First Amendment concerns. 295
287 See supra notes 224-25.
288 Robert W. Crandall, New Zealand Spectrum Policy: A Model for the United States?,
41 J.L. & ECON. 821, 838 (1998); see also id. at 827 ("The obvious rationale for replacing such
a government-administered system is to allow migration of users so that each frequency is
devoted to its most efficient use. But such migration may be difficult, if not impossible for a
variety of practical and political reasons. As a result, a system of private spectrum management
may be less effective than we would like.").
289 See, e.g., Spiller & Cardilli, supra note 136, at 74 (noting that "there have been
substantial problems" with New Zealand's privatization of spectrum and "spectrum managers
thus far have failed to do much management, with few resale or rent transactions taking place").
29 0 Noam, supra note 250, at 786-87.
291 See Dibadj, supra notes 51 and 170.
292 See supra note 254.
293 Perhaps the FCC has now recognized this problem. See Press Release, Federal
Communications Commission, FCC Adopts Spectrum Leasing Rules and Streamlined
Processing for License Transfer and Assignment Applications, and Proposes Further Steps to
Increase Access to Spectrum Through Secondary Markets (May 15, 2003),
http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs-public/attachmatch/DOC-234562Al.pdf (last visited Oct. 12,
2003).
294 See supra note 203. Congress has permitted auctions for "use of the electromagnetic
spectrum." 47 U.S.C. § 309(j)(3)(D) (2000). But it has also made clear that that this in no way
confers ownership or a renewal expectancy. See 47 U.S.C. § 309(j)(6)(D) (2000). Eli Noam
notes however, that, "this is a legal distinction without a real difference. The strong expectation
is that the lease will be almost automatically renewed, just as it has been for TV broadcast
licenses, where of more than 10,000 renewals between 1982 and 1989, less than 50 were
challenged and fewer than a dozen were not renewed, usually because of some malfeasance. A
postcard suffices to renew a license. In cable TV the nonrenewal of franchises is similarly rare."
Noam, supra note 250, at 785. As FCC Commissioner Kathleen Abemathy observes,
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The point here is not that auctions are inherently bad; indeed, I even
recommend a carefully circumscribed form of auction, functioning as a lease with
no renewal expectancy and mandatory resell requirements, as part of the
solution. 296 However, broadly giving away estates in fee simple of public goods
to the highest private bidder is, to say the least, problematic.
e. Coda
When examined critically, the arguments in favor of privatization rest on
facile assumptions: that transaction costs are negligible, that equity is
unimportant, that economic actors are rational. Unfortunately, these basic
assumptions are rarely stated explicitly. 297 As Coase has observed, "[e]conomic
theory has suffered in the past from a failure to state clearly its assumptions. 298
Perhaps surprisingly, many seminal ideas were offered as hypotheses, not
absolute truths.299 Over time, drifting apart from their hypothetical roots, they
"[u]nfortunately, there has been a tendency within the FCC to feel compelled to auction
everything. Although that approach has an appealing symmetry, it is not what the statute
requires, and it does not fit every factual circumstance." Abernathy, supra note 178.
295 See, e.g., Yochai Benkler & Lawrence Lessig, Will Technology Make CBS
Unconstitutional?, NEw REPUBLIC, Dec. 14, 1998, at 12, 14; BENKLER, supra note 82, at 26-
34; see also supra note 186.
296 See infra Part VI.
297 For example, in a recent pronouncement on spectrum allocation, the FCC states that
for prime spectrum "the typical transaction costs associated with negotiation of access rights
tend to be relatively low in relation to the value of the spectrum." FCC SPTF Report, supra note
205, at 38. But no explanation is offered as to why this is the case. Similarly, Thomas Hazlett
critiques a non-property rights regime where "applicants must enter into detailed and lengthy
negotiations with the representatives of existing spectrum users, reaching frequency-sharing
agreements." Hazlett Allocation Article, supra note 61, at 11. But Hazlett does not explain why
these "negotiations" would magically disappear under his property rights system. See also
White, supra note 55, at 35-37 (transaction costs do not appear among objections to his
"propertyzing" idea).
298 Coase NOF, supra note 230, at 386. Similarly, William Fischel wams that
"economists should be modest in the application of their trade. Using their tools of analysis to
create a deterministic analysis of society seems dangerous and wrong-headed." FISCHEL, supra
note 126, at 122. Ironically, Fischel supports privatization of zoning rights. See FlSCHEL, supra
note 126, at xiii; see also id. at 179-84.
299 See, e.g., De Vany et al., supra note. 217, at 1501 ("The proposed system should
provide the basis for field experiments in certain portions of the spectrum, thus making possible
an empirical test of the benefits and costs of alternative spectrum-management systems."). Cf.
supra note 209.
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have become dogma.300 Privatization of public assets, unfortunately, is one such
idea. Far from being a panacea, it will actually exacerbate the anticommons.
B. Public Commons
The other solution proposed, the polar opposite of privatization, is to create a
public commons. This is a relatively new theory that is beginning to form.
Conventional wisdom suggests that a commons is an unworkable way to
allocate resources-be they intellectual property, forests, spectrum, or land.30 1
Commons advocates fundamentally question this notion. At its core, their
argument is that commons, if managed either by regulation or by social norms,
are efficient.302 Carol Rose has discussed how societies create customs to manage
the commons.303 Ellickson's influential book, Order Without Law-which
studies the norms established by the cattle ranchers of Shasta County,
California-can also be read in this light.30 4 Other scholars have followed in
arguing, for example, the efficiency of oyster harvesting during the nineteenth
century when oyster beds were a commons. 305 Straightforward examples of a
regulated commons, on the other hand, are public parks and Streets. 306
The argument has been applied to the examples discussed in Part III.B.
Indeed, they serve as a vastly different approach to the privatization solutions
depicted in Part V.A. In the copyright context, Stephen Breyer has questioned the
300 Brent Walton makes a similar argument in the context of Robert Ellickson's important
work, ORDER WrrHouT LAW (1991). See Walton, supra note 89, at 163 ("Readers of Ellickson
must be made aware that his hypothesis is still just that-a hypothesis that requires testing.").
Of course, performing such an inquiry does not necessarily mean the underlying hypothesis is
wrong. Frank Michelman, for instance, has performed an insightful analysis of the assumptions
behind private property. See Michelman, supra note 34, at 32-34. This in no way contradicts
the notion that private property has performed spectacularly well as an input into economic
growth and development.
301 See supra notes 21-26; see also Hardin, supra note 21, at 1244 ("Freedom in a
commons brings ruin to all."); Abernathy, supra note 178 ("The commons is a precarious
place.").
302 See, e.g., Benkler, supra note 229, at 437 ("The infamous 'tragedy of the commons' is
best reserved to refer only to the case of unregulated access commons .... Regulated commons
need not be tragic at all, and indeed have been sustained and shown to be efficient in many
cases.").
303 See Carol Rose, The Comedy of the Commons: Custom, Commerce, and Inherently
Public Property, 53 U. Ct. L. REv. 711,739-49 (1986).
3 0 4 ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WrrHOUT LAW (1991).
305 See BoNNIE J. MCCAY, OYSTER WARS AND THE PUBLIC TRUST 182-83 (1998). But see
Rasband, supra note 206 (critiquing McCay's thesis).
306 See, e.g., Lessig, supra note 218, at 406.
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validity of copyright protection. 307 In the realm of spectrum allocation, a few
commentators have argued that new technologies-that can seamlessly "hop"
among frequencies to find open channels, 308 or even permit networks to scale
with usage309-make a commons the best solution. There would be nothing to
manage except interference. 310
While theoretically engaging, commons advocates have perhaps not fully
thought through the practical implications of their ideas. The most general
problem is that of externality-as Harold Demsetz has identified, the central
reason why we have private property. 311 Take for example, our national highway
system which commons advocates trumpet as a successful example.312 Since all
taxpayers subsidize the highway system regardless of use, it allows certain
groups, notably suburbanites and truckers, to externalize their costs on the rest of
307 See Stephen Breyer, The Uneasy Case for Copyright: A Study of Copyright in Books,
Photocopies, and Computer Programs, 84 HARV. L. REV. 281, 321 (1970). Justice Breyer
argues:
[T]he case for copyright in books considered as a whole is weak. It suggests that to abolish
protection would not produce a very large or a very harmful decline in most kinds of book
production. And abolition should benefit some readers by producing lower prices,
eliminating the cost of securing permission to copy, and increasing the circulation of the
vast majority of books that would continue to be produced.
Id. This position is consistent with Justice Breyer's dissent over thirty years later in Eldred v.
Ashcroft, supra note 82. For a nuanced discussion of how the public domain, or commons, can
rescue copyright law, see Jessica Litman, The Public Domain, 39 EMORY L.J. 965 (1990).
308 These new technologies include ultra-wideband (UWB), software-defined radio
(SDR) and mesh networks. See, e.g., Technology Developers Urge FCC to Expand Unlicensed
Spectrum, MOBILE COMM. REP., July 22, 2002. A portion of the spectrum today effectively
operates as a commons; namely, for low-powered applications such as wireless fidelity
("Wifi."). However, there are already significant interference problems. See, e.g., Jesse Drucker
& Julia Angwin, New Way to Surf the Web is Giving Cell Carriers Static, WALL ST. J., Nov. 29,
2002, at A3; Steven M. Cherry, More Air for Wi-Fi?, IEEE SPECTRUM, Feb. 2003, at 51.
309 For instance, the Internet pioneer David Reed argues that a network can be designed
such that capacity scales to usage; in other words, as the number of users N increases, network
capacity grows as 4N or even N. See David P. Reed, When Less is More, FuTURE POSITIVE,
May 21, 2002, at http://futurepositive.synearth.net/2002/05/21 (last visited Oct. 12, 2003).
310 See, e.g., Lessig, supra note 218, at 415 ("Broad swaths of the radio spectrum could be
available for any to use, so long as they were using an approved broadcasting device. Spectrum
could become a commons, and its use would be limited to those who had the proper, or
licensed, equipment."); Stuart Buck, Replacing Spectrum Auctions with a Spectrum Commons,
2002 STAN. TECH. L. REv. 2 (2002) (supporting the commons approach for spectrum and
offering examples of successful commons outside the telecommunications field), available at
http://stlr.stanford.edu/STLR/Articles/02_STLR_2/arficle.pdf.pdf (last visited Oct. 12, 2003).
311 See supra note 24.
312 See, e.g., Benkler, supra note 51, at 7.
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society. 313 The analogy in spectrum would be interference among competing
signals.314
Now, this could all be avoided if mainstream technology existed to track the
specific highway usage of individual vehicles. But it does not yet. Similarly,
advanced transmission technologies that can triage information315---critical to
avoiding chaos in an unlicensed spectrum commons316-are still works in
process. 317 Yochai Benkler, one of the most sophisticated scholars advocating a
commons, for example, has heralded applications that in hindsight have been
commercially unsuccessful.318
Perhaps the best example to illustrate this deficiency is Eli Noam's
theoretically provocative proposal to have an "open-entry spectrum system"
whereby individual communications packets purchase tokens which serve as
"access codes." 319 The idea can be thought of as a "micro-license": instead of
obtaining a license to transmit over a certain bandwidth, market actors would bid
for licenses valid only for the duration of the transmission.320 This all sounds
glamorous except that, as Noam himself concedes, "[tiechnologically, the
313 Benkler tries to address this issue somewhat confusingly by differentiating between
upfront and usage cost, and arguing that a subsidy to truckers simply increases the usage cost
differential. See Benkler, supra note 217, at 356-57.
314 See, e.g., De Vany, supra note 141, at 637 ("Pervasive interference externalities
destroy the ability of markets to work efficiently and may prevent them from working at all if
the spectrum becomes a commons."); Hazlett Wireless Article, supra note 61, at 485 ("It is
undisputed that a true commons would lead to over-exploitation and airwave chaos.").
315 The technology to prioritize transmissions does not yet exist. Without this technology,
an analogy may be drawn to the most pressing problem with the Intemet where high value
communications must compete for space with low value, or even destructive items such as junk
e-mail. See also Hazlett Wireless Article, supra note 61, at 491.
316 See, e.g., Benkler, supra note 217, at 360 ("In an unlicensed environment, where no
one controls transmission decisions, rules concerning power limits... in combination with
transmission protocols... can operate to prevent interference and avoid congestion.").
317 See, e.g., Jon M. Peha, Spectrum Management Policy Options, 1 IEEE COMM. SURV.
2, 2-3 (1998) (noting that "rules of coexistence" such as access protocols would still need to be
defined), available at http://www.comsoc.org/livepubs/surveys/public/4q98issuetpdf/Peha.pdf
(last visited Oct. 12, 2003).
318 For example, Benkler touts Metricom's Ricochet, a high-speed wireless network. See
Benkler, supra note 217, at 325-26. However, Metricom ended up a business disaster. See, e.g.,
Todd Wallack, Wi-Fi Fans, S.F. CHRON., Jun. 30, 2002, at G3 ("And San Jose's Metricom,
which attracted a cultlike following for its Ricochet high-speed wireless service, went bankrupt
last year after signing up just 51,000 users in 15 markets.").
319 See Noam, supra note 250, at 777,779.
320 For an overall critique of Noam's idea, see Timothy J. Brennan, The Spectrum as
Commons: Tomorrow's Vision, Not Today's Prescription, 41 J.L. & ECON. 791 (1998).
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proposed system is not presently available .... ,,321 Of course, the technology
could develop and become commercialized at some point. The question is when
and under what circumstances. As a consequence, any proposed regulatory
framework must be both sensitive to existing technology and flexible enough to
evolve.322 In fact, to advocate a commons before the technology is ready may do
more harm than good to the idea in the long run.
Even if we assume the technology exists, what happens to transaction costs-
arguably higher than in any other regulatory regime given the sheer volume of
transactions necessary to make the market function.323 Further, having an
exchange could restrict the content of messages; for instance, via membership
requirements to participate in the spot market or by being able to filter the access
codes. 324
Another, more subtle problem with the commons, at least in areas where
technology is involved, is that it shifts responsibility onto equipment
manufacturers to make the commons function; for instance, by providing
advanced equipment that averts interference. Yochai Benkler argues, for instance,
that "the tragedy [of the commons] can be resolved within the framework of the
equipment market, and does not require a shift to the spectrum market. '325 Yet
what makes the motivations of equipment manufacturers more benign than
anyone else's? In the commons regime, what is to prevent them from becoming
321 Noam, supra note 250, at 778; see also Hazlett, supra note 220, at 813 ("According to
engineering specifications not entirely worked out, and employing machinery not yet available,
the right to use the airwaves for specific instances will be assigned by competitive bidding.").
This technological constraint is pervasive in the broader context of technologies permitting an
information commons. See Lessig, supra note 218, at 415 ("The details of this technology are
complicated. Fortunately, I do not have enough time to sketch them, because they are too
complicated for me.").
322 See infra Part VI.
323 Noam appears to concede this point. See Noam, supra note 250, at 781 ("Fransaction
costs in an open-access system may be larger than in a traditional spectrum-assignment
system .... ). But see Hazlett, supra note 220, at 814 ("Noam assumes that transaction costs in
a digital spread spectrum world are trivial. This is a trick; alert policy analysts will not be
fooled.").
324 See Benkler, supra note 64, at 80-84.
325 Benlder, supra note 217, at 362; see also id. at 351 ("[I]n an unlicensed environment,
equipment manufacturers in general will fulfill the same role allotted to the spectrum owner in
the property rights approach to spectrum management.").
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the bottleneck? 326 If the solution is to regulate via standards,327 how can we
ensure the standard doesn't become the instrument of exclusion?
Perhaps the greatest problem with the commons argument, however, is that it
underestimates the influence of economically powerful actors. Benkler argues
that "[s]pectrum, like manna and unlike twisted copper pair, falls from the
heavens to those who collect it. The monopolist, if one would emerge, would
therefore not be a product of a 'natural' monopoly based on large initial
investment in infrastructure. '328 Unfortunately, the economic reality is that
airwaves, in and of themselves, are commercially useless unless an enterprise
invests in transmission and reception equipment. 329 Without a regulatory
framework that cabins the possibility of bottlenecks, large wireless carriers will
have every opportunity to create a monopoly-in exactly the same way that local
telephone companies have with twisted copper pair, or cable companies with
coaxial cable.330 Not to acknowledge and actively manage this reality is idealistic.
VI. WHAT TO DO?
A. Reconceptualizing the Problem
The traditional reaction to many difficult public policy questions has thus
been bizarrely bifurcated: either privatize the problem, or create a public
commons. The wide divergence between these putative solutions is likely why the
debate is stalled despite voluminous writings on both sides. The first, and
arguably most important, step out of the quagmire, is to identify the problem
correctly. Why do we have exclusionary suburbs, or overly protective intellectual
326 Perhaps anticipating this point, Benkler argues that "[w]hat motivates equipment
manufacturers is that they will sell more devices than their competitors if their devices can
deliver more reliable, faster transmissions in an unlicensed environment where allocation is
attained by queuing." Id. at 360. But this explanation seems unsatisfactory. After all, can not the
same thing be said about any license holder in today's regime? Indeed, does not every for-profit
corporation aspire to sell more of a better product?
327 See, e.g., Benkler, supra note 64, at 81 ("Regulation must focus on equipment
certification rules designed to prevent the implementation of spectrum-hogging techniques in
equipment designed for use of the spectrum commons.").
328 Benkler, supra note 217, at 364; see also id. at 357 ("[T]he free usage of common
[spectrum] infrastructure is not the result of subsidy, because no cost is involved in developing,
maintaining, or recovering the infrastructure.").
329 Interestingly, Benkler himself seems to acknowledge this when he proposes "that we
stop talking about wireless communications regulation in terms of resource management. Using
this terminology obscures the fact that the problem is one of coordinating the use of equipment
that can cause and suffer collisions and congestion." Id. at 391; see also id. at 291 (.'[S]pectrum
management' means regulating how these people use their equipment."); supra note 220.
330 See Dibadj, supra notes 51, 170.
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property law, or a spectrum morass, or public lands being destroyed? To try to
explain this sad state of affairs with public choice theories or perversion of the
public interest mandate is incomplete.
This Article has proposed that the mechanism allowing these travesties is
subtle. Government bestows upon private economic actors rights short of
property rights. In turn, these regulatory givings allow private parties to exclude
others, holding up competition and diversity. Arguably the most critical step in
crafting a solution is the first one: recognizing that anticommons exist and how
they came about.
The second is not to lose hope that we can reform our public institutions. At
its core, the reason why the privatization argument fails is that government is
necessary to supplement and protect market actors from transaction costs,
inequities and irrationality. 331 We must eschew what Lawrence Lessig has
identified as our "self-indulgent 'anti-govemmentalism.' "332 Once we
understand the complexity of the problem, the incompleteness of the raging
dialogue, and the positive role government can be made to play, new possibilities
emerge.
If dismantling and preventing the anticommons becomes a central objective
of administrative law, then different tools can be brought to bear. In his classic
article on administrative law reform, Richard Stewart suggests:
Administrative agencies might be classified by their function, structure,
powers, environment, and the nature and quantities of discretion exercised....
Such a classification of agency functions and institutional contexts might be
paralleled by a similar classification of the various techniques for directing and
controlling administrative power, including judicial review, procedural
requirements, political controls, and partial abolition of agency functions. 333
Substantively, are regulatory agencies getting appropriate authority under their
enabling statutes or putting available resources to their best use? Procedurally,
what checks are there on legislative and administrative power?
Reconceptualization can reveal stunning problems ignored in the current
dialogue. For instance, the Administrative Procedure Act (APA)3 34 excludes from
the usual procedural requirements such as notice and comment rulemaking "a
matter relating to agency management or personnel or to public property, loans,
grants, benefits, or contracts."335 In their study of why "to date, most government
331 See supra Part V.A.2.
332 Lessig, supra note 218, at 418.
333 Stewart, supra note 165, at 1810 (footnote omitted).
334 Pub. L. No. 79-404, 60 Stat. 237 (1946) (codified at 5 U.S.C. §§ 552-706 (2000)).
335 5 U.S.C. § 553(a)(2) (2000) (emphasis added).
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disposition schemes have failed on a grand scale,"336 Harold Krent and Nicholas
Zeppos demonstrate how this omission represents a "failure to conceptualize
government property dispositions as regulatory policymaking .... 337 Recasting
these government givings as central to the regulatory function would necessarily
invite more scrutiny. It would be more difficult to create an anticommons.
We must also shift attitudes away from regulation as omniscient and
deterministic, and toward a model that is flexible to accommodate alternative
viewpoints as well as societal and technological evolution. 338 While applied
economics must usefully inform law, it should by the same token recognize its
significant predictive limitations. 339 Experimental economics, which attempts to
craft its policy prescriptions on empirical reality, is an important step in this
direction.340 A related notion is to move away from one-size-fits-all regulatory
prescriptions. It is in this vain, for instance, that Jane Ginsburg has proposed a
compulsory scheme for "low authorship" 341 works but not necessarily for other
copyrighted works.342 Government must understand the nuances of what it is
planning to give away; after all, as Gerald Torres has proposed in his analysis of
336 Krent & Zeppos, supra note 89, at 1707.
337 Id. at 1747.
338 In fact, this is why command and control economics are destined to fail. Leo Herzel,
who first suggested privatization of the airwaves, harnessed this point to argue against
government prescription. See Herzel, supra note 131, at 808 ("The choice of a method of color
television transmission by an administrative commission is an extremely formidable problem
and involves predictions about the course of scientific development in the foreseeable future
and about public behavior when confronted with new choices."); see also supra note 277.
339 See, e.g., Stewart, supra note 165, at 1703. Stewart explains:
Because applied economics is an art that requires discretionary judgments to be made in
selecting the proper universe for analysis, defining and measuring the relevant variables,
and resolving complications of the second, third, and fourth order effects generated by
possible policy choices, no single policy solution will generally be indicated to be clearly
correct.
Id. (footnotes omitted). For a general critique of the current relationship between law and
economics, see Reza Dibadj, Beyond Facile Assumptions and Radical Assertions: A Case for
"Critical Legal Economics"?, 2003 UTAH L. REv. (forthcoming).
340 See supra, Part V.A.2.c.
341 Defined as "personality-deprived information compilations such as directories, indexes
and databases." Jane C. Ginsburg, Creation and Commercial Value: Copyright Protection of
Works ofInformation, 90 COLuM. L. REv. 1865, 1866 (1990).
342 The compulsory license would enable "competitors to access, copy, and reorganize
data gathered by the first compiler, but [afford] the first compiler compensation for the
appropriations." See id. at 1870-71. In a similar vein, Stephen Breyer has noted that copyright
law has a different competitive effect on textbooks versus trade books. See Breyer, supra note
307, at 321.
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environmental regulation, "[t]he state does not own a river or the sky like it owns
the furniture in the state house." 343
In filings before the FCC, I have argued that perhaps the only way out of the
spectrum "privatization" vs. "commons" debate is for the FCC to hedge its bets
and experiment with both a commons and licensed leases with mandatory resell
requirements. 344 That way, the Commission will be ready no matter how
technology evolves: if the predictions of commons advocates come to pass, more
spectrum can be migrated as licenses expire; if, on the other hand, licensing
remains the only commercially viable mechanism, a robust primary and
secondary market is assured.345
Dissenting in Lochner v. New York, 346 Justice Holmes warned that "a
constitution is not intended to embody a particular economic theory, whether of
paternalism and the organic relation of the citizen to the State or of laissez
faire."347 The same admonition should apply in regulatory law: flexibility should
be a touchstone.
B. Revitalizing Doctrines
1. Consumer Welfare and Competition
Beyond broadly reconceptualizing regulatory law, we should seek to
reinvigorate specific substantive doctrines that can serve to forestall an
anticommons. Foremost among these is to reshape the nebulous "public interest"
standard into one of "consumer welfare." 348 Consumers typically get cheaper,
343 Gerald Torres, Who Owns the Sky?, 19 PACE ENVTL. L. REv. 515,530 (2002).
344 See Reza Dibadj, Public Comment on Federal Communications Commission
Spectrum Policy Task Force Report ET Docket No. 02-135 (Dec. 12, 2002), at
http://gullfoss2.fcc.gov/prod/ecfs/retrieve.cgi?native-or-pdf=pdf&id-document=6513397519.
345 See id.
346 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
347 Id. at 75 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
348 Prominent economists, notably Jerry Hausman, have proposed this in the context of
telecommunications reform. See, e.g., Jerry A. Hausman & J. Gregory Sidak, A Consumer-
Welfare Approach to the Mandatory Unbundling of Telecommunications Networks, 109 YALE
L.J. 417, 450-51 (1999); Jerry Hausman & Howard Shelanski, Economic Welfare and
Telecommunications Regulation: The E-Rate Policy for Universal-Service Subsidies, 16 YALE
J. ON REG. 19, 28 (1999). Cf Hazlett Wireless Article, supra note 61, at 452 ("The public
interest standard relegates consumer welfare to one interest competing among many."). One
must be very careful, however, to ensure that the term "consumer welfare" actually means what
it says. In particular, well-known commentators have cleverly managed to equate "consumer
welfare" with efficiency. This is most notable in antitrust law, where the term is prevalent. See,
e.g., ROBERT M. BORK, THE ANTIrRUST PARADOx: A POLICY AT WAR wrrH ITSELF 91 (1978)
(The "whole task of antitrust can be summed up as the effort to improve allocative efficiency
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more innovative products and services in a competitive and diverse environment;
after all, as the Department of Justice has pointed out, "competition tends to drive
markets to a more efficient use of scarce resources. 34 9
As a consequence, a "consumer welfare" standard can be used to protect new
entrants against established interests who currently use givings to squelch
competition under the "public interest" banner.350 As FCC Chairman Powell
reminds us, "[c]ompanies don't like competition. It's the biggest red herring and
garbage I've ever heard in my life." 351 A consumer welfare standard will force
incumbents to confront what they hate. It pushes regulation to combat bottleneck
control.
Such an approach would quickly debunk arguments supporting regulations
that perpetuate an anticommons. Take, for instance, the recent abandonment of
spectrum caps: there are no longer any regulatory limits as to how much spectrum
a cellular provider can aggregate.352 Under the public interest standard, critics of
spectrum caps triumphed using slippery generalities353  and subtle
inconsistencies. 354 The focus on consumers was lost in the noise. Under a
consumer welfare standard, these regulations would have remained in place, and
without impairing productive efficiency so greatly as to produce either no gain or a net loss in
consumer welfare."). For the argument that this misleading definition of consumer welfare
infects all of antitrust law, see Reza Dibadj, Saving Antitrust, 75 U. CoLO. L. REv. (forthcoming
2004).
349 William J. Kolasky & Andrew R. Dick, The Merger Guidelines and the Integration of
Efficiencies into Antitrust Review of Horizontal Mergers 2 (2002) (unpublished manuscript), at
http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/hmerger/l1254.pdf (last visited Oct. 12, 2003). For a more detailed
look at the benefits of competition see Dibadj, supra note 51, at 263-65.
350 See supra Part IV.B; see also Reich, supra note 9, at 766 ("Just as frequently,
government largess offers protection against the disadvantages of competition.... Sometimes
licensing is a particularly obvious cover for monopoly.... The partnership of government and
private may give further protection-not merely from the consequences of competition, but
also from the legal consequences of eliminating competition.").
351 FCC Spectrum Workshop, supra note 73, at 10 (statement of Michael Powell, FCC
Chairman).
352 See supra note 146.
353 For example, Gregory Sidak et al. have argued that lifting spectrum caps would
"[maximize] potential synergies" without explaining what these are. See J. Gregory Sidak et al.,
A General Framework for Competitive Analysis in Wireless Telecommunications, 50 HASTINGS
L.J. 1639,1664-65 (1999).
354 Sidak et al. also claimed that spectrum caps "are no longer necessary, as competition in
the wireless industry is robust." See id. at 1646-47. This argument however is circular, since
competition is robust precisely because of the existence of caps. They also opine that
"monopolization of the wireless equipment industry by wireless service firms would be next to
impossible." Id. at 1650. It is unclear, however, why monopolization of the equipment industry
is a necessary prerequisite to monopolization of the airwaves.
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consumers would continue to benefit from the robust competition among wireless
providers. 355
2. Public Trust
a. Modernizing an Ancient Doctrine
The public trust doctrine traces its roots to the Justinian notion that certain
resources-such as fish, wild animals, and rivers-should not be owned
privately. 356 Its earliest American manifestation is the New Jersey Supreme Court
case of Arnold v. Mundy,357 where the defendant took oysters from an oyster bed
which the plaintiff claimed belong to him under a land grant tracing back to the
King of England. Finding for the defendant, Chief Justice Kirkpatrick observed:
[T]his power, which may be thus exercised by the sovereignty of the state, is
nothing more than what is called the jus regium, the right of regulating,
improving, and securing for the common benefit of every individual citizen. The
sovereign power itself, therefore, cannot, consistently with the principles of the
law of nature and the constitution of a well ordered society, make a direct and
absolute grant of the waters of the state, divesting all the citizens of their
common right. It would be a grievance which never could be long borne by a
free people. 358
In a similar vein, where a plaintiff claimed he had rights to land under the Raritan
River in New Jersey that was used as an oyster bed under a grant from King
Charles 1H to the Duke of York, the United States Supreme Court noted:
355 As FCC Commissioner Copps argued in an impassioned dissent, lifting spectrum caps
would be "stifling competition, encouraging industry consolidation and short-changing hard-
pressed American consumers. Let's not kid ourselves-this is, for some, more about corporate
mergers than it is about anything else.... We have not adequately evaluated the prospects for
economic concentration and the potential for wireless monopolies." Michael J. Copps,
Statement of Commissioner Michael J. Copps, Dissenting, In Re 2000 Biennial Regulatory
Review Spectrum Aggregation Limits for Commercial Mobile Radio Services (WT Docket
No. 01-14) 1 (Nov. 7, 2001), at http://www.fcc.gov/Speeches/Copps/Statements/2001/
stmjc123.pdf (last visited Oct. 12, 2003).
356 These resources were labeled "res extra commercium" or "res communes." See, e.g.,
Torres, supra note 343, at 529.
357 6 N.J.L. 1 (1821).
358 Id. at 78. In his opinion, Justice Rossell noted that it would be insulting to think "that
our legislatures, from time to time taking upon them to regulate fisheries of oysters as well as of
floating fish for the public benefit, were totally ignorant of their powers, overstepped the bounds
prescribed by the constitution, to the destruction of the rights and interests of individuals? I
think not." Id. at 92-93.
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If the shores, and rivers, and bays, and arms of the sea, and the land under them,
instead of being held as a public trust for the benefit of the whole community, to
be freely used by all for navigation and fishery, as well for shell-fish as floating
fish, had been converted by the charter itself into private property, to be parceled
out and sold by the duke [of York] for his own individual emolument? There is
nothing we think in the terms of the letters patent, or in the purposes for which it
was granted, that would justify this construction. 359
Fifty years later, in Illinois Central Railroad Co. v. Illinois,360 the United States
Supreme Court again used the public trust doctrine to uphold the Illinois
legislature's revocation of a grant of a large portion of submerged lands at
Chicago's waterfront to the railroad.36 1 The best known modem application of the
public trust doctrine is the Lake Mono case, 362 where the Supreme Court of
California allowed the California Water Resources Board to revoke a 1940 permit
allowing the Los Angeles Department of Water and Power to appropriate the
flow from several streams into Lake Mono.363
Consistent in every opinion is the desire to entrust the management of scarce
resources to the state. As society has evolved, however, more resources have
become scarce: we need to worry not only about our waters and fish, but also
about things like spectrum and forests. As Joseph Sax has persuasively argued:
The central idea of the public trust is preventing the destabilizing
disappointment of expectations held in common but without formal recognition
such as title. The function of the public trust as legal doctrine is to protect such
public expectations against destabilizing changes, just as we protect conventional
private property from such changes. 364
359 Martin v. Waddell's Lessee, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 367,413 (1842).
360 146 U.S. 387 (1892).
361 See id. at 456 ('his follows necessarily from the public character of the property,
being held by the whole people for the purposes in which the whole people are interested.").
362 Nat'l Audubon Soc'y v. Superior Court of Alpine County, 658 P.2d 709 (Cal. 1983).
363 See id. at 712 ("In our opinion, the core of the public trust doctrine is the state's
authority as sovereign to exercise a continuous supervision and control over the navigable
waters of the state and the lands underlying those waters.").
364 Joseph L. Sax, Liberating the Public Trust Doctrine from Its Historical Shackles, 14
U.C. DAvIs L. REv. 185, 188 (1980) (footnote omitted). Note the remarkable consistency with
the Supreme Court's motivations in Martin v. Waddell's Lessee:
[F]or the men who first formed the English settlements, could not have been expected
to encounter the many hardships that unavoidably attended their emigration to the
new world, and to people the banks of its bays and rivers if the land under the water at
their very doors was liable to immediate appropriation by another as private property;
and the settler upon the fast land thereby excluded from its enjoyment, and unable to
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If the regulatory state is viewed as the custodian of the public assets-rather than
merely as protecting some ill-defined "public interest"f-then its ability to
perpetuate givings is sharply curtailed.365 The true power of public trust would be
to "integrate legal doctrine and fundamental principles of intelligent resource
management, instead of treating basic social decisions as if they were merely the
province of a title examiner." 366
Modem commentators have already begun applying the doctrine in fields
adjacent to water management, such as managing land,367 and saving the air from
pollution.368 One distinguished scientist urging the preservation of biodiversity
has forcefully argued that forests are "a public trust of incalculable value." 369 But
the idea has even broader applicability. Take intellectual property law, where
scholars insightfully advocate an expansion, not retraction,370 of fair use as an
"instrument of inclusion. '371 The public trust lens would buttress their position:
take a shell-fish from its bottom, or fasten there a stake, or even bathe in its waters
without becoming a trespasser in the rights of another.
See 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) at 414.
365 Cf Wilkinson, supra note 243, at 312 (arguing that the public irust doctrine is not
merely a limitation on agency power, but a mechanism to force agencies to act proactively).
366 Sax, supra note 364, at 194; see also Reich, supra note 9, at 779. Reich states:
Once property is seen not as a natural right but as a construction designed to serve certain
functions, then its origin ceases to be decisive in determining how much regulation should
be imposed. The conditions that can be attached to receipt, ownership, and use depend not
on where property came from, but on what job it should be expected to perform. Thus in
the case of government largess, nothing turns on the fact that it originated in government.
The real issue is how it functions and how it should function.
Id. at 779.
367 See, e.g., Wilkinson, supra note 243.
368 Gerald Torres argues that "all regulation or allocation of the assets make up the sky are
invested with a public interest that defines the limits to actions that the government may take in
relation to this resource. The federal government may no more trade away the public's interest
in the sky than the State of Illinois could sell the shore of Lake Michigan." Torres, supra note
343, at 524. Torres labels his proposal a "skytrust." Id. at 533.
369 Edward 0. Wilson, Selling Out Our Forests, WASH. POsT, Aug. 28, 2003, at A27.
370 See supra notes 85-86.
371 Okediji, supra note 87, at 154; see also O'Rourke, supra note 45, at 1249 (arguing that
"patent law should adopt a fair use doctrine to ... prevent rights from becoming overbroad in
the new circumstances of today's high-tech world"). But see Rubenfeld, supra note 76, at 16-
21 (arguing that the fair use doctrine is not sufficient to make current copyright law
constitutional).
2003] 1109
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
the sovereign could grant rights when they promote a public purpose, while not
granting them or even rescinding them in other circumstances. 372
Another accomplishment of the public trust doctrine would be to make the
entire concept of givings problematic: after all, how can the sovereign give
something away when such an action would transgress its authority? This makes
both blatant giveaways and auctions problematic, and refocuses the debate around
fees. Simply put, if an economic actor wants to use public resources, it must pay a
rental or usage fee that is unsubsidized. 373 A number of commentators have
moved in this direction in a variety of contexts. 374 The state could use the money
to fund programs in a field related to the asset held in trust.375 Unlike auctions or
the current broadcasting license giveaway, the state maintains the option to cancel
the lease at any time.376 Also in contrast to auctions, the government receipts are
spread out across time.377
b. Managing Transitions
The public trust doctrine can also simplify transitions to remedy givings that
have already occurred. In particular, cases such as Illinois Central and Lake Mono
stand for the proposition that the sovereign has the right to revoke a grant
conferred under the public trust.378
372 Keith Aoki argues that such an interpretation would respect the language of the
Copyright Clause, which instructs Congress to "promote the Progress of Science and useful
Arts." See Aoki, supra note 40, at 41-46; see also supra note 82.
373 As Richard Stroup and John Baden have argued, "there is a measure of equity in
having those people who use a resource, or wish to reserve it for use, pay for it by sacrificing
some of their wealth." See Stroup & Baden, supra note 89, at 307.
374 In the forest management area, see id. ("Those using the forests would be required to
pay, whether it be for recreation, timber harvest, or even research in a unique area."); Knize,
supra note 1, at 112. Lawrence Lessig suggests fees in the context of copyright, at least as a
mechanism to separate active copyrights from those that should fall into the public domain. See
Lawrence Lessig, Protecting Mickey Mouse at Art's Expense, N.Y. TtMEs, Jan. 18, 2003, at
A17 ("Patent holders have to pay a fee every few years to maintain their patents. The same
principle could be applied to copyright."). Interestingly, Leo Herzel's initial proposal to
privatize the airwaves suggested the "FCC could lease channels for a stated period to the
highest bidder." Herzel, supra note 131, at 811 (emphasis added).
375 For instance, spectrum rental fees could be used to improve digital content, software
and tools for education. See CALABRESE, supra note 56, at 12.
376 This would be consistent with Congress' statutory direction. See supra note 203.
377 See supra note 279; see also Peha, supra note 317, at 7 ("That way [via fees]
governments could not use one-time payments to pay for annual expenditures.").
378 See supra notes 360-63.
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Take, for instance, the case of incumbents, such as UHF licensees, who
currently control broad swathes of spectrum without having paid a dime.379 One
of the key holdups to license reform is how to move these bandwidth hogs and
replace them with more productive users. In its latest pronouncement on spectrum
reform, the FCC contemplates leaving incumbents where they are, or providing
incentives for them to move.380 The underlying assumption, however, is that the
licensees have a pre-determined right to use those frequencies. Even sophisticated
commentators such as Arthur De Vany simply assume that "[a]bandonment of
frequencies by an incumbent.., is rational only if the licensee receives
compensation. ' 381 But why is this rational? In fact, why isn't the dialog around
the irrationality of perpetuating an incumbent's free ride?382 Under the public
trust doctrine, of course, there would be no need to compensate the incumbents.
This alone could help refocus the spectrum reform debate.383
Another example is that of government tax concessions. In his study of
government franchising and the development of railroads in nineteenth century
New Jersey, Christopher Grandy criticizes the state for reneging on tax
concessions, accusing government of an "opportunistic breach."384 If, however,
this analysis is refocused using the tools presented in this Article, the tax
concession can be viewed ab initio as a giving.385 Further, under a broad
379 See supra notes 58-60 and accompanying text.
380 See FCC Spectrum Rights Report, supra note 205, at 49-51; see also EVAN KWEREL
& JOHN WILIAMs, A PROPOSAL FOR A RAPID TRANSMON TO MARKEr ALLOCATION OF
SPECrRuM 6 (Fed. Communications Comm'n, OPP Working Paper No. 38, 2002),
http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs.public/attachmatch/DOC-228552AI.pdf (last visited Oct. 12,
2003).
381 De Vany, supra note 141, at 639 (emphasis added). Curiously, supporters of spectrum
privatization suddenly point to transaction costs and equity as reasons to prevent incumbent
relocation. See, e.g., Peter Cramton, et al., Efficient Relocation of Spectrum Incumbents, 41 J.L.
& ECON. 647,648 (1998). Cf IKEDA NOBUO, THE SPECTRUM AS COMMONS (RIETI, Discussion
Paper No. 02-E-002, 2003) (arguing that government authorities could pay incumbents to free
spectrum via reverse auctions), http://www.rieti.go.jp/jp/publications/dp/02e002.pdf (last visited
Oct. 12, 2003).
382 The New America Foundation does suggest that "[o]ne option is to simply set a date
when incumbent licenses will be auctioned rather than automatically renewed." See
CALABRESE supra note 56, at 14. But then it dismisses this idea as "politically impractical." Id.
383 Let alone the fact that not giving incumbents the right to stay on public property would
be consistent with § 301 and § 304 of the Communications Act. See supra note 203.
384 Christopher Grandy, Can Government Be Trusted to Keep Its Part of a Social
Contract?: New Jersey and the Railroads, 1825-1888,5 J.L. EON. & ORG. 249, 249 (1989).
385 Grandy argues that governments should not be parties to relational contracts since the
state has enforcement power. See id. at 266-67. But curiously, Grandy becomes concerned only
once the "giving" is taken away, not with the initial contract. More broadly, he ducks the
question of how a state can participate in commerce without being a party to contracts.
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conception of the public trust doctrine, the sovereign had every right to revoke its
concessions, much like the State of Illinois did in Illinois Central.386
The public trust doctrine also accords with economic reality. Louis Kaplow
suggests that efficiency dictates economic actors find ways to manage risk
without relying on government largesse, since "[tlransitional relief constitutes an
externality that disrupts the market's response to the risk imposed by uncertainty
concerning future government action."387 Daryl Levinson even argues that
"making government pay money is not an especially promising approach to
constitutional remedies .... [G]overnment behavior responds to political, not
market, incentives." 388
At the broadest level, the public trust doctrine could help remedy two flagrant
inconsistencies that exist between current takings and givings jurisprudence. First,
compensation is due a private party if the government "takes" something, but we
do not require the private party to pay a portion of the proceeds when the
government "gives" something.389 Second, not only does the private party not
have to pay, but we expect the government to compensate the private party if the
government revokes what its largesse originally bestowed. A weak form of the
public trust doctrine would address the second problem; for example, moving
incumbent broadcast licensees. A stronger form-one that renders givings
themselves problematic-would also deal with the first.
386 See supra notes 360-61.
387 Kaplow, supra note 249, at 551. Kaplow argues:
The example of firms making potentially dangerous products, or making large investments
on land that is likely to be taken in the near future for a highway project, illustrates the
intuition behind the subtle and frequently overlooked point that it is desirable for investors
to be influenced by the prospects of future government action, however uncertain, in
making current decisions.
Id. at 615; see also supra notes 249-50.
388 Daryl J. Levinson, Making Government Pay: Markets, Politics, and the Allocation of
Constitutional Costs, 67 U. CHI. L. REv. 345, 416-17 (2000); see also id. at 414-15 ("In short,
whereas well functioning markets require relatively stable entitlements and relatively high
levels of individual autonomy over the disposition of these entitlements, democratic politics
often demands coerced redistribution. Using market criteria to evaluate the fairness or efficacy
of democratic processes simply will not do.").
389 See, e.g., Kaplow, supra note 249, at 554 ("[T]hose advocating mitigation of windfall
losses virtually never recommend taxation of similar windfall gains."); Adam Diamant,
Government Takings? What About Givings?, CHRISTIAN Sci. MONrToR, Feb. 24, 1995, at 18
(suggesting, somewhat tongue in cheek, that if government should compensate people under
takings if the value of their land decreases more than 10%, then they should have to return 90%
of any givings back to the government).
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3. "Property" vs. "Liability" Rules
Another idea to forestall the anticommons is greater use of "liability" rules
over "property" rules. In their classic article to unite concepts in tort and property
law,390 Guido Calabresi and Douglas Melamed distinguish two types of legal
entitlements. An entitlement "is protected by a property rule to the extent that
someone who wishes to remove the entitlement from its holder must buy it from
him in a voluntary transaction in which the value of the entitlement is agreed
upon by the seller."'391 On the other hand, "[w]henever someone may destroy the
initial entitlement if he is willing to pay an objectively determined value for it, an
entitlement is protected by a liability rule."392 Property rules, like the privatization
approach in Part V.A, thus give an absolute right to exclude; with a liability rule,
another party is allowed to encroach on the entitlement provided she is willing to
pay.
The conventional wisdom is that property rules encourage contracting.
Building on Calabresi and Melamed's work, however, Ian Ayres and Eric Talley
have challenged this concept:
The ability of Solomonic entitlements such as untailored liability rules to
facilitate Coasean trade is starkly at odds with the accepted wisdom that property
rules are "market-encouraging" when transaction costs are low. Property rules
and liability rules may thus run neck and neck in a Coasean horse race, even
when transaction costs are low; and when private information is the major source
of inefficiency, liability rules and other divided entitlement forms may hold the
lead.
Our conclusion that uncertain and weakly protected entitlements might
produce more efficient trade than undivided property rights runs counter to
deeply held but possibly unexamined beliefs.393
A central reason for this reality is that with a liability rule, the entitlement owner
is forced to reveal what the entitlement is worth to her, thereby sharply curtailing
390 Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and
Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARv. L. REV. 1089 (1972).
391 Id. at 1092 (emphasis added).
39 2 Id. (emphasis added).
393 Ian Ayres & Eric Talley, Solomonic Bargaining: Dividing a Legal Entitlement to
Facilitate Coasean Trade, 104 YALE L.J. 1027, 1101-02 (1995) (footnotes omitted). Calabresi
and Melamed themselves observe that liability rules are created to avoid the hold-up problem.
See Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 390, at 1106-07.
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strategic bargaining and holdouts.394 A hold-up, of course, is the telltale sign of an
anticommons. 395
Calabresi and Melamed observe that with liability rules, the state has to set
the amount that needs to get paid. 39 6 Some commentators have seized on this
additional step to question the superiority of liability rules.397 Louis Kaplow and
Steven Shavell have noted, however, that "if a court sets damages equal to its best
estimate of harm-the average harm for cases characterized by the facts the court
observes-the outcome under the liability rule will be superior, on average, to the
outcome under property rules." 398
In fact, liability rules are particularly good where there are collective action
problems. Conceptualize, for example, a number of rights vested collectively in
citizens: the right to enjoy clean air or vibrant forests, for example. Under a
property rule regime, corporations who want to infringe on those rights would
need to bargain with the polity at large. Of course, this is virtually impossible. The
corporation could bargain directly with the state to cede those rights (which is
happening today), but the state is not in a position to give the rights away, because
they belong to the people. Liability rules, on the other hand, would force the
corporation to pay for infringement. This conception dovetails nicely with the
public trust doctrine: the state is acting as custodian for the public's rights, and
anyone who wishes to infringe on those rights must pay for use. 399 No one
claiming to be acting on society's behalf should be allowed to bargain away the
entitlement for good.
Though not couching their arguments in this framework, a few innovative
commentators are already heading in this direction. In the environmental arena,
Kaplow and Shavell advocate pollution taxes, a variation on liability rules,
realizing the futility of having pollution victims bargain under a property
394 See Ayres & Talley, supra note 393, at 1082 ("[D]ivided entitlements can enhance
welfare by promoting greater revelation of information during bargaining.").
395 See supra notes 41-42.
396 See Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 390, at 1092 ("Obviously, liability rules involve
an additional stage of state intervention: not only are entitlements protected, but their transfer or
destruction is allowed on the basis of a value determined by some organ of the state rather than
by the parties themselves.").
397 See, e.g., James E. Krier & Stewart J. Schwab, Property Rules and Liability Rules: The
Cathedral in Another Light, 70 N.Y.U. L. REv. 440, 453 (1995) ("Just as obstacles to
bargaining (transaction costs) might impede efficient exchanges by the parties in property rule
cases, so problems in obtaining and processing information (assessment costs) might impede
efficient damage calculations by the judge in liability rule cases.").
398 Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Property Rules Versus Liability Rules: An Economic
Analysis, 109 HARv. L. REv. 713, 719 (1996); see also id. at 728-32. In addition, creative ways
of determining damages are possible, such as having to divide the profits from infringement.
See infra note 402.
399 See supra Part VI.B.2.
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regime. 4°° In the context of our current, property-rule based, copyright regime
which hinders social and scientific progress, Jed Rubenfeld argues that copyright
should focus on "the prohibition of piracy, meaning an unauthorized duplication
(and sale) or another's work."40 1 Thus, a form of "liability" regime attains as long
as the work is not a simple duplication:
If the later work merely pirates the older work, it can be enjoined, and damages
can be awarded. If it is not a reproduction but a derivative work, neither an
injunction nor damages should be available. In such cases, however, the
copyright holder would not be left wholly without remedy. Instead, he would
have an action for profit allocation.40 2
Other scholars have similarly advocated a "compulsory licensing" mechanism
where patents could be infringed upon. Some couch this as an expansion of fair
use;403 others would like to see infringers pay a fee.404
One can easily extend the liability rule argument to other anticommons.
Imagine how different our urban landscape would be if those who wanted to
deploy exclusionary zoning could do so only at a steep price. Or how much new
technological innovation we would enjoy if we refused to give incumbent
broadcasters or wireless providers an absolute right to exclude new competitors.
400 See Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 398, at 749 ("Bargaining appears to have relatively
little importance in the context of industrial pollution because, as is often stated, victims of
pollution are unlikely to bargain with those responsible for it.").
401 Rubenfeld, supra note 76, at 48. Rubenfeld bases his ideas on the notion that copyright
must not squelch the "freedom of imagination" which can be expressed via derivative works.
See id
40 2 Id. at 55 (emphasis added; "profit allocation" emphasized in original). As Rubenfeld
notes, this framework does not track the Calabresi-Melamed definitions since derivative works
are immune from both injunctions and damages. See id. at 56. However, one can conceptualize
the profit allocation as a proxy for the damages that the state must determine under the liability
regime.
403 See O'Rourke, supra note 45, at 1249-50 ("The [fair use] defense would authorize
courts to weigh defined factors in deciding whether or not to excuse an infringement as fair.");
Okediji, supra note 87, at 182 ("A fair use doctrine that considers the nature of the
technological medium and that accounts for the value of the alleged infringer's use of the work
offers the prospect of successful, if difficult, mediation of these interests in cyberspace."). Cf.
Zaret, supra note 86, at 26-27 (suggesting that there needs to be less restrictive enforcement by
copyright owners, and that part of the success to uphold greater copyright restrictions in the
courts has been by carefully selecting defendants who are clearly hackers or pirates rather than
more traditional users who legitimately benefit from fair use allowances).
404 See, e.g., Ayres & Talley, supra note 393, at 1093 ("Such a system would ... take the
form of a 'compulsory licensing' scheme, giving the improver an option to infringe the
pioneer's patent in exchange for a fee determined by a licensing tribunal.").
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C. Process Checks
1. Judicial Review
One of course hopes that legislators and regulators, held to a standard that
finds the anticommons unacceptable, would deploy these reconceptualized
substantive doctrines to curb givings. But courts have an important role to play if
the elected branches do not. As Charles Haar points out in his study of the impact
of suburbanization on the American landscape:
The proposition I advance here is that courts are obliged to intervene--to
undertake the coercive reordering of major social institutions-when a wrongful
social practice either impairs a group's ability to participate in the political
process or when another branch of government is systematically delinquent in
carrying out the mandates of the constitution. 405
Two well-known cases from environmental and local government law serve to
illustrate the point. In Seattle Audubon Society v. Evans,406 when Federal District
Court Judge William Dwyer issued an injunction against timber sales from old
growth forests,407 he was careful to note that the "problem here has not been any
shortcoming in the laws, but simply a refusal of administrative agencies to
comply with them.... This invokes a public interest of the highest order: the
interest in having government officials act in accordance with law."408
In Mt. Laurel I, when invalidating a zoning allowing only single family
detached dwellings, 409 Justice Hall observed that land use regulations "cannot
foreclose the opportunity of the classes of people mentioned for low and
moderate income housing and in its regulations must affirmatively afford that
opportunity, at least to the extent of the municipality's fair share of the present
and prospective regional need therefor."'410
405 HAAR, supra note 97, at 184; see also id. at xiv ("[A]t the present juncture of class and
race relations in the United States, an aggressive posture on the part of the third branch of
government is indispensable to the achievement of economic and social equality.").
406 771 F. Supp. 1081 (W.D. Wash. 1991).
407 See id. at 1093 ("The logging of 66,000 acres of owl habitat, in the absence of a
conservation plan, would itself constitute a form of irreparable harm. Old growth forests are lost
for generations. No amount of money can replace the environmental loss.").
408 Id. at 1096.
409 See supra note 99.
410 S. Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel, 336 A.2d 713, 724 (N.J.
1975). For a discussion of the successes of the Mt. Laurel doctrine, see HAAR, supra note 97, at
190. Haar even suggests that the Mount Laurel doctrine could:
[E]xtend to other issues of metropoliswide concern, such as air pollution, the location of
waste treatment plants, or the building of hospitals, sewer systems, or other major facilities.
1116 [Vol. 64:1041
REGULATORY GIVINGS AND THE ANTICOMMONS
Courts thus can "operate as a safety valve when the rest of the governmental
system is clogged."411 In particular, heightened judicial scrutiny of legislative
delegation to private interests412 would focus the debate on uncovering the
existence of a giving.
To be sure, judicial review is not a panacea. There will still be collective
action problems:
[W]here the impact of a decision is widely diffused so that no single individual is
harmed sufficiently to have an incentive to undertake litigation, and where high
transaction costs and the collective nature of the benefit sought preclude a joint
litigating effort, even though the aggregate stake of the affected individuals
would justify it.4 13
Perhaps expanding, rather than limiting, citizen-suit provisions such as those in
the Clean Air Act414 could begin to address this issue.
Another criticism is that judicial remedies are often messy,415 and courts
should not pretend they are legislatures. Procedurally, greater use of special
Taking their cue from the courts, public interest groups and developers could now react
less deferentially to the historically presumptive authority of localities to formulate policies
with an eye only to local welfare.
Id. at 194.
411 HAAR, supra note 97, at 179.
412 See, e.g., FARBER& FRiCKEY, supra note 112, at 133-36.
413 Stewart, supra note 165, at 1763.
414 See, e.g., Torres, supra note 343, at 559. Torres notes:
The effects of trading schemes compound the injury that results from a limitation of
the citizen suit provisions. Under the emissions trading program a utility can legally emit
as much pollution as it wants (consistent with other requirements of the Act) as long as it
buys enough allowances to guarantee its pollution entitlements. This effectively deprives
citizens of their ability to enjoin such excessive pollution via the enforcement action, and
fails to compensate them for this divestiture of their property right in the nuisance action
that was functionally replaced by the citizen's suit provision. Thus, the current emissions
trading program effectively transfers the citizen's entitlement to the utility owners, who in
turn trade these entitlements for cash and realize significant financial benefits.
Id.
415 S. Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel, 456 A.2d 390 (N.J.
1983) (Mt. Laurel I1) is an example. During the course of a 216-page opinion, the court
appointed a panel of three judges to manage housing cases. See id. at 490-91. But again, what
other option was there to defend housing diversity? For a cynical view on the Mt. Laurel
litigation, see FISCHEL, supra note 126, at 320 ("If the wood fiber in all the books and papers
written about the original Mount Laurel decision were converted into construction materials, it
would conceivably amount to more low-income housing than was built as a result of the
decision."). Recall, of course, that Fischel supports privatization of zoning rights. See id. at xiii.
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masters and technical experts could make the judicial role more effective. 416 Far
more importantly, however, as in the case of Roe v. Wade4 17-arguably the most
famous "legislative-type" opinion-if, as a last resort, courts do not reach out to
protect individual rights, then who will?4 18
There are, of course, also weak court decisions that perpetuate the
anticommons. 4 19 But without allowing active judicial review, even courageous
judges like Hall and Dwyer would have no avenue to defend the public's rights.
In the end, judicial review can serve as a fundamentally counter-majoritarian
check on legislative and agency power. As Farber and Frickey point out:
"[d]emocracy cannot be equated with pure majority rule, because pure majority
rule is incoherent. Rather, a viable democracy requires that preferences be shaped
by public discourse and processed by political institutions so that meaningful
decisions can emerge." 420 Put more simply in the words of Justice Wilentz in
Mount Laurel II, judges "may not build houses, but we do enforce the
Constitution."421
2. The Public/Private Distinction and Pusblic Oversight
While courts can help fight the anticommons, a stronger weapon is greater
civic participation and input. Richard Stewart even suggests a rethinking of
democracy as the only solution to curing the ills of administrative law:
The only conceivable way out of the labyrinth would seem to be a new and
comprehensive theory of government and law that would successfully reconcile
our traditional ideals of formal justice, individual autonomy, and responsible
mechanisms for collective choice, with the contemporary realities of
decentralized, uncoordinated, discretionary exercises of governmental authority
and substantial disparities in the cohesiveness and political power of private
interests.4 22
416 See, e.g., HAAR, supra note 97, at 138.
417 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
418 See also HAAR, supra note 97, at 137 ("To claim that constitutional rights must be the
prisoners of procedural technology fashioned for other forms of litigation is a form of willful
ignorance.").
419 See, e.g., Poletown Neighborhood Council, supra notes 183-84; State Street Bank &
Trust v. Signature Financial Group, supra note 75.
420 FARBER & FRICKEY, supra note 112, at 61-62.
421 S. Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel, 456 A.2d 390,490 (N.J.
1983).
422 Stewart, supra note 165, at 1807. Morris Cohen also argues:
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While this might be an ideal to aspire to, our current bureaucracies are unlikely to
be replaced by a participative democracy overnight. We must first take steps to
understand the reasons why the polity often disengages from issues of public
policy.
Perhaps the greatest obstacle to achieving public participation is the
stubbornness of the public/private distinction. Grossly oversimplified, the idea is
that citizens should concern themselves with their private lives and businesses,
and-except perhaps for voting every few years423-not participate in public life.
Rooted in a nineteenth century ideal of separating public and private law,424 it
symbolizes the "inherent conflict between individualism and collective control
that informs the liberal perspective ....425
The public/private distinction has historically been used to justify very bad
policy. The Civil Rights Cases4 26 struck down a Reconstruction-era statute
barring discrimination on the theory that:
It would be running the slavery argument into the ground to make it apply to
every act of discrimination which a person may see fit to make as to the guests
he will entertain, or as to the people he will take into his coach or cab or car, or
To the profounder question as to what goods are ultimately worthwhile producing from the
point of view of the social effects on the producers and consumers almost no attention is
paid. Yet surely this is a matter which requires the guidance of collective wisdom, not to
be left to chance or anarchy.
Cohen, supra note 83, at 30. See also Gerald E. Frug, The City as Legal Concept, 93 HARV. L.
REv. 1057, 1129 (1980) ("Instead, our refusal is a political choice, a choice for organizing our
social life by means of technical hierarchy rather than democratic control.") [hereinafter Frug
City Article]. For a discussion of how legal doctrines perpetuate administrative bureaucracy, see
Gerald E. Frug, The Ideology of Bureaucracy in American Law, 97 HARv. L. REV. 1276 (1984).
423 Which many do not even do.
424 See, e.g., Morton J. Horwitz, The History of the Public/Private Distinction, 130 U. PA.
L. REv. 1423, 1424 (1982). Horwitz writes:
[O]nly in the nineteenth century was the public/private distinction brought to the center of
the stage in American legal and political theory .... One of the central goals of nineteenth
century legal thought was to create a clear separation between constitutional, criminal, and
regulatory law-public law-and the law of private transactions--torts, contracts,
property, and commercial law.
Id.
425 Karl E. Klare, The Public/Private Distinction in Labor Law, 130 U. PA. L. REv. 1358,
1422 (1982).
426 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
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admit to his concert or theatre, or deal with in other matters of intercourse or
business. 427
Lochner struck down a state labor law on the theory that the "statute necessarily
interferes with the right of contract between the employer and employ6s,
concerning the number of hours in which the latter may labor in the bakery of the
employer."428 Gerald Frug has even explored the public/private distinction as a
principal culprit behind the powerlessness of cities.429
Despite its instrumental use, the public/private distinction cannot withstand
critical scrutiny. Early twentieth-century legal realists were the first to point out
that the very concept of private property is only meaningful in relation to public
enforcement of rights. 430 Today, it is hard to find a private function that does not
have a public counterpart, and vice-versa.431 Comparing Bowers v. Hardwick432
to United States Dept. of Transp. v. Paralyzed Veterans of America,433 Alan
Freeman and Elizabeth Mensch have aptly noted, "that which seems at the
experiential level most private-sex-is declared public, while that which seems
427 Id. at 24-25. Justice Harlan, in dissent, rightfully asks whether "the management of
places of public amusement is a purely private matter, with which government has no rightful
concern." Id. at 42 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
428 Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 53 (1905). In dissent, (the second) Justice Harlan
argued: "I take it to be firmly established that what is called the liberty of contract may, within
certain limits, be subjected to regulations designed and calculated to promote the general
welfare or to guard the public health." Id. at 67 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
429 Frug City Article, supra note 422, at 1099-1120.
430 See, e.g., Cohen, supra note 83, at 21 ("To be really effective, therefore, the right of
property must be supported by restrictions or positive duties on the part of owners, enforced by
the state as much as the right to exclude others which is the essence of property.").
431 For example, the provision of traditional public services have often become
privatized-security guards, utilities, letter couriers, jails, and the like. Charles Haar points out
the functional equivalence of private and public land use restrictions. See HAAR, supra note 97,
at 201. Gerald Frog has argued the futility of attaching the labels of public and private to
corporate property. Frug City Article, supra note 422, at 1130. Frug points out:
[I]f corporate assets are not the shareholders' private property, they are certainly not the
property of corporate executives or directors. Since no human owner can be found, the
corporation itself seems the only possible candidate to be the owner of corporate property.
And if that is true, all corporations, including "public" corporations [such as cities], can be
seen as owners of private property.
Id.
432 478 U.S. 186 (1986) overruled by Lawrence v. Texas, 123 S. Ct. 2472, 2484 (2003).
In Bowers, the Supreme Court had ruled that the state of Georgia could crininalize consensual
sodomy.
433 477 U.S. 597 (1986). Here the Supreme Court decided that airlines do not need to
comply with the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, applicable to recipients of federal financial
assistance, despite federal subsidies to the air traffic control system.
1120 [Vol. 64:1041
REGULATORY GIVINGS AND THE ANTICOMMONS
most public-air traffic-is declared private. '434 Gerald Frug has noted the
particular problems of relying on the public/private distinction in administrative
law where agencies "represented the merging of concepts of public and private
into the idea of expertise."435 Duncan Kennedy laments that "one simply loses
one's ability to take the public/private distinction seriously as a description, as an
explanation, or as a justification of anything."436
Directly relevant to government largesse, Alan Freeman and Elizabeth
Mensch have observed that:
The legal literature is flled ... with theoretical invocations of public welfare,
used to justify ... what are merely hierarchical property relations.
... Conventional free-market ideology extols the virtues of private capital
accumulation, entrepreneurial skill, and the harsh reality of risk. Yet tax breaks
are granted to entice industries to invest or remain in localities. Cities compete
for the opportunity to sprovide sports teams with ever more luxurious stadiums.
Huge companies get government help when they face financial ruin. Private
companies rarely turn down the opportunity to feed greedily at the public
trough. 437
Note how seriously the public/private distinction is harnessed to defend freedom
of contract, and how it magically disappears in the context of regulatory givings.
Once this legal sleight of hand is recognized, new mechanisms to forestall the
anticommons emerge.4 38
434 Alan Freeman & Elizabeth Mensch, The Public-Private Distinction in American Law
and Life, 36 BUFF. L. REv. 237, 250 (1987). But see Robert H. Mnookin, The Public/Private
Dichotomy: Political Disagreement and Academic Repudiation, 130 U. PA. L. REv. 1429, 1440
(1982) ("Is your rejection total, or is your disagreement really limited to the attempts to
characterize economic activities as private? Are you really closet liberals when the
public/private dichotomy is used to defend autonomy in the sexual realm?").
435 Frug City Article, supra note 422, at 1138-39.
436 Duncan Kennedy, The Stages of Decline of the Public/Private Distinction, 130 U. PA.
L. REv. 1349, 1357 (1982); see also Freeman & Mensch, supra note 434, at 248 ("It [the
public-private distinction] can easily be turned inside out precisely because it has no logical
content at all."); Henry J. Friendly, The Public-Private Penumbra-Fourteen Years Later, 130
U. PA. L. REv. 1289, 1291 (1982) ("If we now know more about the location of the border
between public and private action, this is rather because the [U.S. Supreme] Court has pricked
out more reference points than because it has elaborated any satisfying theory.").
437 Freeman & Mensch, supra note 434, at 248-49.
438 Cf id. at 238 ("Once the public-private split is recognized to be merely an artificial
construct, new possibilities for human contact are born.").
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Publicizing government misbehavior439 and greater public participation in
agency decision-making via notice and comment rulemaking 440 seem simple first
steps. More direct participation, such as the public's monitoring of agencies,
much like shareholders monitor corporations, is a possibility.441 Some
commentators have proposed experimenting with the election of administrative
agency members.442 Others point to contexts where majorities should govern." 3
Some scholars even go so far as to suggest transferring a few profit-making
businesses to government control. 444 Whether we want to adopt any of these
solutions should be hotly debated, but the more important point is to have the
civic debate.
The overarching challenge will be to find ways to motivate the public to
participate in civic life. Mancur Olson's work on group behavior warns us that
"[o]nly when groups are small, or when they are fortunate enough to have an
439 See, e.g., Levinson, supra note 388, at 419 (arguing that bad publicity will affect
governments who react to political, not financial, motives).
440 See, e.g., Krent & Zeppos, supra note 89, at 1771-72.
441 See id. at 1770. Krent and Zeppos note:
[R]evamping agency disposition practices is critical. Ideally, a monitoring scheme could
mimic the market oversight mechanism of shareholders so as to prevent wasteful
management and the siphoning off of revenue to particular interest groups. Agency
managers would face the wrath of shareholders (or some type of analogue) for every
botched deal or disclosed subsidy.
Id. Krent and Zeppos also propose greater agency oversight from Congress and the Office of
Management and Budget (OMB). See id. at 1771.
442 See, e.g., Stewart, supra note 165, at 1790. Stewart also outlines how agency members
could be appointed by private organizations. See id. The latter, however, would be particularly
susceptible to the dangers of interest group representation, which Stewart himself
acknowledges. See id. at 1801 (arguing that "obvious" dangers include "heightened conflict
over policy choices leading to domination or deadlock; the fragmenting of governmental
authority and responsibility; the impairment of administrative efficiency and impartiality; the
erosion of govemment's ability to leady and innovate").
443 See, e.g., Dagan & Heller, supra note 45, at 595.
444 For example, to combat city powerlessness, Gerald Frug suggests "transferring a
portion of the banking and insurance industries to city control." Frug City Article, supra note
422, at 1128. For instance, there is evidence to suggest that competition from municipal cable
companies leads private cable franchisees to lower their prices significantly. See FED.
COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION, IMPLEMENTATION OF SECTION 3 OF THE CABLE TELEvIsIoN
CONSUMER PROTECTION AND COMPETITION ACT OF 1992, STATISTICAL REPORT ON AVERAGE
RATES FOR BASIC SERVICE, CABLE PROGRAMMING SERVICE, AND EQUIPMENT, FCC Doc. No.
02-107, MM Docket No. 92-266, at 37 (Apr. 4, 2002) (report on cable industry prices). Note
also that during the California electricity debacle Los Angeles County, which has a municipal
electricity provider, was one of the few areas unaffected by price gouging. See, e.g., Janet
Wilson, Potential Cost of Utility Sparks Dispute in Irvine, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 14, 2003, at B3;
Tina Borgatta, After Energy Jolt, Cities Think Small, L.A. TIMES, May 26, 2002, at B 1.
1122 [Vol. 64:1041
REGULA TORY GIVINGS AND THE ANTICOMMONS
independent source of selective incentives, will they organize or act to achieve
their objectives."445 As a consequence, the "multitude of workers, consumers,
white-collar workers, farmers, and so on are organized only in special
circumstances, but business interests are organized as a general rule."446
Can we create small groups, or "selective incentives"? Richard Revesz has
argued, for example, that having state and local regulation of the environment
may be preferable from a public choice point of view since it allows smaller
groups of citizens to operate at a grassroots level.447 Is it too far-fetched, for
instance, to contemplate offering tax incentives to citizens who fulfill greater civic
obligations?
VII. CONCLUSION
Those who believe in economic competition and social diversity should
occasionally be shocked by what the legal system permits: destruction of the
natural environment, squelching of competition, and a civic life too often
characterized by "alienation and anomie."448 Perhaps we have allowed this to
happen precisely because we do not yet fully understand the underlying
mechanisms. This Article has attempted a first step in that direction.
When government bestows its largesse on a small number of economic or
social actors-be they logging companies, license holders, or suburbanites-it
unwittingly creates a right for these recipients to exclude the rest of us even
though no property has changed hands. National forests are destroyed as logging
companies enjoy below market stumpage fees. Innovative wireless technologies
are stalled in favor of incumbents' running infomercials. The urban core
degenerates thanks to subsidized suburban sprawl. In each case, regulatory
givings create an anticommons.
Once identified, using conventional tools to analyze and address the problem
is often unproductive. Public choice theories are incomplete, and critiquing the
so-called "public interest" doctrine provides limited analytic insight. Emphasis on
"public" and "private" polarities, to which the overwhelming majority of
commentary is devoted, is unsatisfying. Privatization ignores transaction costs,
fairness, and human behavior. The commons is prematurely utopian. More
importantly, these proposals are so philosophically different, that the current
debate offers little hope for shared ground.
445 OLSON, supra note 118, at 167. "Selective incentives" can be thought of as by-
products of a group's main purpose, such as professional organizations offering insurance and
technical publications to their members. See id. at 132-39; see also supra notes 118-20.
446 OLSON, supra note 118, at 143.
447 See Richard L. Revesz, Federalism and Environmental Regulation: A Public Choice
Analysis, 115 HARv. L. REv. 553 (2001).
448 JACKSON, supra note 3, at 272.
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Even though the problems are difficult,449 they are not intractable. Provided
we are willing to refocus the debate, there are ways to regulate without giving the
public's house away. We can set real consumer welfare as a goal, modernize the
public trust doctrine, and experiment with liability rules. We can fight for greater
judicial oversight and redefine the artificial barriers that separate private from
public participation. But little is possible if we are not able to recognize the
problem. If this Article can at least make commentators and regulators pose
themselves two questions before a proposing a regulation--(i) is this a giving? (ii)
does it create an anticommons?-then it will have accomplished its goal. If it can
refocus the debate toward realistic solutions, even better.
449 As Richard Stewart points out, "[b]ecause it is so directly concerned with reconciling
government power and private interests, administrative law is peculiarly vulnerable to the
intellectual and social pressures resulting from the juxtaposition of frayed ideals and current
realities." Stewart, supra note 165, at 1813.
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